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Abstract
This thesis investigates the concept of ‘race’ and its place within the discourse of
‘official multiculturalism’ in the Canadian context. More specifically, I explore the ways
that ‘race’ has been coded in the popular media in my examination o f selected articles
from the Toronto S ta r’s coverage of: Philippe Rushton, human genome research, and
racial profiling practiced by the Toronto Police Service. Through a textual analysis that
combines the insights o f Barthes’(1972) notion of myth as well as tools derived from
critical discourse analysis, this research reveals that a conservative racialized discourse
lies beneath The S ta r’s seemingly critical stance on issues o f racism. Indeed, although
The Star appears, ostensibly, to be critical o f racism it, nonetheless, maintains and
perpetuates dominant perceptions of ‘race’ as both an objective genetic entity and a
permanent category that exists in culture.
Despite my findings and the fact that most progressive social scientists refrain
from employing the construct of ‘race’ as a determinant o f specific social phenomena,
discussions o f ‘race’ - as a fixed analytical and descriptive category - continue to
dominate popular and media discourses. Such rigid characterizations are also prevalent in
the official narratives o f Canadian multiculturalism that attempt to define and categorize
citizens into clearly delineable groupings under the rubric o f ‘difference’. This notion of
‘difference’, couched in the broader ‘liberal’ discourse o f tolerance and diversity,
however, continues to reinscribe ‘race’ as a fixed cultural category. Moreover, such
formulations tend to contain the vestiges of colonialist legacies.
In order to dismantle the ‘strange fruits’ that ‘racisms’ bear within today’s
multicultural society, one must first understand, and then demystify the common myth
about ‘race’ as a social and historical construct imbedded in the colonialist ideologies of
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imperial domination as they are imbricated in the policies and practices o f ‘official
multiculturalism’ in Canada. This undertaking must be premised on the notion that the
modem concept o f ‘race’ comes out of the existence o f racism and not vice versa.
Indeed, the popular concept of ‘race’ must be reconsidered if any meaningful anti-racist
discourse is to be articulated and put into the broader aims o f social justice.
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1

I.

IN THE BEGINNING

STRANGE FRUIT - A Naturalized, Normalizing Discourse
Southern trees bear strange fruit,
Blood on the leaves and blood at the root,
Black bodies swinging in the southern breeze,
Strange fruit hanging from the poplar trees.
Pastoral scene o f the gallant south,
The bulging eyes and the twisted mouth.
Scent o f magnolias, sweet and fresh,
Then the sudden smell o f burning flesh.
Here, is fru it for the crows to pluck,
For the rain to gather, fo r the wind to suck,
For the sun to rot, fo r the trees to drop.
Here is a strange and bitter crop.
(Abel M eeropol A K A Lewis Allen 1939)

Inspired by the overt racism entrenched in the culture o f the ‘deep south’ (USA), a
young patron o f Harlem’s trendy Cafe Society wrote a haunting poem on lynching as a
represented manifestation o f American social injustice in hopes that it would be
performed by Billie Holliday. Little did he know the impact that his poem would have on
the world of jazz, blues, popular culture, and - for the purposes o f this thesis - a critical
theory about ‘race’ and its relation to multicultural society. Although composed to
articulate the racism of a seemingly bygone era, its spectre still haunts new articulations
o f the ‘racisms’1 that plaque society today.

1 1 Borrowing from Antonia Darder and Rudolfo Torres (2004), I ocasionally refer to racism in the plural.
‘Racisms’, as opposed to racism, is conceptualized “within the context o f demographic shifts, changing
capitalist class relations, and global socioeconom ic dislocations” (Darder & Torres, 2004, p. 3). This
pluralized conceptualization o f ‘racisms’ is better suited than its singularized counterpart for theorizing
about the premise that ‘race’ is not a fixed entity. In light o f this fact ‘race’ w ill be frequently typed in
quotation to draw attention to its arbitrary quality. Attempts to fix ‘race’ in science, religion, culture etc.,
has resulted in a popularized concept o f racism that has been antiquated amidst the changing order o f
various social phenomena both locally and globally. In contrast, ‘Racism s’ serve to encompass change
w hile preventing static understandings o f racialized oppressions from being relegated to the dustbins o f a
colonial and separatist past. A s a result, ‘racism s’ can be seen to take many forms in society today that not
only accounts for individual acts but also systemic forms o f oppression.
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As today’s society becomes increasingly diverse, it may seem absurd at first
glance, to level the accusation that these ‘strange fruits’ still continue to grow. Certainly,
lynching does not occur in a ‘liberal’ and arguably progressive place like Canada. What,
then, of these ‘strange fruit’? And how are they relevant to the study o f ‘race’ and
‘racisms’ in today’s multicultural society? In order to address this accusation, one must
first take a critical look at the discourse that lines the narrative o f this poem ’s verses.
The pastoral imagery o f this poem displays a paradox o f values in a society where
identity is constructed between the narratives of a performative dialectic - a dialect
performed between the voice o f ‘se lf and ‘other’; ‘us’ and ‘them ’; ‘Western (European)
Occidental white’ and ‘Non-Western (non- European) Oriental people o f colour’.
Identities o f ‘se lf and ‘other’ are constructed amidst this play o f difference. A
relationship of power is formed in the hierarchical categorization o f this difference that
interpolates the former in a position o f dominance over the subjugated latter. Following
in the deep rooted ideologies o f colonial ‘racisms’ that plague contemporary social
relations, a crisis o f identity occurs in the location of ‘se lf through the displacement of
‘other’ (Bannerji, 2000; Darder & Torres, 2004; Eze, 2001; Hardt & Negri, 2000; Razack,
2004; Said, 1978, 1993; San Juan Jr., 2002; Walcott, 2003).
In this instance, ‘s e lf comes into existence through the violence perpetuated on
the populations o f ‘other’ as a sure way o f demarcating difference. It is assumed then,
that in order for ‘s e lf to exist, populations o f ‘other’ that exist within the national
landscape must be categorized and strictly policed (Clarke, 1993; Razack, 2004; Said,
1978, 1993; Walcott, 2003). By policing ‘other’, especially through violence, order in
2 Throughout this thesis, I w ill often refer to ‘Western’ - not narrowly defined as a cultural singularity but as a hybrid and heterogeneous Empire derived from dominant/ ruling classes o f imperialist European
values.
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society is established as natural. Indeed this is made explicit by virtue o f the ‘strange
fruit’ (i.e. the dangling black bodies amidst the sweet fragrance o f magnolias). The
imagery depicts a seemingly natural occurring phenomena (the growth o f dangling black
bodies on the southern trees) hitherto unquestioned, and taken for granted as an
ornamental part o f the common landscape. Difference becomes fixed as lifeless; open to
the gaze and consumption o f the dominant, conquering, colonizing status quo.
In her book, Regarding the Pain o f Others, Susan Sontag (2003) illustrates the
seemingly natural qualities o f this discourse by describing how the ‘pain of others’ is
viewed or ‘examined’3 through the privileged lens o f the ‘s e lf. Referring to the
photographs taken o f ‘black victims of lynching’, and the subsequent spectacle that
ensued after its publication in book format, Sontag (2003) critically explores the act of
indulging in these representations to help the viewer/examiner understand the acts
depicted “not as the acts o f ‘barbarians’ but as the reflection o f a belief system, racism,
that by defining one people as less human than another legitimates torture and murder”
(p. 92). Racism, in this sense, is not a simple act o f deviance or isolated practices.
Indeed, racism exists as a functional part o f everyday society. This is the result of what
Foucault (2003) refers to when he claims that ‘biopower’ becomes celebrated within the
‘mechanisms of the State’.

BIOPOWER - Life & Death; The Struggle to Survive
According to Michel Foucault (2003), modem racism - practiced through the State takes the form o f what he calls ‘biopower’. For Foucault, ‘biopower’ - as a basic

3 For Susan Sontag (2003), the significance o f the term ‘exam ine’ is given a sense o f agency on the part o f
the viewer to ‘clinically’ or perhaps critically indulge in as opposed to sim ply ‘look at’ the images depicted.
This is an attempt to resolve any feelings o f guilt or voyeuristic pleasure from inadvertently part-taking,
second-hand, in the atrocities and suffering o f ‘others’ as they were depicted (p. 92).
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mechanism of power - essentially forms a break in the biological continuum, creating the
existence of separate ‘races’ from one; the human ‘race’. In the process of distinguishing
differences between separate ‘races’, a hierarchy among them is formed determined by
imagined qualities o f superiority and inferiority. By fragmenting an otherwise unified
biological domain into separate ‘races’, power becomes distributed unevenly throughout.
Because of this, racism is seen to have two functions.
First, racism functions to fragment society in the interests o f maintaining an
unequal distribution o f power among populations. Second, as a result o f ‘biopower’,
racism functions to purify those considered to be members o f superior ‘races’ - as an act
of survival - by annihilating those whom it considers to be members o f inferior ‘races’.
Like the images in Strange Fruit, difference must be separated, managed, and controlled
through the practice o f ‘biopower’ in the interests o f maintaining the existence of an
imagined ‘superior race’. In the process, subjugated ‘races’ become isolated from the
state mechanisms that define and exhibit power over them, causing a type of civic death
deemed necessary to preserve the civic life o f the ‘superior races’. Bridging the gap
between the violent effects o f yesterday’s racism - as seen through lynching - to the more
contemporary forms o f racism - like ‘official multiculturalism’ and racial profiling Foucault (2003) is worth quoting at length here:
In a normalizing society, race or racism is the precondition that makes
killing acceptable. When you have a normalizing society, you have a
power which is, at least superficially, in the first instance, or in the first
line a biopower, and racism is the indispensable precondition that allows
someone to be killed, that allows others to be killed. Once the State
functions in the biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murderous
function o f the State.. .If the power o f normalization wished to exercise the
old sovereign right to kill, it must become racist. And if, conversely, a
power of sovereignty, or in other words, a power that has the right of life
and death, wishes to work with the instruments, mechanisms, and
technology o f normalization, it too must become racist, (p. 256)
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The above passage can be interpreted to explicitly explain the way racism works
through ‘biopower’ - the power over life and death - in a naturalized environment like
the one described in Strange Fruit. It can also be interpreted to implicitly explain the
ways in which ‘racisms’ continues to work through ‘biopower’ today - without the overt
violence of lynching - through the State mechanisms o f ‘official multiculturalism’ and
racial profiling. This can be seen when Foucault (2003) goes on to explain that the
meanings behind killing and murder, as justifiable actions within a ‘normalizing society’,
can be taken both literally and figuratively. Life and death are qualities o f ‘biopower’
that are no longer considered absolute; they become notions relative to the imagined
boundaries created in discourse.
When I say “killing,” I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but
also every form of indirect murder: the fact o f exposing someone to death,
increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political
death, expulsion, rejection and so o n .. .And we can also understand why
racism should have developed in modem societies that function in the
biopower m ode.. .Racism first develops with colonization, or in other
words with colonizing genocide. (Foucault, 2003, pp. 256-257)
The above passages clarify the functions o f racism - rooted in colonialism - that
essentially works through ‘biopower’ in a normalizing capacity, exercising control over
life and death among populations. This normalizing capacity creates the existence o f a
social order that is made to look natural. Through naturalization o f this social order, the
gaps o f inequality and injustice become obscured. As a result, when further applied to the
poem Strange Fruit, the ‘strange fruit’ - as physical manifestations o f the function of
racism (‘race’) - are tolerated as objectified parts o f the social landscape. This is a
reminder, albeit extreme, as to how this society is at the same time tolerant and intolerant
o f difference in the spectacle o f identity construction. If we deconstruct this narrative

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

further, it becomes evident that the Southern trees (racism) bear ‘strange fruit’ (historical
and material effects o f its harmful discourse through ‘race’) that marks the imagined
identity of the colonized world.
Strange Fruit happens to be the title o f this thesis for what I believe to be very
current and salient reasons. I use this title because I plan to illustrate that the ‘tree’ of
racism continues to bear ‘strange fruit’ o f injustice and oppression despite the fact that
overt and physical manifestations like lynching in a presumably ‘liberal’ society such as
Canada, are now rare. Even though the violence o f overt forms o f racisms are rare today,
more sophisticated and subtle acts o f violence have evolved through ‘biopower’ to
effectively control life and death, symbolically, in the realms o f social and political
struggle. Indeed, as an historical phenomenon, vestiges o f the past continue to linger and
inform the present. In order to understand this point better, a critical perspective on the
conception o f time must be elucidated.

TIME AFTER TIME - That was then. This is now.
Time is not necessarily linear and intermittent nor is it essentially classified by
increments defined in space and cultural achievement that carry clear demarcations in
history. How we interpret our existence by virtue o f its temporality is largely a cultural
undertaking. Referring to T.S. Eliot’s central premise on the relationship between past,
present, and future, Edward Said (1993) states that “how we formulate or represent the
past shapes our understanding and view o f the present” (p. 4). Under this conception of
time, past and present are overlapping qualities. There is a large degree o f the past in the
present. Because of this, the legacy o f colonialism persists today through the totalizing
ideological tenets o f imperialism.
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Edward Said (1993), in his book Culture and Imperialism, picks up where
Orientalism leaves off in its central question as to whether or not modem imperialism has
ended with colonialism. In this book Said (1993) articulates clear definitions of
colonialism and imperialism as historical agents o f domination that I find applicable in
discussing the management o f difference today. According to Said (1993), “imperialism
means the practice, the theory, and the attitudes o f a dominating metropolitan centre
ruling a distant territory; colonialism, which is almost always a consequence o f
imperialism, is the implanting of settlements on a distant territory” (p. 9). However
narrowly defined on one level, these notions imply a spatial metaphor grounded in the
acquisition o f foreign territory - foreign in respect to the positioning the imperial centre
in relation to the conquered periphery. By virtue o f this understanding, colonialism as a
consequence o f imperialism - where settlements are erected in geographical space - is
not as common today. The colonialism o f the past, however, has now been transformed
into a neo-colonialism o f the present - where settlements are erected in social, cultural,
political and economic spaces - continuing an imperial legacy o f domination and
oppression.
Applying contemporary notions o f imperialism and colonialism to more current
issues regarding the management o f diversity, it becomes evident that imperialism and
colonialism can imply more than mere accumulation and control o f geographical space.
Indeed, these terms can be interpreted to represent the accumulation and control of
cultures. For example, the centre/ periphery metaphor still holds true under the
‘impressive ideological formations’4, which have become institutionalized in state policy

4 By using the phrase “im pressive ideological formations”, Edward Said (1993, p. 9) refers to the
structures and or mechanisms that support and drive imperialism and colonialism beyond the acts o f
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and public discourse, through the fixing and ordering o f differences in the public sphere.
Imperialism still persists in relation to its political, economic, and social capacities to
subjugate marginalized groups o f diverse populations residing within the conquered
periphery. In sum, as the past and present are intimately related and overlapping, the
‘impressive ideological formations’ o f a colonial legacy are passed on from a colonial
history of imperialistic exploits that continue to manifest in current social circumstances.
Thomas Holt (2000) illustrates this phenomenon clearly by stating that “the tropes
of racism are fairly constant whereas the repertoire o f racist practices is all too mutable”
(p. 27). Within the context o f Strange Fruit, a history o f marked physical subjugations like lynching - are transformed into more subtle acts o f social and political
disenfranchisement as seen in today’s more polite, institutionalised ‘racisms’ that
systematically mark and segregate difference. This distinction is what Stuart Hall (1995)
refers to as ‘overt’ and ‘inferential’ racism. The latter form o f racism, constitutive of a
naturalized sate of mind, has become so ingrained in the every day functioning of society
that it often works to name and defeat the former type o f racism as deviant (Essed, 2002).
In so doing, it essentially masks and obscures its own racist actions. This latter racism is
what Paul Street (2002) refers to as ‘New Age Racism’. Although individual acts of overt
racism still exist, they have declined considerably as a result o f the growing strength of
‘New Age Racism’ (Street, 2002). In my opinion, therefore, the more subtle and arguably
more impressionable nuances o f institutional ‘racisms’ have become increasingly
deserving o f our attention within a purportedly tolerant and increasingly diverse society.

acquiring objects (land and people). For Said (1993) these structures and mechanisms “include notions that
certain territories and people require and beseech domination, as w ell as forms o f knowledge affiliated with
domination” (p. 9).
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In a 1992 essay titled “Public Enemies”, Austin Clarke poignantly outlines this
concern by stating the importance o f analyzing the structure o f racism over individual
acts. “I am not speaking about private, individual intercourse. I am speaking, rather,
about the entire system, that institutional structure o f unapproachable, unseen power”
(Clarke, 1992, p .l 1). While addressing the issues o f police violence against racialized
communities, Clarke goes beyond engaging in the discourse o f racism as merely isolated
and individual occurrences by placing the entire system o f racism under scrutiny. For
Clarke, although these individual acts deserve our serious attention, they should not
detract from or obscure our focus on the ‘institutional structure’ that lay beneath such
acts. This is precisely where he believes the true power o f racism resides.

THE STRUCTURE OF OPPRESSION - Behind ‘A Few Bad Apples’
Analyzing the structural dynamics o f racism, this thesis focuses on the
institutional forms that I believe to be more insidious than the overt acts of ‘a few bad
apples’5. I consider institutional racism to be more insidious precisely due to the fact that
it has become a naturalized and functioning part o f our current multicultural society.
Take for instance, the brutal torture and beating of a Somali youth by two members o f the
Canadian Peacekeeping forces during the UN intervention o f 1992. Sherene Razack

5 The term ‘a few bad apples’ refers to the overt, pathological, and more or less criminal actions o f
individuals - now considered deviant in today’s ‘liberal’ society - that champion the beliefs o f white
supremacy. It is worthy to note here that W indsor’s C hief o f Police, Glen Stannard, at an October 25th 2003
panel discussion on racial profiling put on by the Local 200 CAW , acknowledged that racism exists within
the police service, not in the capacity that the Windsor Police service is a racist organization or that
systemic racism exits within the institution per se but to the effect that there have been incidents caused by
‘a few bad apples’ that tamish the services reputation. C hief Stannard made it clear that these ‘bad apples’
have made community-oriented policing more difficult and wished to work with the community to put an
end to it. B y limiting the definition o f racism to the actions o f ‘a few bad apples’, the Windsor Police C hief
surreptitiously avoided the implications that his service may be involved in the practice o f racial profiling,
while discounting the existence o f broader systemic racisms as a pervasive part o f our everyday lives. This
makes the task o f ending institutional racisms all the more elusive when the structure o f every day racism,
that plague society, are stifled from the onset, preventing any meaningful discussion towards a solution.
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(2004) illustrates the fact that although these racist actions appear on the surface to be
exceptional with regards to Canada’s peacekeeping initiatives; they speak directly to the
hidden racisms that underlie Canada’s colonial legacy as bearing the ‘white man’s
burden’ o f executing the civilizing mission in the ‘darkest com ers’ o f the earth.
The fact that the two soldiers implicated in the beating death o f Shidane Arone the murdered Somali youth - were o f Aboriginal origin - also members o f an oppressed
class - increases the importance o f examining the incident as not wholly exceptional but
sutured deep within the everyday consciousness o f the troops deployed to bring peace to
an otherwise ‘savage and barbaric land’. According to Razack (2004 a), “to look for
exceptional and overtly racist acts was to miss the absolute ordinariness and
pervasiveness o f the racist attitudes and practices both in the military generally and
among the troops deployed in Somalia” (p. 126). Although the Canadian military did
have self-declared white supremacists among their ranks working in Somalia, few of
these individuals were directly implicated in the events that transpired. This is cmcial to
understanding a broader definition o f racism - as a structural belief system that signifies
the power relationship o f dominance and oppression based on phenotype or cultural
superiority - and the subsequent dehumanization o f the ‘other’ through the ideologies of
colonialism and imperialism6. To extend this definition o f racism, as a system of beliefs,
a bit further, without alienating or excluding the practices that follow from such beliefs,
racism can become broadly characterized as a way o f life.
Racism, as a way of life, is not exclusively owned by devout pathological
practitioners o f racial discrimination, nor should it be limited to a narrow definition that
6 Sherene Razack (2004) advocates the use o f a broad definition o f racism to imply colonialism and
imperialism. Borrowing from Said (1993), racism in this sense is “not simply the acquisition o f lands but
also the ‘impressive ideological formations’ that continue on into the present”. (Razack, 2004, p. 143)
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targets them exclusively. To solely focus on a narrow definition o f the term would
effectively sever the deeper historical hatreds and “the material and ideological systems”
that thrive on them (Razack, 2004, p. 135). Racism has a structure that is woven neatly
amidst the dominant ways o f viewing the world. Because o f this, ‘racisms’ are more
subtle and pervasive than commonly assumed. As a result they have become invisible,
existing ‘unseen’ as a part o f our everyday discourse (Clarke, 1992). Indeed, its effects
on society, therefore, are not necessarily immediately evident.
Racism, as a common part o f everyday life, can be seen as working like
microwave signals - invisible forces that can lead to critical illnesses having adverse
effects on the human body when subject to prolonged periods o f exposure. If we view
society like a human body and racism like microwave signals, racism can be imagined to
collect and fester within the social entity inevitably leading to social anomie, and
ultimately social death. If left unchecked for long periods o f time, racism can work like a
cancer causing agent, slowly eating away at the very fabric o f humanity that essentially
binds a healthy and socially just civilization. Examples o f how ‘racism s’ are currently
working this way are illustrated in the police narratives o f racial profiling that are
fertilized by the ‘liberal’ discourses o f tolerance and diversity which also form the
foundation of Canada’s notion o f ‘official multiculturalism’. Although the practice of
racial profiling and multiculturalism are not as overt as scenes o f lynching, ‘racisms’
continue to grow, masked beneath the seductive scent of ‘official multiculturalism’ that
continues to be mystified in the Canadian identity - ‘sweet and fresh’. They still produce
‘strange fruit’ as they are rooted in the soils of a racist colonial ideology.
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STATE RACISM - A Collective Cultural Concept
The discourse of race struggle ... will become the discourse o f power
itself. It will become the discourse o f a centred, centralized and
centralizing power. It will become the discourse o f a battle that has to be
waged not between races, but by a race that is portrayed as the one true
race, the race that holds the power and is entitled to define the norm, and
against those who deviate from that norm, against those who pose a threat
to the biological heritage. At this point, we have all those biological-racist
discourses o f degeneracy, but also all those institutions within the social
body which make the discourse o f race struggle function as a principle of
exclusion and segregation and, ultimately, as a way o f normalizing society
... At this p o in t... we see the appearance o f State racism: a racism that
society will direct against itself, against its own elements and its own
products. (Foucault, 2003, pp. 61-62)
‘Racisms’ - institutional and individual - are a common phenomenon within our
contemporary multicultural society. ‘Racisms’ in Canada are common due to the fact that
difference has been legitimated as a ‘natural factor’ in the production o f the national
imaginary7. This national imaginary appears to be altogether tolerant and inclusive of
difference, through various political and economic apparatuses (official multiculturalism,
affirmative action policies, and ‘liberal’ notions o f capitalism etc.), while simultaneously
retaining the colonial discourse of intolerance and exclusiveness (Hardt & Negri, 2000)
through the process o f ‘otherizing’ or ‘orientalizing’ difference (Said, 1978, 1993).
Bearing the ‘strange fruit’ o f injustice, this paradox indicates somewhat of a national
identity crisis - rooted in an older colonial ideology o f racism - that continues today
through a ‘liberal’ discourse o f tolerance and difference. This crisis o f identity has
created essentialized, fixed categories o f people, further perpetuating a hierarchy of
7 I use the adjective ‘imaginary’ to describe Canada as a national construct com posed in the imagination
o f its citizens. I have borrowed this term to reflect a ‘national imagination’, or as Himmani Bannerji (2000)
states (in the tradition o f Benedict Anderson, 1991) a ‘national imaginary’. Further reference to the use o f
this term can be found throughout her book The D ark Side o f the Nation. Canada’s ‘national imaginary’
can be found on page 65 in reference to a totality o f collective imaginations. Richard Day (1998) outlines
the mosaic metaphor, illustrating claims that Canadian identity is structured on a notion that Canadian
history is multicultural. To quote Day (1998), “although this claim is obviously absurd, that hasn’t
prevented it from being a nodal signifier in the official Canadian imaginary” (p. 42)
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difference structured in modem notions o f ‘race’ and culture8 (Bannerji, 2000;
Bissoondath, 2002; Walcott, 2003).
‘Race’ as a biological and discursive analytical concept has also been recently
subsumed by narrowly defined notions of culture (Darder & Torres, 2004; Hardt & Negri,
2000; Razack, 2004; San Juan Jr., 2002), that can be heard from both right-wing
conservative voices (D ’Souza, 1995) as well as those who speak from a more liberal
pluralist ideology (Taylor, 1994). In both cases ‘race’ and/or culture serve as
homogeneous fixtures that define, position, and manage populations in relational
difference to one another. In some cases, ‘race’ and culture are often used
interchangeably. This can be seen in the ways that cultural/ racial difference comes to
overshadow cultural/ racial similarities in conservative discourse.

A NEW RIGHT RATIONALIZATION - ‘Race’ and Cultural DNA
According to Dinesh D ’Souza (1995) people in general have more shared traits
than differences overall. Despite this admission, however, he also believes it to be foolish
to perceive these differences as insignificant. D ’Souza (1995) claims that such
8 Although I occasionally cite criticisms o f multiculturalism by including N eil Bissoondath, Himani
Bannerji, Rinaldo Walcott and E. San Juan Jr. in the same reference, it is important to make note o f the fact
that their criticisms o f multiculturalism come from opposing perspectives. Bissoondath’s criticism o f
multiculturalism com es from a more conservative perspective that can often be coupled with writers such as
Dinesh D ’Souza. A s a result, Bissoondath often appears to be hostile o f immigrants who resist
assimilation. For Bissoondath, the problem o f multiculturalism is a problem o f immigrants who refuse to
assimilate within a presumably superior Eurocentric way o f life. Contrary to Bissondath, however,
Bannerji and San Juan Jr. criticize multiculturalism with a more critical focus on the existence o f a
racialized political economy. From this perspective, the problem o f multiculturalism is not due to a lack o f
assimilation from immigrants but the systematic exclusion and marginalization o f divergent (immigrant)
voices from the shaping o f the political econom y towards the benefit o f all walks o f life within a given
citizenry. According to Bannerji and San Juan Jr., assimilation only serves to manage and police difference
under the ‘liberal’ rubric o f tolerance and diversity. Moreover, this perspective view s multiculturalism as a
form o f apartheid, segregating citizens rather than uniting them. Despite these contrasting perspectives,
there are som e points o f convergence that articulate ideas complimentary to their respective differences.
One such notion o f convergence can be seen in the ways that culture is view ed as a living thing that cannot
be static or absolute. As a result, differences between cultures cannot be fixed. M y intention behind citing
these authors together within the same reference was to highlight this particular example o f convergence
without im plying that they com e from the same perspective.
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differences, therefore, should not be overlooked. “Just as variation among individuals
explains why some individuals perform better than others, so variation between groups
could explain why some groups do better than others” (D ’Souza, 1995, p. 450). Indeed,
this statement addresses individual differences and group differences alike. The problem
exists, however, in the uncertain attributes that distinguish the individual from the group.
Although D ’Souza (1995) explores various theories on ‘race’ as naturally defined
by biological attributes - many o f which contradict each other - he does not clearly
define his position on how groups should be distinguished from each other. Instead, he
quietly escapes critically engaging the contradictory debate over biological determinism
by simply stating that groups do in fact exist naturally without explaining how or why.
Seeing that he cannot fix group differences to any one theory o f biological distinction,
D ’Souza (1995) insists on the salience o f cultural distinction by virtue o f socialization
and education as an - albeit tenuous - appendage to theories o f natural selection. Culture,
in this sense, becomes the ‘new biology’ as a matter o f expression.
Culture as the ‘new biology’ does not imply biology in the clinical or scientific
sense o f the word but can be seen in the ways that groups o f people are slotted into fixed
homogeneous imaginaries o f a new heredity, passed on from one generation to the next; a
“cultural DNA” o f sorts (D’Souza, 1995, p. 472). This ‘cultural DNA’ - evidence of
fixed group differences championed by the new polite racists (Van Dijk, 1998, 2000,
2001) - serves to explain the ‘pathologies’ and sociable deficiencies o f various cultural/
racial groupings in society (Podur, 2002). Furthering this perspective, Michael Hardt and
Antonio Negri (2000) state that “as a theory o f social difference, the cultural position is
no less ‘essentialist’ than the biological one, or at least it establishes an equally strong
theoretical ground for social separation and segregation” (p. 192). Accordingly, this
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‘cultural DNA’, used by D ’Souza (1995) and his neo-conservative epigones, has served to
simultaneously justify and deny racism based on the notion of “rational discrimination”
(p. 282).
‘Rational discrimination’ exists as a contradiction in terms whereby it has been
used to justify policies that boldly legitimate institutional racisms like racial profiling,
without actually admitting that there is such a thing as institutional racism. This is
illustrated in D ’Souza’s (1995) belief that institutional racism implicates everybody, in
some capacity, as being racist. D ’Souza’s (1995) faulty reasoning follows that “if
everyone is a racist, then no one is a racist” (p. 335). This statement cleverly uses circular
logic to mask oppression and promote “white complicity” (Razack, 2004a, p. 141) while
obfuscating the historical and material conditions that enable racisms to exist.

DERACINATING ‘RACE’ - Towards a Libratory Anti-Racism Discourse
I believe that in order to dismantle racism one must explore the power
relationships created by overt and individual racisms and their connection to the more
subtle nuances of institutional ‘racisms’. It is my contention that the modem concept of
‘race’ and its tenuous, albeit contemporary, connection to an erroneous perception of
culture - must first be dissected and ameliorated from the chains o f its objectified position
in society at large, before being eradicated altogether, if any meaningful anti-racist
discourse is to be articulated and put into practice in the interest o f broader social justice
aims. This undertaking must be premised on two levels.
First and foremost, the notion that the modem concept o f ‘race’ comes out o f the
existence of racism, and not vice versa (Darder & Torres, 2004) must be clearly
understood and accepted. And the reality of racism, in fact, has absolutely nothing to do
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with the existence o f distinct ‘races’. Second, a broader more transitional understanding
of culture must be liberated from this outdated notion o f ‘race’. In order to dismantle the
‘strange fruit’ that racisms bear within today’s multicultural society, one must first
understand and demystify the modem myth about ‘race’ as a social and historical
construct, imbedded in the colonialist ideologies of imperial domination, as they are
imbricated in the policies and practices o f ‘official multiculturalism’ in Canada.
This thesis investigates, in a preliminary way, the concept o f ‘race’ and its place
within the discourse of ‘official multiculturalism’ in the Canadian context. More
specifically, the ways that ‘race’ has been ‘coded’ and ‘represented’ in the popular media
through an examination o f selected articles from the Toronto S ta r’s coverage of: Philippe
Rushton, the genetic discoveries that disprove popular notions o f ‘race’, and its expose of
racial profiling practiced by the Toronto Police Service. Through a textual analysis that
combines the insights o f Barthes’ notion o f myth (Barthes, 1972; Gaines, 2001) using
tools derived from critical discourse analysis (Dellinger, 1995; Huckin, n.d.; van Dijk,
1998, 2001, 2002), this research reveals that a conservative racialized discourse lies
beneath The Star's seemingly critical stance on issues o f racism. Indeed, although the
Toronto S ta r’s coverage of aforementioned issues appears, ostensibly, to be critical of
racism it, nonetheless, maintains and perpetuates dominant perceptions o f ‘race’ as both
an arbitrary social construct and as a construct that exists in and through language
(Appiah, 1995; Hall, 1995; Pieterse, 1995).
Deconstructing the language o f ‘race’, using Barthes’ concept o f myth through
tools derived from critical discourse analysis (CDA), reveals the ways that ‘race’ has
become reified as an objective, biological, reality within a popular collective
consciousness. This is reflected in a common racial discourse practiced in the public
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sphere, represented in the media, and institutionalized through government policy. The
modem concept o f ‘race’, as a dominant cultural myth in contemporary Western society,
has been naturalized through ideology and de-contextualized from the material and
historical conditions o f its origin in the process. As a result, ‘race’ has come to exist as
both an imaginary social construct and as a constmct that has a real material and
historical impact on the populations that people are positioned by discourse as subjects
within a broader colonial ideology. This ideology works through myth, obscuring the
historical context o f ‘race’ by naturalizing a language about it. Hiding the real relations
o f power, a colonized discourse about ‘race’ essentially positions people as subjects,
within distinct populations, along lines o f dominance and subordination. This becomes
evident in the ways that difference is coded through racialized categories that have
become institutionalized through the policies and ordinary discourses o f a ‘multicultural’
society like Canada.
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II.

O ’ CANADA...OUR HOME ON NATIVE LAND?

A PARADOX OF BELONGING - The Construction of a Common Canadian
‘What does it mean to be Canadian? ’ It means being willing to circulate
indefinitely about an impossible object, thereby achieving the articulation
o f o n e ’s embodied subjectivity with the process o f rational-bureaucratic
domination, production and consumption that comprise a ‘Canadian ’ life.
(Day, 1998, p.42)
A common, everyday discourse on cultural diversity is matched by a parallel
policy on ‘official multiculturalism’ in Canada. This concept o f ‘official
multiculturalism’ signifies the state initiated endeavour at diffusing a national identity
crisis in the face of: increasing non-European immigration from the third-world leading to
increased cultural diversity; the emergent tendency towards armed struggles over land
claims as seen through the American Indian Movement (AIM) among indigenous
populations within the nation’s borders; and the looming threat o f armed struggles from
Quebec militants that fuelled separatist movements in the province (Bannerji, 2000).
‘Official multiculturalism’ appeared as a gift that Pierre Trudeau offered an
unsettled nation to disarm the radical and militant social movements that were brewing.
Moreover, an official policy on multiculturalism reduced the political and economic
demands of these groups to mere concerns over culture. As a result multiculturalism was
used to incorporate the threat o f radical social resistance within a dominant angloCanadian national imaginary (Bannerji, 2000). Indeed, this ‘official’ policy of
multiculturalism came to define a nation amidst a brewing sea o f political discontent.
Through the process o f ‘orientalizing’ difference (Said, 1978), diversity, from the outset,
was considered to be a politically perceived public problem (Day, 1998).
The problem of Canadian diversity has always been public, has always
involved state-sponsored attempts to structure the possible field o f action
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o f problematic Others, and it has always been articulated with the
discourse on British-Canadian unity. The reality o f Canadian diversity is
symbiotically dependent upon this will to unity - without it, diversity does
not exist and certainly cannot be a problem. (Day, 1998, p.44)
Building upon the state sanctioned introduction o f Canada’s Multiculturalism
Policy of 1971, The Canadian Multiculturalism Act was adopted by parliament in 1988.
According to a Government o f Canada website on Canadian Heritage, the adoption o f The
Act placed Canada on the map as the first nation to pass a law affirming a notion of
‘official multiculturalism’ as a principle Canadian value (Minister o f State Multiculturalism, n.d.). This value serves to define an imaginary nation through a
multicultural politics, essentializing fixed cultural differences in relation to a ‘Canadian
culture’ without regard or input from those whom the policy and The Act essentially
subjugates (Bannerji, 2000). It is largely based on the notion that diversity must be
managed in the interest o f colonial superiority. Indeed, diversity only became a problem
when British-Canadian sovereignty was put to the test. Furthermore, what The Act
assumed and still assumes about immigrants is that they can be defined, classified, and
fixed as such, strictly along the lines of culture and ethnicity, and loosely along the lines
o f ‘race’.
With a policy that touts aphorisms implying a richness of difference through
tolerance - as a virtuous marker o f national identity - Canada is the perfect site of critical
analysis to demystify a dominant ‘myth about race’. In this space o f tolerance and
difference, the notion of diversity is essentialized within the identity politics of a
Canadian multicultural imaginary. Ostensibly, Canadian identity is contingent upon the
tolerance of difference through the institutionalization of an ‘official multiculturalism’.
In contrast to its American neighbours to the south, who invite or coerce - depending on
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your political predisposition - immigrants to assimilate within a homogenous national
imaginary by relinquishing their original cultural norms as secondary, Canada prides its
national identity on the notion that many ‘varieties of people’ can retain, practice, and
preserve their original cultural heritage within its borders. The latter has been termed a
cultural ‘mosaic’ whereas the former has been termed a cultural ‘melting pot’. (Bannerji,
2000; Day, 1998)

TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN - Metaphors ‘Melting Pot’ and ‘Mosaic’
A ‘melting pot’, although originally comprised o f disparate parts, produces a
homogenous stew whereby the distinctions between the original ingredients are no longer
readily apparent. A ‘mosaic’, however, describes a national imaginary that is essentially
comprised o f the sum o f its disparate parts. Essential to the composition o f a ‘mosaic’ is
the assumption that it retains the original qualities of the individual parts that comprise it
as a whole. This further implies that the essence o f its composite parts remains intact and
is easily distinguishable from the other parts that are included within the overall national
picture. Where the ‘melting pot’ metaphor has been perceivably marked by a process of
assimilation, the ‘mosaic’ metaphor has been perceivably marked by a process of
integration.
Richard Day (1998) assesses the definitions of assimilation and integration as two
main approaches to dealing with diversity. According to Day (1998), the traditional
definitions of these two terms are presented as binary opposites. Assimilation is what
integration is not, and vice versa. Where assimilation calls for the abandonment of
distinctive group traits in the interest o f the dominant imaginary, Integration is supposed
to accommodate diverse groups as they retain their distinct, defining qualities,
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participating equally within the overall social imaginary. A paradox is created by virtue
of the definition of the latter process. If distinct groups are to retain the qualities that
make them distinct, how are they to participate equally in the overall social imaginary?
According to Day (1998), this problem offers an easy solution under assimilation.
Under assimilation, distinct groups give up the qualities that define them by
undergoing a transformation from a state o f “otherness” to a state o f “sameness” (Day,
1998, p. 57). Under integration, however, distinct groups are expected to retain their
‘otherness’ while assuming an overall quality o f ‘sameness’. This outlines the
impossibility o f ‘official multiculturalism’ as the defining image o f a unified Canadian
identity. Day (1998) sums up this paradox quite elegantly by stating that “as the
Canadian National Thing, the Mosaic functions as the object o f a desire for a Canadian
identity that forever fails to achieve its goal, and thereby achieves its aim, which is to
perpetuate itse lf’ (p. 43). This is not to say, however, that the ‘melting pot’ metaphor is
better suited towards defining a national identity over the ‘m osaic’ metaphor.
It is important at this juncture to state that I am not advocating one metaphor
(melting pot vs. mosaic) over the other, nor am I pushing for one process (assimilation vs.
integration) as the ideal model towards dealing with diversity9. Both metaphors and
processes essentially strive towards the same ends by nuanced and overlapping methods.
Attempts to attain homogeneity may be attained through overt coercion as well as through

9 W hile delivering a paper at the University o f Montreal on February 24th 2 005, at 7th Colloquium o f the
CEETUM for Students and N ew Researchers, I was asked what approach to dealing with diversity I think to
be more correct; the ‘m elting pot’ or the ‘m osaic’. I was unaware that by discussing both approaches, while
concentrating my criticism on one, that I may have inadvertently appeared to be championing one metaphor
over the other. To clarify m y position with respect to understanding the structurally racist ties intrinsic to
both methods o f managing difference, I had only intended to use both metaphors for the purpose o f
highlighting the differences in the quality o f racism between Canada and the U nited States. It is important
to note that however different the quality o f racism may be between these tw o countries, they share a
common structural root that, in opinion, is both imperialistic and Eurocentric at its core.
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forms subtle seduction in both models and approaches. Indeed, both models and
approaches ultimately continue the legacy o f imperialistic goals in the exploitation and
subjugation o f ‘otherness’ through the domination o f imagined differences by virtue o f an
imagined ‘sameness’. For the purpose o f this thesis, however, I will be concentrating on
the latter approach to dealing with diversity; the cultural mosaic as it applies to ‘official
multiculturalism’ in the constitution o f a ‘Canadian identity’. As seductive or coercive as
the ‘mosaic’ may appear, it holds unto itself its own sets o f myths containing ideologies
that obscure the power relations at work among its disparate parts.
An official policy o f multiculturalism solidifies and shapes the cultural ‘mosaic’
metaphor. Where the parts that make up the ‘m osaic’ translate into ‘varieties o f people’
within the Canadian cultural landscape, the entire ‘mosaic’ comes to represent the overall
Canadian cultural imaginary as a variety o f cultures interpreted officially as multicultural.
In theory, multiculturalism allows the harmonious intermixing o f different cultures to be
tolerated within the overall national imaginary. Tolerance, however, does not necessitate
acceptance. As a result, inclusiveness is merely tolerated on the surface.
A concept o f Diversity that includes reified notions o f ‘race’ becomes a buzzword
signifying a sort o f multi-cultural ornamentation, conveniently used to decorate an
imagined national identity10. This is done without allowing equal access for those
‘varieties of people’, defined as culturally different from those whose power defines
them, to participate equally in the shaping of the national identity. This creates a notion
of tolerance that obscures struggles towards justice and equality and masks oppression
under a guise o f privilege. As a result, it becomes assumed - by virtue of a perceived

10 For more details on an ‘imagined national identity’ in the Canadian context, please see Tony W ilden’s
The Im aginary Canadian (1980).
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attitude of imperial arrogance - that immigrants should be viewed as privileged enough to
be allowed to integrate into a ‘Canadian society’, despite their subsequent marginalization
and civic annihilation regarding any social, political, and economic input as to what
should constitute a ‘Canadian society’. Their civic prowess becomes castrated while the
potential power o f their presence is rendered impotent with regards to contributing to the
shape o f the Canadian imaginary through the official mechanisms of integration/
assimilation.
Immigrants, especially those of colour (a designation o f ‘racial’ difference), are to
be considered privileged as citizens under the civilizing project o f Canadian
multiculturalism. Difference is tolerated so long as it can eventually conform to the ideal
European imaginary that has colonized and ‘fathered’ the imaginary that we have come to
know as Canada. As a result, racism continues to exist surreptitiously within the
institutional fabric o f a ‘multicultural’ Canadian society. W hat this model fails to realize
in theory, however, has manifested itself within the strict reality o f racist practices carried
out by the institutions designed to accommodate its parts (varieties o f people). Missing
from the ‘mosaic’ analogy is the fluid quality o f culture and its evolutionary propensity
for change and development.
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III.

LOCATING CULTURE IN MULTICULTURE

PERPETUALLY RECEDING HORIZONS - Constructing Cultural Imaginings
Philosophically, I do not believe in the purity o f cultures, or even in the
possibility o f identifying them as meaningfully discrete wholes. I think o f
cultures as complex human practices o f signification and representation,
o f organization and attribution, which are internally riven by conflicting
narratives. Cultures are form ed through complex dialogues with other
cultures. In most cultures that have attained some degree o f internal
differentiation, the dialogue o f the other(s) is internal rather than intrinsic
to the culture itself. (Benhabib, 2002, p. ix)
According to Seyla Benhabib (2002), what we come to know and classify as
distinct cultures have become “badges o f identity” through the faulty epistemic premises
of what she terms the “reductionist sociology o f culture” (p. 4). For Benhabib (2002),
conservatives and progressives alike base their perceptions o f culture on the assumption
that: they are “clearly delineable wholes” ; they can be applied as uncontroversial
classificatory labels to population groups; and the hybridity and overlap o f population
groups ascribed to more than one culture does not pose a problem for policy (p. 4).
Based on these faulty epistemic premises, policies like the Canadian Multiculturalism Act
have been institutionalized to reify, essentialize, fetishize, naturalize, and organize
difference within a public multicultural discourse. It is important, however, not to take
this perception o f culture at face value. More attention must be paid to a critical analysis
of the structure imbedded in the composition o f this multicultural discourse.
Using a “narrative view o f actions and culture”, Benhabib (2002) peels back the
layers o f the essentialized cultural perspective used by the “reductionist sociology of
culture” (pp. 4-5). The starting point for analysis is to differentiate the subject/ object
relationship between the perspective o f ‘social observer’ and the ‘social agent’ with
regards to the analyzed cultural entity. According to Benhabib (2002), the “social
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observer.. .is one who imposes, together with local elites, unity and coherence on cultures
as observed entities” whereas ‘social agents’ - in contrast, participants in culture “experience their traditions, stories, rituals and symbols, tools and material living
conditions through shared, albeit contested and contestable, narrative accounts” (p. 5).
This distinction is important in its implications that the former, ‘social observer’ must
essentially view cultures as distinct wholes for the purposes o f coherence, classification
and control. This standpoint can only be assessed and imposed from the ‘outside’. In
contrast, the latter - ‘social agent’ - does not need to view what they agree their culture to
be as a whole because their standpoint is experienced from the ‘inside’.
The ‘social agent’ perspective is a rather telling one, with regards to the structure
of cultural construction, primarily because cultures are formed through contested
accounts. According to Benhabib (2002), this is evident for two reasons. The first reason
is illustrated through a ‘double hermeneutic’. This implies that “we identify what we do
through an account o f what we do” (Benhabib, 2002, p. 6). Indeed, meaning in all
socially significant action is determined through communication. As a result, action(s)
gain significance through the accounts o f the agent as well as others in reference to the
action(s) performed. This locates culture as a social entity constituted within webs of
overlapping and contested narratives.
The second reason that cultures are formed through contested accounts refers to an
evaluative dimension o f actions. Benhabib (2002) considers this evaluative dimension to
be a “second-order narrative” (p. 7). This second-order narrative implies a ‘normative
attitude’ towards first-order accounts o f actions about narratives. For Benhabib (2002),
these ‘normative attitudes’ derived from an evaluative dimension form the basis of
cultures. Because there are two dimensions o f contested accounts - two levels of
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narrative contestation - cultures cannot be fixed as delineable wholes. They are
constantly shifting entities that “form a horizon that recedes each time one approaches it”
(Benhabib, 2002, p. 5). This has very salient implications when applied to notions of
multiculturalism.

MULTICULTURALISM AND THE CONFINEMENT OF CULTURE
Notions o f ‘official multiculturalism’ are based on the faulty premises o f the
‘reductionist sociology o f culture’ (Benhabib, 2002). This perspective, further assumes
that cultures can be preserved. Because cultures are not the fixed, delineable parts that
can be frozen in time to comprise a completed national picture, “culture is not something
that can be preserved nor conserved” (Walcott, 2003, p. 139). Following the logic of this
premise, if cultures cannot be preserved or conserved because they do not exist as
delineable wholes - due to the fact that their form is constituted in contested narratives then they cannot properly fit as parts within a multicultural mosaic. A multicultural
‘mosaic’, therefore, cannot sufficiently serve as a proper metaphor that identifies and
defines a complete and inclusive national portrait. Subscribing to a belief on the contrary
is problematic on two levels.
First, to assume the possibility o f a complete national portrait would be to finalize
the national identity as frozen within time. So doing would essentially position the
national identity as transcendent to its social and historical context. This would eliminate
the possibility for change via growth and development. As a result, the national image, as
it currently exists, could only be interpreted as a-historical. This would mean that it has
always naturally existed as it is, in its current conception, and it will remain so forever.
Furthermore, the naturalization of an a-historical national identity would ultimately
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exclude immigrant input as alien from ‘without’, while being antithetical to difference
from ‘within’. To clarify this point, immigrants could not integrate within the national
imaginary without first being cleansed of the qualities that make them different in relation
to those who constitute the national imaginary. Those qualities are essentially what
constitute their difference as immigrants. As a result, difference cannot be fully accepted
within the national imaginary because the national imaginary ultimately strives towards
homogeneity which is actually antithetical to the very notion o f difference that immigrant
populations represent. These immigrant populations are considered to be necessary
ornaments within a multicultural ‘mosaic’. W ithout them, the ‘m osaic’ could not exist.
For immigrants to occupy space within the national imaginary as immigrants (those
defined in difference to the national status quo) their input must be viewed as alien to the
homogeneity that has already been achieved through consensus a priori within the
imaginary itself (exclusively formed by a dominant colonizing force).
As diversity becomes homogenized under the rubric o f the national imaginary,
difference (in the ‘liberal’ sense) can only be tolerated and not fully accepted, if this
national imaginary is in fact antithetical to the very notion o f difference. Despite this
logic, however, the Canadian identity - as comprised within a multicultural ‘mosaic’ continues to be premised on a static concept of culture that has become naturalized
through myth within the national imaginary. (Bannerji, 2000; Bissoondath, 2002;
Walcott, 2003)
The second level, where imagining cultures as fixed wholes within the national
image constitutes a problem, can be seen in the current disposition o f the various cultures
that form the surface o f this national portrait. Because difference cannot be fully
accepted, these diverse cultures are seen as naturally located outside o f the national
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imaginary despite the fact that they reside within its composition. The centre/ periphery
image created in the relationships o f cultural and economic class holds true in this sense
as difference is pushed out towards the margins in order to be better managed by the
colonizing interior. Furthermore, given the problems o f locating diversity within the
national imaginary, an ‘official multicultural mosaic’ as constitutive o f the Canadian
identity is problematic in the way in which it fixes the diverse cultural parts as
manageable objects.

DEHUMANIZING OBJECTS OF DIFFERENCE AND A CULT OF FETISH
Although the location of diverse cultures appears to exist naturally on the
periphery, objectified through the ‘impressive ideological formations’ o f imperialism as
manageable commodities, they are in fact constituted and positioned that way by the
dominant forces that define them as such. Edward Said (1978) eloquently captures this
sentiment when he states that “only the Orientalist can interpret the Orient, the Orient
being radically incapable o f interpreting itself’ (p. 289). Because o f this, the limited
perception o f the ‘social observer’ (Benhabib, 2002) is driven by the need to essentialize
a fixed cultural badge to the object o f difference being managed. This fixed cultural
badge becomes worn like a straight] acket to keep difference confined within the
trivialities o f their subjugated positioning. The diverse cultures that make up the portrait
o f Canada, therefore, are narrowly reduced to one-dimensional caricatures, commodified
by the fruits o f their ‘exotic’ lifestyles.
Material products like food, costume, and music are cultural artefacts that can be
packaged, marketed, and sold to consumers to concretize an imagined multicultural
national identity. These cultural parts are themselves fractured pieces o f broader, fluid,
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cultural heritages that are now reduced to the aesthetic shells o f consumption by the
dominant Canadian imaginary. Seen as nothing more than an aesthetic appeal to the
‘exotic’, these cultural fragments adorn the Canadian imaginary like ornaments: visible,
manageable, trinkets o f convenience. In the process o f fragmenting identity, the
producers o f commodified cultural artefacts become objectified themselves. This
objectification o f difference is a patently dehumanizing act o f power exercised in the
interests of the dominant group.
According to Paulo Freire (1970), the act o f dehumanization is a crucial marker of
oppression played out in the dialectical relationship between a dominant class and a
subordinated class - both o f which can only exist in relation to one another. For Freire
(1970), “an act is oppressive only when it prevents men [sfc] from being more fully
human” (p. 42). The objectification of difference is one such act that is executed by the
dominant or oppressive class through the exclusive conception o f themselves as human
beings. To clarify this point, one must remember that the notion o f ‘s e lf - the dominant
‘oppressors’ - is solely contingent on the definition ‘other’ - the ‘oppressed’ class. This
definition of ‘other’, therefore, is not only different from the notion o f ‘s e lf but as
signifiers of identity they are diametrically opposed. For ‘s e lf to lay exclusive claim to
the status of humanity, ‘other’ - by default - must be dehumanized in the interest of
maintaining one’s humanity solely at the expense o f another’s. This is further illustrated
by the dominant class’ belief that everything - including other people - can be objectified
as commodities to be managed and purchased. Difference, in this case must necessarily
be objectified and ultimately dehumanized in order for the dominant class to maintain its
privileged position o f power.
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It could not be otherwise. If the humanization o f the oppressed signifies
subversion, so also does their freedom; hence the necessity for constant
control. And the more the oppressors control the oppressed, the more they
change them into apparently inanimate “things.” (Freire, 1970, p. 45)
Difference, therefore, is not accepted, but merely tolerated as an act o f imperial
arrogance. Under this arrogance, reinforced by Canada’s ‘official multiculturalism’,
tolerance becomes a privilege afforded to alterity by the benevolence o f Empire.
Accommodating diversity exclusively on a superficial level, so long as the national
imaginary remains the product o f its colonial founders, Canada’s ‘official
multiculturalism’ segregates its citizens, constituting a form o f cultural apartheid.
Alienated from the national imaginary, cultural differences become reduced as objectified
ornaments o f diverse fetishes.
Fetishizing cultural difference allows for the inclusion and spectacle o f
ornamentation (via cultural artefacts or objectified others), while excluding the people
that produce these artefacts as real citizens within the Canadian imaginary. Reducing
perceived cultures to random, fragmented aspects o f their hybrid and evolving lifestyles,
essentially robs the members o f these perceived cultures o f their potential to participate as
equal citizens that make up the country. For example, to the ‘social observer’ Chinese
culture becomes narrowly defined by perceived foods and festivals, patronizingly and
generically referred to as Chinese. The same can be seen with respect to almost all other
ethnic groups and perceived cultural wholes that are constituted within the ‘mosaic’. In
this superficial instance, the visuospatial metaphor o f centre and periphery appears to
dissolve under the rubric o f the ‘mosaic’ metaphor, ostensibly implying a sense of
progress towards the ‘liberal’ notion o f equality.
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MULTICULTURAL MOSAIC - Centre & Periphery Reborn in the ‘Ex-factor’
Within the ‘m osaic’ metaphor, the centre is perceived to be subsumed by the
periphery. As a result, the illusion o f a unified, homogeneous whole is created even
though it is actually constituted thoroughly by various fluid, heterogeneous parts. This
occurs primarily due to the fact that a dominant group - characterized within a racialized
hierarchy by a value o f ‘whiteness’11 - has been written out o f the metaphor, as an
invisible, ubiquitous and creative force that enables the ‘m osaic’ to exist. Indeed, the
‘mosaic’ is a product o f the dominant group’s creative imagination. As the dominant
group, impelled by the ‘impressive ideological formations’ o f imperial designs, remains
‘ex-nominated’ (Barthes, 1972, 1984) in the ‘mosaic’, the metaphor becomes solidified
and secured. ‘W hiteness’, therefore, serves as a ‘norm ative’ value in relation to the
mosaic and is rendered invisible. This invisibility allows ‘w hiteness’ as a normative
value to remain ‘unnamed’. Borrowing Barthes’ (1972, 1984) concept o f denomination,
the power dynamic intrinsic to the precarious positioning o f unnamed engineers o f the
‘mosaic’ is precisely what I would refer to as the ‘ex-factor’. Power, in this sense,
operates by separating the creator and the object created at safe distances from each other

1 1 According to Ruth Frankenberg (1993), ‘w hiteness’ is structured within a negotiated terrain o f
historical and material contingencies. Like other racialized constructs - such as ‘blackness’ - ‘w hiteness’
exists as a means o f articulating lived experiences through ‘race’ and is by no means a monolithic entity.
Indeed, people w ho are perceived as ‘w hite’ are also racialized and exhibit many w ays o f living
‘w hiteness’. Exploring and naming ‘whiteness’, attempts at dem ystifying its apparent normative and
invisible qualities with respect to the perceived racial neutrality about it. This perceived racial neutrality is
part and parcel an effect o f its dominance where subjects are positioned within social, political, and
econom ic relations o f power. The meanings generated about these relations that help to define the positions
o f social actors (subjects) situated within them, are socially constructed and are, therefore, susceptible to
shift over time and are in no w ay absolute. As a result, ‘w hiteness’ can be interpreted as a relational
category, defined in ‘racism s’ that determine other racialized categories. For the purpose o f this thesis,
however, “the term ‘w hiteness’ signals the production and reproduction o f dominance rather than
subordination, normativity rather than marginality, and privilege rather than disadvantage” (Frankenberg,
1993, pp. 236-237).
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discursively. This becomes evident, for example, when examining government census
data on diversity.
According to the 2001 Census Highlights, produced by the Ontario Ministry of
Finance, the province o f Ontario appears to be increasingly diverse (see Appendix A). As
a result, it can be said that Ontario is becoming increasingly multicultural. If Ontario is
perceived as becoming increasingly ‘multicultural’, Canada - by default - is also seen as
becoming increasingly ‘multicultural’ since Ontario is a province o f Canada (Census
2001 Highlights). Accompanied by an array o f colourful charts, a graph, and statistics, is
the subheading “Visible Minorities Making Canada Increasingly Diverse.” This
subheading anchors the statistics that purportedly point to increased diversity without
truly defining what is meant by diversity. Interestingly enough, however, ‘visible
minorities’ are defined “as persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are nonCaucasian in race or non-white in colour.” ‘W hite’ becomes the base signifier from
which all difference is measured. Caucasian is the ‘race’ - based on a flawed taxonomy that tenuously connects false notions o f racial designation to narrowly defined notions of
fixed cultures while remaining invisible beyond the scope o f difference.
‘W hiteness’, characterized by subscription to a Western ideology, as a broad
classification o f a dominant racialized group, is known in reference to everything that it is
not. To explain this further, there are no cultural ornaments that straight]'acket a ‘w hite’
cultural horizon as a delineable whole. ‘W hite’, as it appears to exist in binary opposition
to that which it has narrowly defined as “other” or ‘coloured’ is actually based on a
hierarchical relationship. This is what Edward Said (1993) refers to when he states that
cultural identities are not essentializations that exist as complete entities in nature - even
though the essentializations o f cultural identities are considered to be part o f their
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“enduring appeal” - but are in fact “contrapuntal ensembles” formed in an array of
“opposites” and “negatives” (p. 52). Cultural identity, therefore, is formed within a sea of
‘contested narratives’ (Benhabib, 2002) that contributes to the essence o f its hybridity. It
becomes problematic to fair and equal social relations, when one group dominates
through the realization its own hybridity by denying the hybrid quality o f the ‘other’
groups that it subjugates. The hybridity o f the dominant cultural entity is already
assumed in its absence from the ‘mosaic’. The ‘mosaic’, therefore, becomes a
conceptual tool o f dominance solely reserved to define and manage difference and not
sameness.
This categorization o f difference within the ‘mosaic’ allows for the visibility of
diverse groups to be managed and policed in a surreptitiously different way than other
Canadians o f a less visible stature (or those whose visibility is absorbed a priori in the
constitution o f the Canadian imaginary with no fixed status o f pseudo-belonging).
Difference, in this case, becomes coded in relation to an idealized standard o f the ‘self.
As an idealized standard or centre around which difference orbits, the ‘s e lf is defined in
its ‘non-differential’ status. The ‘se lf is titled as such because it is not the ‘other’. Not
only is ‘other’ necessarily defined in difference from the ‘s e lf, ‘s e lf also comes into
existence by creating and locating ‘other’ in order to reduce the anxiety created by an
identity crisis (Eze, 2001; Fanon, 1967). The identity o f the ‘s e lf is contingent upon the
clarity of difference agreed upon through convention in the production and process of
positioning ‘other’ in relation to what the ‘s e lf believes it is not. ‘S e lf and ‘other’ are
hierarchical subjects in a performative play o f relational difference.
The construction o f identity - for identity.. .while obviously a repository of
distinct collective experiences, is finally a construction in my opinion involves the construction of opposites and “others” whose actuality is
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always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of
their differences from “us” . . .Far from a static thing then, identity o f self or
“other’ is a much worked over historical, social, intellectual, and political
process that takes place as a contest involving individuals and institutions
in all societies. (Said, 1978, p.332)
Intrinsic to this process, ‘se lf maintains a position o f privilege by virtue o f its
exclusive access to shaping the national imaginary and its subsequent right to establish
boundaries o f membership by naming difference. Indeed, the ‘impressive ideological
formations’ that fashion and drive imperialism has imbued those positioned as ‘se lf with
the power to represent and speak for those they position as ‘other’. This relationship,
perpetuated by unlimited access to the national imaginary, is legitimated through myths
that serve to enforce and preserve a current balance o f power in society. These myths
work to maintain privilege for the position o f ‘s e lf through the imperialistic ideologies of
racism as they become naturalized by the consensus o f the dominant class.
Since notions o f ‘other’ are different from ‘s e lf, and it is precisely this difference
that necessitates the existence o f the ‘se lf, myth is used to naturalize these differences
creating the least amount o f potential for possible resistance. Although gaps are
inherently created by difference, as it is systematically coded by the ideologies o f the
privileged class positioned as ‘s e lf, myth is used to employ ideologies that work to
smooth out the gaps and potential class conflicts coded through difference. In other
words, myth serves to obfuscate the social relations o f power - as seen through the ways
in which racialized communities are constituted in the social organization o f classes - that
order perceived cultural differences making them appear natural.
By segregating naturally perceived cultural differences, the formation o f potential
networked solidarities are discouraged, creating the impression that coalition building is
an impossible feat based on the illusion o f the incommensurability and incompatibility of
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diverse cultural communities. As a result, various racialized communities are placed in a
relative state of competitiveness with one another; further obscuring any commonalities
that they may share through the historical and material conditions that constitute class
distinctions (Bannerji, 2000). According to Bannerji (2000), “a concept o f class helps us
to see the network o f social relations constituting an overall social organization which
both implicates and cuts through racialization/ ethnicization and gender” (p. 7).
Once class relations are obscured in the mythic constructions o f racialized and
cultured communities, difference o f the ‘other’ must be tolerated in order for ‘other’ to be
positioned as subordinate while creating an environment with the least potential for
resistance. By positioning ‘other’ as a cultural fetish to be consumed at a moment’s
convenience, the growth and development o f cultures are ultimately restricted. The
Canadian policy o f ‘official multiculturalism’ is one way in which the gap o f difference is
smoothed over using the ‘liberal’ ideology o f tolerance. This limits the scope and depth
of Canadian cultural identities and ultimately, intentional or not, sanctions racial
hierarchies as naturalized within the myth about ‘race’.
Despite the current rhetoric o f tolerance, ‘official m ulticulturalism’ serves to
further perpetuate a notion o f exclusion that has very insidious effects on the social
relations o f citizens within the national composition. Based on this ‘liberal’ rhetoric of
tolerance, ultimately alienating cultures through marked exclusion from the national
imaginary, ‘official multiculturalism’ has set a precedent for the practices o f racism that
plagues the lives o f various Canadian communities. Inspiring a normalizing discourse of
‘acceptable’ oppression through the practice o f racial profiling by police services like
Toronto, and the subsequent coding of racialized difference in the ‘liberal’ media, the
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perceived notion o f ‘race’ as scripted within ‘official multiculturalism’, must be explored
and deconstructed as a signifier constructed in and through language.
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IV.

HISTORICAL CONTINGENCIES TO RACIALIZED
REALITIES

LANGUAGE OF RELATIONAL DIFFERENCES - ‘Race’ of Ancients to Irish
And the mind that has conceived a plan o f living must never loose sight o f
the chaos against which that pattern was conceived [...] Thus, having tried
to give pattern to the chaos which lives within the patterns o f your
certainties, I must come out, I must emerge.
(Ellison, 1947, pp. 580-581)
The construction o f ‘race’ through language reveals one o f the biggest illusions of
Western civilization. In contrast to common perceptions about it, ‘race’ is not a biogenetic reality. Traditional notions o f ‘race’ as seen through somatic differences, based
on skin colour and hair texture, come from Western myths o f objective realism that
inform a dominant world view. Grounded in the dominant notion o f reality, ‘race’
remains an unrelenting part o f some o f the most oppressive ideologies (Hall, 1995). Like
perceived notions o f reality, the material assumptions about ‘race’ are subject to critical
discursive analysis.
Throughout history ‘race’ has become a way o f classifying people of the world
into groups o f relational differences. Constituted in language, these values in difference
have changed among and between civilizations, over time. Such classifications o f distinct
populations are formulated in systems o f difference that are socially and historically
contingent. These systems of difference are motivated by discourses that form the
distinct realities o f separate world views. Because o f these factors, ways of ordering
existence in relation to ‘others’ can be interpreted as arbitrary constructions even though
they constitute common social knowledge through myth. This is seen in the ways past
civilizations have ordered their realm in terms o f racial differences.
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Kwame Anthony Appiah (1995) offers a brief historiography on the social
construction o f ‘race’. For Appiah (1995), modem racial categories are seen as
ideological constructs contingent upon the varied histories o f different civilizations.
These constructs are subject manifestations o f dominant conceptual frameworks or myth.
As ideological creations, they become susceptible to the shifting climate o f their
respective historical and material conditions that temper a relative social atmosphere. For
example, one way that people delineated perceived racial difference was through common
subscriptions to religious beliefs and practices. This is seen in the ways in which the
ancient Greeks and Hebrews distinguished themselves as separate from other populations
that they had encountered.
Delineating themselves as different from the rest o f the world, the ancient
Hebrews culturally located each other in allegiance to the same God. Everyone who
worshiped the same God, in the same manner, was considered members o f the same
‘race’ (Appiah, 1995). Essentially those claiming membership to the same ‘race’ were
assumed to be subscribing to the same world view. In so doing, each individual lived
within the dominant framework o f a shared reality. Although the ancient Hebrews had
one way of interpreting their existence by classifying difference, theocentric myths were
not the only form o f ordering the ancient world.
In ancient Greece, the Hellenes distinguished themselves from the rest o f the
world according to the environment in which they lived. In the fifth century B.C,
Hippocrates believed his ‘race’ to be naturally tougher and more independent than the
people of Asia Minor in the West (Appiah, 1995). His belief was largely based on the
perceivably unique environmental conditions through which the population that he
belonged to developed and thrived. His reasoning behind this was that the infertile soils
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had forced them to evolve that way. ‘Race’ is distinguished here, not in terms of
theological affiliation, but in terms o f geographical logos and personal worth. Above all,
this notion o f personal worth was based less on biology and more so determined by “the
nature of the political relationship between peoples which causes a people to be viewed in
a particular light” (Pieterse, 1995, p. 26). Following this line o f reasoning it becomes
clear that the concept o f ‘race’ has not always been confined exclusively to a biological
explanation.
Jan Nederveen Pieterse (1995) argues that the concept o f ‘race’ is not biologically
grounded at all. As an ideologically loaded construct, the modem assumption about
‘race’, as a valid biological taxonomy, is in fact a socio-political fabrication. Pieterse
(1995) examines the ways in which ‘race’ and class intersect through systems of
domination. Indeed, both o f these forms o f social stratification are inextricably linked
through specific histories, ideologies, and the underlying logic o f how power in society is
distributed (Pieterse, 1995). Although power in society was in some cases defined and
exercised through class relations it was also defined and exercised in part by differences
in physical appearances as a result of the imperial conquests o f ‘other’ civilizations like
those in Africa.
Throughout modem history, where there has been an unequal distribution of
power in society, people who have been subjugated to the powers o f dominant groups
have been compared to dark skinned Africans either in terms o f status, treatment, or
appearance (Pieterse, 1995). For example, Chamfort, during the 18 century, referred to
the poor underclass as the Negroes o f Europe (Pieterse, 1995). In this case class
distinctions were coded as racial difference. Although ‘race’ was also coded on the basis
of somatic features - as seen in the ways that the British colonizers referred to East
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Indians as niggers on the basis o f skin colour - ‘race’ was not always exclusive to
biological interpretation. ‘Race’ - as a way of delineating differences between
populations - was primarily a way o f politically justifying an Em pire’s moral right to
subject conquered populations to powers o f domination (Said, 1978, 1993). As an
imperialistic discourse, the concept o f ‘race’ was even used in the British treatment o f the
Irish.
Shortly after the Anglo-Norman invasions, the Irish were considered to be a
savage and barbaric ‘race’ of people. They were seen, by the British, uncivilized, just
like the rebellious tribes of Africa and the America’s. From the 19th century forward, the
British began to depict the Irish as sharing some o f the same physical traits that were
supposedly exclusive to Negroes in various printed illustrations and cartoons. The Irish
were looked upon as having darker skin than the average Caucasian and were
characterized as exhibiting ape-like features in many publications and illustrations o f the
time. They were White Negroes (Pietrerse, 1995). This phenomenon was further
compounded by the sudden influx o f Irish immigrants during the famine of 1840, and
their constant resistance to British rule. The title ‘white negroes’, however, did not
remain a fixed category in which all Irish would be classified. The Irish were eventually
able to assimilate into ‘whiteness’ (Postal & Ignatiev, 1997) by identifying with other
Europeans through somatic features12. A racialized caste system based on somatic

12 American history has recorded incidents o f European bond-labourers on perceivably equal footing with
their African counterparts especially during the 17th century. Both groups were initially united by their
membership in a shared working class and would find solidarity in various revolts and uprisings. In order
to curb this solidarity to weaken revolts, new forms o f solidarity were organized, produced and reproduced
along notions o f ‘race’. These new forms o f solidarity were based on skin colour, bringing about a new
form o f social control in the ‘invention o f the white race’. For more information on this transition see
Theodore W. A llen ’s (1994) The Invention o f the White Race: The O rigins o f R a cia l Oppression in Anglo
America.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

41
differences that created a hierarchical structure for ordering ‘races’ was also initiated
from the outset of Western and capitalist imperial expansion.

EMPIRE AND THE BIRTH OF ‘RACE’ AS A BIOLOGICAL TAXOMOMY
As Western empires expanded, under capitalist and imperial endeavours, their
populations became exposed to other populations that looked ‘exotic’ them. This
discovery created anxieties among Western populations - including the poor and the Irish
- that led to a crisis o f identity. Practicing new customs, the ‘exotic’ beings stood outside
o f any previously held identity profile. Indeed, they were even considered beneath
Europe’s poor. They had dark skin - even darker than the poor and the Irish - and were
considered to be direct opposites o f the Europeans. A new system o f categorizing
individuals into groups was devised to soothe the anxieties caused by the identity crisis
felt by the colonizers.
Colonizers believed that one way o f categorizing everyone, was through ‘sensible’
somatic differences. Seeing that these strange beings had features like dark skin and
coarsely textured hair - in contrast to the skin and hair o f the colonizers - somatic
distinctions appeared to be a logical way o f coding difference. Difference, in this
capacity, was quickly appropriated within a dominant biological discourse used to
distinguish the colonized from the colonizers. These features became naturalized
demarcations of racial identity. As a result, ‘race’, was, and in some cases still remains,
biologically defined as a natural way o f categorizing differences among people. In order
to illustrate this continuity in racism, from ancient societies through imperial colonialism
to present, one must carefully examine the ‘peculiar institutions’ (Wacquant, 2002) that
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continually produce new ‘racisms’ while attempting to maintain fixed notions of ‘race’
(Hall, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2002).

‘PECULIAR INSTITUTIONS’ AND THE PRODUCTION OF RACISMS
Loic Wacquant (2002) identifies the ways in which ‘racisms’ have been
perpetuated throughout American history as the result o f the development o f at least four
main ‘peculiar institutions’ that helped to define the social relations o f power in American
society. These four main institutions - chattel slavery and restricted labour, the Jim Crow
system o f legalized segregation, the ghettoization o f urban living spaces, and the penal
system o f mass incarceration - all contributed to the legitimization, normalization, and
perpetuation o f everyday ‘racisms’. The existence o f ‘racisms’ that emerge as a result of
these institutions are defined in the specific social relations o f power that operate to
position, manage, and control populations o f ‘other’ (most noticeably peoples o f the
African diasporas currently labelled ‘black’) (Podur, 2002; Wacquant, 2002).
Here we can clearly see the historical link between the ‘strange fruit’ o f the
colonial past and the ‘strange fruit’ o f the ‘tolerant’ present. What is o f particular
importance to this thesis, drawing from this sense o f historical racial continuity, is the fact
that racisms emerged and continue to persist as by-products o f the systemic structures of
society’s ‘peculiar institutions’. For example, slaves were not stolen from Africa simply
as a means to satisfy racist endeavours. Slaves were initially brought to the America’s
from Africa for their labour. Racism was produced as an effect o f the dehumanizing
aspects o f slavery.
Slavery, as an institution that exploited the labour o f objectified beings for
capitalistic gain, was in dire need of a system that justified the dehumanizing aspects of
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its practice (Wacquant, 2002). Such a system was perceived as naturally derived from the
division o f labour based in the conception o f racial categories. These racial categories,
coupled with a disparate market economy, reinforced a racialized caste system of
hierarchical ordering. This caste system was based on the creation and implementation of
delineable racial categories that were devised in relation to somatic features like skin
colour. Racism, therefore, was a not a precondition o f slavery but a consequence.
Indeed, racism actually occurred through the justification o f an exploitative ‘peculiar
institution’ in the creation and implementation o f a racialized caste system. In order for
the caste to work, it had to appear natural and absolute. Difference had to be marked and
fixed in order to be effectively managed and dealt with. Not far removed from its roots as
a construct within the market system, skin colour remains a primary signifier of
difference - as previously discussed in the Census 2001 Highlights - even within a
‘liberal’ society that purports to tolerate diversity.
Although ‘race’ - commonly perceived through colour today - was bom a
construct, it continues to be a dominant defining quality o f difference that remains
couched in a myth o f naturalized orientation. Despite the fact that it is an abstraction,
‘race’ continues to serve as an objectified social genre that is commonly used to define,
categorize, separate and control groups o f people. Once separated, difference can be
exploited and controlled more efficiently. Because the imagined existence o f separate
groups - known as ‘races’ - have been reinforced in many ways, through various
‘peculiar institutions’ over time, notions of difference have become taken-for-granted,
constituting a dominant social myth about ‘race’.
As myth, the social, political, and historical context o f ‘race’ has been removed
from the dominant discourse about it, allowing it to exist ensconced in nature as an
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autonomous entity, affecting real material and historical conditions o f oppression. As a
result, there has been the development o f some critical schools o f thought that places
unwarranted emphasis on the concept of ‘race’ as a means within itself that can
purportedly be useful in organizing anti-racist practices towards social change.

PUTTING THE ‘CRITICAL’ BACK IN CRITICAL RACE THEORIES
Despite the fact that many forms of domination and oppression - like those based
on systems o f ‘race’, ‘class’, and ‘gender’ - are intimately connected (Hooks, 1995,
1997), there have been attempts lately by some critical ‘race’ theorists to forge a critical
pedagogy that decentres notions o f class in the interests o f centring notions o f ‘race’
(Allen, 2004; Leonardo, 2004; Lynn, 2004; Parker & Stovall, 2004). Even though their
best efforts are guided by noble purposes, this centralized notion o f ‘race’ is a curious
undertaking, to say the least, especially when systems o f domination and oppression are
not mutually exclusive and autonomous in relation to one another. For Gregory
Meyerson (2002), “oppression is multiple and intersecting but its causes are n o t ... it does
not follow that multiple oppressions require multiple structural causes” .
Modalities like gender and ‘race’ are forms o f social stratification that are
epiphenomenal attributes o f a class based society (San Juan, 2002, 2003). For example, it
becomes very difficult for a person to address issues o f racism without exploring its
connections to the globalized forms o f capitalism that contribute to conditions of
apartheid world wide (Marable, 2004). For this reason, some other critical theorists
cannot avoid noticing the importance o f class when criticizing racism as systematic
phenomena (Bannerji, 2000; Cox, 1959; Darder & Torres, 2004; Meyerson, 2000; Sahay,
1998; San Juan, 2002, 2003; Scatamburlo D ’Annibale & McLaren, 2003, 2004). For
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these theorists, class is not simply one aspect o f identity but a socializing totality marked
by the mechanisms o f capitalism (San Juan, 2002, 2003). Based on this premise,
‘racisms’ are examined in the ways in which they become produced and reproduced in
class-based society (Cabusao, 2005). By de-emphasizing class through an emphasis on
‘race’, some o f the self proclaimed critical ‘race’ theorists essentially fix notions o f ‘race’
as an autonomous category through which racial oppression must be exclusively handled.
This only further contributes to the same acts o f fetishizing and reifying ‘race’ that helps
in maintaining the existence of the ‘racisms’ they purport to be stridently against (Bell,
2002; Gilroy, 2002; Sahay, 1998). This occurs despite widespread scholarly
acknowledgment o f the fact that ‘race’ is a social construct.
Even though all critical theorists will agree that ‘race’ is a social construct, some
scholars insist on objectifying and fetishizing its abstraction, by claiming that it creates
systems and circumstances for historical and material oppression. The effects o f these
systems and circumstances have been referred to as racism. What occurs is the proverbial
‘chicken and egg’ scenario. For such theorists, racism is perceived to be the natural
product o f distinct ‘races’. Because o f this they believe that ‘race’ must play a central
role in critical theory. A contradiction exists, however, in this assessment. ‘Race’ as a
social construct cannot produce natural phenomena; it can only produce constructs that
are further removed from a historical and material base. Because o f this, ‘race’ is not a
useful analytical or discursive construct for effecting change.
As stated at the outset of this thesis, racism produces ‘races’ and not vice versa
(Darder & Torres, 2004). By virtue o f this premise, ‘race’ cannot explain racism
(Meyerson, 2000). Class division, structured historically in the rise o f imperial
capitalism, produces the material circumstances that breed racism (Bohmer, n.d.; Daniels,
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1996; Wacquant, 2002). The historical and material circumstances that call racism into
existence, therefore, has fabricated notions o f a hierarchy o f distinct racialized bodies,
commonly perceived as ‘races’. Indeed, the existence o f distinct ‘races’ as a biological
fact is rather a science fiction composed in myth. In light o f this logic, one would be
more effective in the struggle against various ‘racism s’ by focusing less on ‘race’ and
more on the process of ‘racialization’. Even though ‘race’ is fictional, many people will
agree that ‘racialized communities’ are factual, existing in the real systems and
circumstances o f historical and material oppression.

‘RACE’ vs. ‘RACIALIZED COMMUNITIES’ - Demystification & Emphasis
Distinguishing between notions o f ‘race’ and ‘racialized communities’ is
important towards the creation o f a critical anti-racist discourse. The notion o f ‘race’, as
touted by pseudo-scientists like Philippe Rushton, is a biological term used for identifying
subspecies (Wise, n.d.). The notion o f subspecies indicates that a degree o f genetic
variance must be significant enough to subcategorize organisms that are on the verge of
branching off into entirely new species (Wise, n.d.). This notion o f ‘race’ further implies
that the human species can be divided into subgroups as a result o f naturally occurring
phenomena. The term ‘race’ connotes a biological reality and its use is therefore
problematic when articulating a constructed quality about it. Instead o f using ‘race’ as an
analytic and discursive construct, the process o f racialization - through which such a
construct comes into existence - may be a more useful tool o f critical articulation.
According to Manning Marable (2004), ‘racialization’ connotes “the construction
o f racially unequal social hierarchies characterized by dominant and subordinate social
relations between groups” . For Marable (2004), this process is a global problem that is
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intimately connected to the rise o f global capitalism - as a ubiquitous colonizing force that causes social relationships characterized by a type of global apartheid. Apartheid is
an Afrikaans word meaning separateness that is based on the concept that a ‘herrenvolk’
or ‘master race’ is destined to rule over other ‘races’ (Marable, 2004). Although
apartheid has historically defined the white minority rule in South Africa, it should not be
considered a phenomenon exclusive to racism in South Africa.
According to Marable (2004), global apartheid is “the racialized division and
stratification of resources, wealth, and power that separates Europe, North America and
Japan from the billions o f mostly black, brown, indigenous, undocumented immigrant and
poor people across the planet”. For the purposes o f this thesis, however, the concept of
apartheid and a ‘master race’ can be translated into the ‘strange fruit’ that poison
contemporary society through the racist policies and institutions o f ‘official
multiculturalism’ in Canada. As an overarching, state sanctioned discourse, ‘official
multiculturalism’ taps into the deep structures o f systemic racism that not only naturalizes
the practice o f racial profiling but also fuels the mass media - as yet another ‘peculiar
institution’ - that perpetuates the myth that separate ‘races’ exist naturally.

THE NATURE OF THINGS - Grouping Populations According to ‘Race’?
As natural as ‘race’ may seem, there is absolutely nothing natural about it.
Indeed, there are gaps and contradictions inherent to the dominant notion that distinct
‘races’ actually exist in nature. These gaps and contradictions become increasingly
obvious as we peel back the layers o f inter-textuality that constitute a dominant myth
about ‘race’. As a result, ‘race’ becomes coded, through dominant discourses about it, as
a concept that exists as a part o f an objective and observable reality. Taken to be a part of
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objective reality - as it is interpreted to exist in nature - ‘race’, as a fixed subject for
categorizing populations, becomes canonized as a veritable knowledge claim. This claim,
however, reveals two main flaws that should not be overlooked.
First, it is virtually impossible to classify every human being into categories of
skin colour and hair texture. Despite this fact, popular Western myths accept three main
racial classifications. Negroid - having dark skin and coarse hair; Caucasoid - having
light skin and straight hair; and Mongoloid - having pale skin and shapely eyes. If
Negroes have dark skin and coarse hair, and Caucasians have light skin and straight hair,
where do the majority o f East Indian people fit in? Most o f them have dark skin and
straight hair. This model of classification also serves to alienate and exclude many
aboriginal groups as being void o f racial distinction. After all, according to these narrow
traits of classification, some aboriginal groups may fit the category o f Mongoloid because
o f their light skin and shapely eyes; but what of those with dark skin and coarse hair?
Second, if ‘race’ is biological, why is it not contingent upon other biological
distinctions that our species share? Why should race be divided along the lines o f skin
colour and hair texture? Why not eye colour and hair colour; or why not blood type, or
height? To open the dominant narrative to a wider array o f contingencies, would
challenge the privileged subject association that contemporary myths prescribe as
knowledge based. As a result, anxieties formed due to an identity crisis would increase,
creating a shift in the power relationships among the racial hierarchy within society.
It was only relatively recent that ‘race’ was restricted exclusively to physiognomy.
As discussed previously in this thesis, ‘race’ was also interchangeable with religion,
nation, class, and/or culture throughout various points in history. People within Europe
were characterized along similar dimensions to groups o f people outside of Europe
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(Pieterse, 1995). Europeans had practiced racial languages that oppressed groups along
shifting imaginary boundaries. Because o f this, ‘race’ can be seen as interchangeable,
contingent upon negotiated discursive assumptions. Indeed, classifying people along
phenotypes or somatic differences, as a primary signifier, also carry the prescribed
notions o f secondary signified meanings within a dominant racial language.

SLIDING SIGNIFICATIONS AND THE LANGUAGE OF ‘RACE’
Stuart Hall (1996) examines the power dynamic intrinsic to the ideological bias of
‘race’ as a socio-political construct. According to Hall (1996), ‘race’ has no taxonomic
designation by virtue of a bio-genetic ascription. Despite this fact, ‘race’ survives as part
of a contemporary Western vocabulary, loaded with harmful and oppressive ideological
assumptions. These ideological assumptions about ‘race’ are manifest in discursive
practices that have become validated through dominant W estern myths.
The dominant myths, about ‘race’, contend that natural characteristics subsume
value differences between groups along the lines o f intelligence and behaviour. People
who subscribe to these myths, living within the dominant culture, assume that ‘race’ is a
real and viable form o f classification that constitutes knowledge. According to this view
it is perceived as commonsense that ‘race’ can be used as a form o f obvious and natural
distinction - both biologically and culturally. It is considered commonsense, therefore,
that ‘race’ exists as a natural form of maintaining order among difference, within the
existing social dynamic that serves to justify existing relations o f power. This implies
that a universal sense o f permanence, attributed to these taxonomic divisions, is rooted in
a racist colonialist discourse.
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Stuart Hall (1996) claims that there is nothing static or absolute about ‘race’.
Constituted in language, its meanings are subject to the socio-political atmosphere o f the
historical environment that helps to create it. Because o f this, meanings created about
‘race’ are always susceptible to change. Although classifications and categorizations are
a fundamental human characteristic used to order meaning through language, these
meanings are not absolute and should not be interpreted as such. Classifications and
categorizations become especially problematic when they systematically attempt to
justify existing power relationships as a way o f maintaining an unjust social order by
fixing differences. Once these differences are perceived as fixed, the corresponding
systems o f classification and categorization become taken-for-granted as myth. This is
evident in the dominance of a social order based on the bio-genetic classification o f ‘race’
as it has become and continues to be perpetuated through a dominant social myth. These
myths can be revealed when the cultural artefacts in which they are coded are read as
texts.
When read as a text, Hall (1996) perceives ‘race’ as working more like a language
than a biological entity. As a result, ‘race’ can be seen as a discursive construct working
as a sliding signifier (Hall, 1996). This statement can be best qualified through a brief
examination of how meanings are produced through language and communication.
During the production o f meanings, through the discursive process o f competition and
negotiation o f preferred readings, meanings can shift. This implies that ‘race’, as sliding
signifier, cannot be fixed in its popular conception through bio-genetics. Grounded in
language, meanings surrounding ‘race’ are continually susceptible to contested and
negotiated perceptions that float through history. This means that the meanings
surrounding the concept o f ‘race’, as a ‘floating signifier’, are contextual and relative. Its
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meanings, therefore, are neither universal nor absolute. Race “floats within a sea of
relational differences” (Hall, 1996). Given this premise, Hall (1996) has classified three
main relational positions o f difference for interpreting concepts about ‘race’.
First, the Realist position believes that objective, bio-genetic differences exist,
outside o f language, and are accurately reflected in common sense systems o f knowledge.
This Realist position is commonly interpreted from within the culture that considers such
claims as knowledge. Second, the Linguistic position, discounts any notions that
objective, physical differences exist, within what people consider to be real outside o f its
construction in and through language. Within this second position, any differences that
come into existence are a result o f their construction in and through language. According
to this position, language creates reality. A third position, however, considers that there
are many material differences that exist in what we perceive as reality outside of
language. It is only in and through systems o f language that these differences become
intelligible. Hall (1996) considers this third position to be discursive.
Subscribing to the Discursive position, Hall (1996) sees three major historical
phases o f discourse that attempted to - and still attempt to - justify power relations
through the categories o f racial hierarchy. All three phases try to fix differences as
constitutive by absolute knowledge within the dominant myths o f society. These
differences are an attempt to make nature correspond with culture, by removing any
historical context surrounding notions o f ‘race’. Indeed, these naturalized assumptions
become part o f a commonsense social discourse within each respective phase of
understanding. For Hall (1996), these three epistemological phases are constitutive o f the
dominant discourses that have influenced and changed a given culture’s perspective on
the reality o f ‘race’ over time.
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As the first phase o f knowledge, religion attempted to explain and fix perceived
racial differences. When Europeans encountered people o f the ‘New W orld’ there was a
question of whether or not these ‘new beings’ were human like the Europeans. It became
assumed and understood as commonsense that the indigenous populations o f the ‘New
World’ were of a different animal species created by God. Knowledge, in this case, was
reflected and legitimated through religion. As Western empires realized that the new
populations encountered could be somewhat assimilated into a W esternized culture by
being converted to Christianity, religion no longer served to be an adequate explanation
to fix cultural and somatic differences.
Anthropology served as the second phase o f knowledge for understanding new
populations o f people. When it was determined that the people o f the ‘New W orld’ were
o f the same species as the Europeans, it became assumed as common knowledge that
these ‘new people’ were at a different stage o f evolutionary development. The
indigenous people o f Africa and the Americas were believed to be closer to the original
species, and were seen as ‘missing links’ on the evolutionary ladder that distinguished
humans from primates. Anthropological assumptions, in this case, informed and
determined commonsense, positioning Europeans at a higher stage o f evolutionary
development over ‘people o f colour’. When anthropology no longer provided a sufficient
rationale to explain and fix the gulf of difference between the two populations, the
collection o f ‘scientific’ research and data was used in its place.
Science, as the third phase of knowledge, currently underlies much o f our
contemporary Western myths about ‘race’. Subsuming previous religious and
anthropological discourses about ‘race’, claims about modem science is often times used
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to justify and fix racial differences through the study o f bone structure, blood factors and
genetics.
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V.

THE SCIENCE OF OPPRESSION

COMPETING SCIENTIFIC PARADIGMS - A Contested Terrain of Inquiry
Scientific knowledge, like language, is intrinsically the common property
o f a group or else nothing at all. To understand it we shall need to know
the special characteristics o f the groups that create and use it.
(Kuhn, 1962, p. 210)
The theory and practice of Western Science, itself constructed within a discourse
o f related empiricisms (Kuhn, 1962), is subject to ideological scrutiny because it is bom
within a social and historical context and cannot be divorced from the environment of its
conception (Adelman et.al, 2003). As the stmcture o f science evolves, the bio-genetic
reality o f ‘race’ can even be challenged through contrasting scientific paradigms (Brace,
2000; Bamshad & Olsen, 2003). Because o f this, the debate among biological
anthropologists on the reality o f ‘race’ is polarized.
Biological factors classifying people into distinct ‘races’ can yield many
contradictory results. Forensic anthropologists, working with bone stmcture, believe that
they can group people as originating from specific geographic regions. Based on this
data, some o f them believe that further inferences can be made on the type of ‘race’ that a
person belongs to by matching bone stmcture with further speculations on other somatic
features like skin colour (Gill, 2000). According to this belief, bone stmcture corresponds
to commonly held assumptions about ‘race’ and is based on inheritable morphological
attributes. For example, some forensic anthropologists believe that they can classify
human skulls as belonging to distinct ‘races’. Narrow nasal passages and eye sockets that
are in close proximity to each other may indicate a Caucasoid, emphasized cheek bones
may indicate a Mongoloid, and broad nasal passages “shaped like an upside down heart”
may indicate that the skull belonged to a Negroid person (Rushton, 1995, 1996, 1998,
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2000). On the other side of this debate, however, anthropologists studying blood factors
disagree.
Serologists show that many biological traits cut across traditional racial
boundaries. Phenotypical attributes such as skin, hair and bone, are distinct categories
influenced by natural forces like climate. Blood-factor frequencies are not shaped by
environmental forces in the same ways that skin, hair, and bone are. Serologists consider
these physical variations among people as gradients o f change known as clines (Brace,
2000). With physical variations in appearance being attributed to clines (as opposed to
clearly distinguishable separations), it is impossible to conclusively delineate one group
of people as distinct from another group o f people. Differences in skin colour are gradual
and seamless with no break in distinction from one geographical region to the next.
Differences from ‘white’ skin to ‘black’ skin, rest on latitudinal orientation and exposure
to the intensity o f the sun’s ultra violet rays. Without comparing extremes, it is hard to
discern where one ‘race’ ends and another begins. Despite this fact, academics,
intellectuals, and scientists alike, still ponder and debate imagined distinctions between
populations by classifying them in terms o f ‘race’ as a heritable, biological taxonomy.
Many o f these proponents have made a handsome career off such overtly racist and
misleading notions. One o f the leading proponents o f ‘race’ - as a scientifically valid
taxonomic concept - is Canada’s own J. Philippe Rushton.

J. PHILIPPE RUSHTON AND THE EVOLUTIONARY PARADOX
John Philippe Rushton currently teaches as a tenured professor in the University
of Western Ontario’s Psychology department. Author o f many controversial journal
articles and books - like his most infamous Race, Evolution and Behavior - Rushton is
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one o f Canada’s hallmark figures in a hotly debated ‘reality o f race’ argument. Rushton’s
(1995, 1996, 1998, and 2000) studies attempt to prove that by analysing proposed
morphological and physiological differences between perceived ‘races’, scientists can
accurately predict differences in intellectual potential and behavioural patterns - such as
aggression and sexual restraint - that he believes can be attributed to differences between
the respective racial categories. Furthermore, Rushton (1995, 1996, 1998, and 2000)
believes that ‘race’ as a causal factor is not only scientifically verifiable within North
America but is also consistent globally throughout time. This implies a universality and
absoluteness to his findings that also highlights a glaring contradiction in his overall
paradigm. This glaring contradiction - as I will return to shortly - ultimately leads his
main arguments down a path of self destruction.
Rushton’s (1995, 1996, 1998, and 2000) research, linking perceived racial
differences to causal behavioural attributes and intelligence, places Asians at the more
advanced end o f the racial spectrum and Africans at the more primitive end. Europeans,
in this framework, are curiously located consistently in between Asians and Africans.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Europeans are not only located in the middle but
are actually located in closer proximity to Asians than they are to Africans. His location
of these three dominant racial categories is supposedly based on research that includes
data from over 60 social and somatic variables. Some of these variables include: brain
size gathered from the measurement and volume o f skulls, the use o f wet brain weight
during autopsies, and scans from magnetic resonance imaging (MRI); intelligence based
on IQ scores, and; sexual habits and temperament derived from the production of
testosterone, just to list a few. Due to his own admission, the results interpreted from
these variables, however, are not due to his own empirical studies but are derived instead
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from a compilation o f studies done by other researchers - most o f which are outdated and
misconstrued. Nonetheless, these variables - among others according to Rushton - help
him to ‘scientifically’ determine that intelligence and behavioural characteristics can be
linked to existence o f clearly delineable ‘races’. Moreover, Rushton believes that his
findings are conclusive based on the consistency and predictability o f the results
interpreted through his research framework. In order to reveal the contradictions intrinsic
to his research, a closer look at how Rushton contextualizes ‘race’ should be examined.
Rushton’s concept o f ‘race’ is derived from the 18th century views o f Swedish
naturalist, Carolus Linaeus. Dividing the human species into four main categories Asians, American Indians, Europeans, and Africans - variations on Linaeus’
classification system is still commonly used in biology among many zoologists today. A
definition of ‘race’ that is common to most zoologists implies that a variety or a
subdivision exists in a given species. Variety that subdivides species is believed to occur
naturally in a distinct combination o f inherited physiological, biological, and
morphological traits. When grouped together, such traits are interpreted as indicative of
racial differentiation.
Although Linaeus’ classification system identifies four main ‘races’ o f the human
species, some people would combine the categories that delineate Asians and American
Indians into one ‘race’. As a result, we are left with three main ‘races’ known
respectively as Mongoloid, Caucasoid, and Negroid. These three ‘races’ form the basic
categories through which Rushton operates within his research framework.
According to Rushton, racial differentiation occurs over long periods o f time
through evolution. As individuals within one group o f people reproduce exclusively
within their group, remaining confined to a specific geographical location, they are
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believed to have evolved distinct biological features - like skin colour - adapted as
advantageous to the survival o f the subspecies in their respective environment. As
previously mentioned, these populations o f subspecies are what zoologists consider to be
‘races’. This conception o f ‘race’, however, is commonly accepted as a misinterpretation
of clinal variation between populations by many leading theorists in the scientific
community (Adelman et.al, 2003; Brace, 2000; Bamshad & Olsen, 2003). What separate
these scientists from Rushton are their views on how ‘race’ is interpreted.
For scientists like Rushton and Gill (2000), ‘race’ exists beyond simple arbitrary
labels. ‘Race’, in this sense, is not only universal but it is also absolute. There is a
contradiction inherent to the very thought o f this statement within the accepted
evolutionary paradigm o f science. For instance, how can evolution - under its established
principle of constant change, mutation or development based on environmental factors be subject to stasis, as culminated in an absolute conclusion o f a species’ development?
To answer while clarifying this question, Rushton believes that three main ‘races’
exist as a result o f the evolutionary development from a single population that originated
in Africa. Rushton traces this development to outward migration that occurred as the
original population reproduced and increased. According to this assumption, most people
within the scientific community13 commonly believe that Homo sapiens first appeared in
Africa approximately 200,000 years ago. As this population reproduced and increased in
size, they gradually migrated to Europe approximately 110,000 years ago and into Asia
approximately 70,000 years later. Rushton (1995, 1996, 1998, and 2000) believes that the

13 When I refer to ‘the scientific community’ I am by no means im plying that consensus exists among all
those claiming to be scientists. Rather, the ‘scientific com m unity’ here loosely refers to a culture o f
professionals bound by empirical research methodologies that lead to postulations about consistency in
observable phenomena. There is no singular ‘scientific com m unity’ as there is no singular notion o f
culture. This term should not be taken outside o f its generic construct.
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evolutionary effects caused by these gradual migrations formed the three main racial
groupings (Mongoloid, Caucasoid, and Negroid) that are conceptualized today.
Seeing that evolution indicates a continual state o f development based on
gradually shifting environmental factors, the perceived permanence about these three
racialized categories is essentially arbitrary. Even though this process points to the
arbitrary nature o f classifying populations into distinct ‘races’, scientists like Rushton and
others o f his ilk use evolution to fix specious distinctions within human populations as
objective and observable. Indeed, the use o f evolution to qualify the existence of racial
differences is tenuous at best and contradictory to say the least. The reason for this
criticism is due to the fact that differences cannot be fixed if they have resulted from
evolution simply because they must continue to be subject to evolution.
If differences within the human species - like those attributed to somatic
distinctions commonly interpreted as ‘race’ - are evolutionary, there should be no
objective and observable break from one population to the next. As a result, racial
evolution occurs as a singular process within a species based on clines. Differentiation
within a species, therefore, does not indicate the development o f a subspecies but more so
a clinal variation. Nonetheless, Rushton has made him self the authority on where the
distinction between populations begins and ends by qualifying his arguments through an
appeal to evolutionary principles in spite o f this glaring contradiction. The
contradictions inherent to using evolutionary theories, to explain the existence o f distinct
‘races’, is further revealed in the ways that Rushton has trouble grouping the entire
human population within his three narrow racial categories.
Although Rushton (1995, 1996, 1998, and 2000) believes that three main ‘races’
exist, he also acknowledges that these three main ‘races’ can be further subdivided in
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order to accommodate the logic o f his belief in evolution. These further subdivisions are
a result o f increased spatial mobility across geographical boundaries and increased
reproduction among populations in different geographical areas. Using this logic, the
principles of evolution remains intact, in order to account for relatively recent mutations
in populations that do not fall neatly into any o f the three main categories. For example,
Rushton (1998) has trouble classifying Hispanic or ‘Latino’ people.
As per Rushton’s rigid classification system, Hispanics are neither European nor
Asian. For Rushton (1998), they represent a further subdivision o f the human species that
indicates the admixture o f a combination o f racial attributes. According to Tim Wise
from Znet (n.d.), however, ‘Latino’ is a term that refers to “an ethnic/ national/ regional/
heritage group within which skin color and racial phenotype varies dramatically”.
Anomalies o f sorts, Hispanic and Latino people, for Rushton, are caught in a virtual
limbo o f evolutionary development, constituting the interstices o f a flawed and arbitrary
construct. By the logic o f evolution, this further implies that the developments o f new
‘races’ are constantly occurring phenomena. If this remains the case, how then can racial
categories be anything but arbitrary?
Rushton’s main ‘races’ - Mongoloid, Caucasoid, and Negroid - are perceived as
universal and absolute. If this is the case, Rushton’s research essentially contradicts the
principles o f evolution. Did evolution cease to work, as it has been for millions of years,
as soon as J. Philippe Rushton appeared on the scene? Curiously, as Rushton claims to be
a ‘high priest’ in the evolutionary science and genetics o f ‘race’ - despite the fact that he
has had no formal training in genetics - he surreptitiously manages to espouse a heretical
logic against evolution all within the same research. Therein lies the contradiction
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inherent to Rushton’s racial classification system that essentially undermines his very
premise on ‘race’ as a causal factor.
Without solid evidence that distinct racial categories do in fact exist - as Rushton
(1995, 1996, 1998, and 2000) has expertly conceptualized them - causal factors, like
intelligence and behavioural attributes, that have been postulated as linked to these racial
distinctions, quickly disintegrate from scientific knowledge claims and emerge as patent
nonsense. If this is in fact nonsense masquerading as science, why do people like
Rushton continue to make a living by misleading the public? The answer to this question
is threefold and is based on: Rushton’s convictions, sources o f ample funding, and media
hype.
In most cases researchers, conducting scholarly work or engaged in scientific
inquiry, conduct their research under the belief that they are advancing knowledge in their
respective field or discipline. As a result, researchers actually believe in the information
that they have researched and therefore consider such findings to be knowledge. Clinging
to the distortion that objective, observable phenomenon can be interpreted purely as it
exists in reality, scientific researchers do not necessarily set out to intentionally mislead
(Herman, n.d.). Indeed, Rushton has often tried to defend his research against
implications that he is a racist, by claiming that he is simply a scientist that tries to reveal
the truth. Perhaps his views are indicative o f an underlying social psyche that yearns for
some sort o f validation towards hidden racist beliefs (Herman, n.d.). Maybe he doesn’t
realize that he is racist. Moreover, these hidden beliefs could possibly reveal a part of
what Henry Giroux refers to as White Panic (Giroux, 1995). Either way, these views can
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be interpreted as bound in essence by what Herbert Marcuse (1969) refers to as the
‘biology’ of their discourse14.
The ‘biology’ of a group’s discourse is essentially how they make sense o f the
world around them in order to survive as it were. Knowledge in this sense, when
interpreted under a more critical lens, is revealed as myth. The belief that ‘race’ is a
biologically real entity becomes taken-for-granted as a natural fact. This occurs through
the myth constructed about it and justified by the paradigm (Kuhn, 1962) that created it.
Furthermore, propagating this myth about ‘race’ can also be profitable. This brings us to
the second reason why some scientists make a living on flawed knowledge claims. There
are underlying political and economic interests at stake, supporting the types o f funding
that keeps such research afloat.
Steve Buist (2000) exposes the fact that J. Philippe Rushton had received close to
one million US dollars in funding during the 1990’s from an organization called the
Pioneer Fund. According to Buist (2000), the Pioneer Fund is an American organization
that has a long legacy of funding ‘race’ research and eugenics. As mandated in its
charter, the organization is dedicated to the notion o f ‘race betterment’. It becomes
1 4 Herbert Marcuse (1969) criticizes capitalism in the ways that it has becom e rooted within the organic
and instinctive nucleus o f humanity. At this level, the mechanisms o f global capitalism have been
subsuming morality for profits. The dive for profits, in order to make a living, has becom e the basis to
survival. This basis o f survival has becom e entrenched at every dimension o f social being, including the
biological. Marcuse (1969) clarifies what he means by biological in his distinction o f the term from a
scientific discipline. For Marcuse (1969), biology and biological refers to a second nature o f sorts. It
represents the dim ension o f instinct and behaviour that becom e like vital needs to be satisfied in order for
an organism to survive. Marcuse (1969) proposes the notion that Socialism must address the need towards
revolution against global capitalism in order to be successful. Revolution must be enacted, not only in the
social dimension but in the biological dimension also. H ow ever fitting for this section o f the thesis,
b iology, in this sense, is not intended to be physiological. Although Marcuse’s (1969) formulation o f
biology speaks to a Socialism that must counter global capitalism, I believe that his theories can be
applicable to all forms o f revolutionary struggle. In specific reference to this case, I have taken liberty to
apply this notion o f biology to a deep structured cultural instinct throughout Western science for fixing
categories o f ‘race’ as natural. Although there is no pun intended, the ‘b io lo g y ’ o f discourse is what I
w ould like to refer to as myth, in the ways that it remains hidden in culture w hile organizing a perception o f
reality. To bring this analogy back to science, change can only occur when the myths propagated in one
paradigm, encounter the myths propagated in another contesting paradigm (Kuhn, 1962).
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abundantly clear that this notion o f ‘race betterment’ implies the proliferation o f white
supremacist ideology through the sponsoring o f scientific research that implies the
existence of naturalized racial hierarchies. Even though Rushton currently holds a
position on their executive board, he was not the only person funded. The Pioneer Fund
sponsors other ‘race’ scientists, like Rushton, who demonstrate a penchant for research in
the hopes that it can be used to prove a hierarchy among ‘races’. Arthur Jenson, who has
published research on why ‘black’ people have low IQ scores, happens to be another
recipient of funding from this institute and pulls in even more financial support from the
Pioneer Fund than Rushton (Buist, 2000).
With all the money to be made from wealthy and powerful racist organizations it
is no surprise that ‘race’ myths are given voice that continues to be passed off as objective
science. Whether or not these individuals who conduct this type o f research are racist or
politically motivated is not entirely the issue at hand. They will be the first to tell you
that they are scientists and remain secluded in the world o f science. They prefer to leave
the policies and politics to politicians (Rushton, 1998, 2000). The curious thing about
this statement is the fact that they have no problem accepting money from those who are
politically motivated, who, in turn, intend to use the research that they fund to effect
policy as in Hermstein and M urray’s (1994) The Bell Curve. Rushton’s theories, coupled
with the possibility that his research may be used to affect racist policies and incite
tensions between racialized communities, have created a great deal o f media hype in the
popular press.
In a January 28th 1989 Toronto Star article titled “An obstinate professor and his
theories on race. Race superiority theories pure hokum, scientists say”, Rushton is quoted
as saying:
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I ’m not a policy maker and I ’m not a racist. I just think government
should be aware o f differences between the races and take them into
account when planning. The government may have to be more
interventionist when dealing with these differences, (p. A8)
Although Rushton claims that he is not responsible for possible policies that his
research may implicate, he is supportive o f government using his findings to effect
policy. Perhaps such policies could be aimed towards amending the existing policy of
‘official multiculturalism’ as it can be interpreted to be based on a familiar platform.
Either way, Rushton’s suggestion is problematic - not only in the implication that
government policies should pander to the claims o f racial superiority but more so based
on the assumption that distinct ‘races’ do in fact exist.
On a deeper level, slightly removed from the overtly racist implications of
Rushton’s research, is the possibility and ease through which the government could
potentially implement policy based on racial differences. After all - as previously
discussed in this thesis - Canada’s official policy on multiculturalism is a more subtle and
purportedly more benign way o f managing difference based on culture and/ or ‘race’.
Rushton’s suggestion that government should consider basing policy on his ‘race’
research is promptly followed by scientists who claim that Rushton has misused their
data, making any policy derived from such research problematic.
One aspect o f Rushton’s research - that The Star highlights as dubious based on
the criticisms o f scientists - is the premise that the more recently developed a ‘race’ is,
the more advanced it is in many intellectual and behavioural respects. Seeing that
Rushton posits all members of the human race as being evolved originally from Africa
approximately 200, 000 years ago, he believes that Asians are the most recent to have
evolved making them the most advanced sub-species o f human. According to an article
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in The Star, scientists in the field o f genetics and biochemistry consider the data used
from this premise to be outdated and it has since been revised.
The revised data indicate that a second set o f people from Africa have evolved last
- even after Asians - making Rushton’s evolutionary ‘timing and advancement’ theory
null and void. The same article quotes University o f California micro-biologist, Svante
Paabo as saying, “I don’t know if Dr. Rushton has accidentally or deliberately
misunderstood our work on evolutionary dating. In any event this whole field is still
highly speculative. To present it as scientific fact is wrong” (p. A8). Paabo goes on to say
that “One thing we do know, however, is that it’s ridiculous to compare races because
they all emerged from one and there has been constant intermingling” (p. A8). This
statement by Paabo is the only statement that The Star uses that derides Rushton’s
research on the belief that separate ‘races’ exist. Throughout the rest o f The S ta r’s
coverage of Rushton, however, ‘race’ is assumed to be a natural fact where differences in
‘race’ are descriptive markers for different communities. If The Star were to place more
emphasis on the illusion o f ‘race’, Rushton’s theories would quickly dissolve without all
the added hype and spotlight. This is one clear example on how news is made and
interpreted as opposed to being directly reported from objectively observed phenomena.
According to Richard Ericson, Patricia Baranek, and Janet Chan (1987), news is
an interpretation o f real phenomena that is structured through the organizational
conventions that shape its discourse. As such, the facts presented in a news report are not
self evident; the facts must be invested with significance (Ericson et al., 1987). Indeed,
the creation o f news involves a process of structuring reality. Although The Star article
clearly makes the case that distinct ‘races’ do not exist because “they have all emerged
from one”, it nonetheless continues to use ‘race’ as descriptive categories that signify
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distinct communities. In this case, news is created in the insinuated beliefs that distinct
communities o f ‘raced’ individuals are subject to racism, without examining the ways in
which racism structures racialized individuals into separate ‘races’. Studies that question
the scientific validity o f ‘race’ can even be applied to Rushton’s studies linking brain-size
to intelligence.
With regards to Rushton’s conclusions derived from brain size data, the same
article mentioned above quotes University o f Guelph neuro-psychologist Michael Peters
as stating that there are “no reliable, racial brain-size studies” (p. A8). In my opinion The
Star could emphasize this point in greater detail by stating a reason for this fact. The
main reason that comes to mind as to why there are “no reliable, racial brain-size studies”
could be that ‘race’ does not exist as an objective biological quality. Peters goes on to
state that Rushton “compiles information without having any true expertise in the
different specialties involved” (p. A8). Out o f all the Toronto Star articles surveyed on
the issue, this was the only article that discussed data that was used to challenge
Rushton’s research. This is rather telling with respect to the ways in which the public is
informed about the issues surrounding Rushton’s research and its broader social
implications.
Instead o f exposing the illusion o f ‘race’ as a flawed premise within Rushton’s
research, The Star seemed content to promote an emotionally charged debate between
Rushton and his critics. This angle was possibly deemed more newsworthy within the
organizational structures that shape the discourse o f news. As a result, this debate was
presented as a ‘hot ticket item’ to be sold to large audiences. Headlines such as:
“Teachers condemn Rushton’s theory o f racial inferiority” ; “Rushton’s credibility
attacked by professors”; “An obstinate professor and his theories on race. Race
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superiority theories pure hokum, scientists say”; “Scholars dismiss Canadian’s racial
theory”; “Rushton’s crime theories have no basis in fact”, captured the spirit of the
debate. By taking a closer look at these articles, however, most them - with the exception
o f two (one scarcely mentions that all people have evolved from one ‘race’ and the other,
that happens to be an opinion letter to the editor, states that no pure ‘races’ exist) insinuate the belief that distinct ‘races’ do in fact exist and Rushton’s theories are racist
under the premise that they attempt to justify a hierarchy among the ‘races’. As a result,
The Star managed to highlight the conflict and divisiveness between imagined racialized
communities. Indeed, the Rushton coverage was quickly subsumed by questions of
‘black’ inferiority and ‘w hite’ superiority.
In a letter to the editor, published in the Opinion section o f the March 14th 1989
issue, Julian Roberts and Thomas Gabor - from the University o f Ottawa’s Criminology
department - represent a minority o f people published in The Star that challenged the
credibility o f Rushton’s theories on the premise that distinct ‘races’ exist in pure form.
According to Roberts and Gabor, Rushton’s theories o f racial differences between
‘blacks’ and ‘whites’ are predicated on false assumptions about racial purity. Roberts and
Gabor attempt to qualify this assertion by stating that “in North America, many blacks are
more than half white by lineage and many whites have some black ancestry” (p. A21).
This is a clear example o f how racism is marketed primarily as a ‘black’/ ‘white’ issue.
Despite the fact that these scholars argue that there are no pure ‘races’, they do not
attempt to discuss the presumed purity o f Asians. This is crucial because, according to
Rushton, Asians are on top of the evolutionary ladder of racial superiority. Although
Roberts and Gabor do not go as far to say that ‘races’ do not exist, they do state that pure
‘races’ do not exist. Upon the basis o f that assumption alone, Rushton’s views are
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regarded as bogus science. Despite this criticism, however, commonly perceived racial
groupings are still preserved in the ways that The Star continued to report on them.
In a March 15th 1989 article titled “Teachers condemn R ushton’s theory o f racial
inferiority”, Bob Mitchell o f the Toronto Star writes that “most scientists insist there are
no racial intelligence differences that are biologically determined, and that all racial genes
come from the same evolutionary pool” (p. A7). Despite the admission that all “racial
genes come from the same evolutionary pool”, the article uncritically quotes Rosemary
Clark - a secondary school teacher - as stating that “we have a significant amount of
blacks and Orientals in our school ... I don’t condemn research if it is academically done
properly. But I do condemn any theory that ranks the races” (p. A7). This quote further
supports the claim that ‘races’ are preserved as objective biological signifiers o f identity.
For Clark, the problem here is not that Rushton acknowledges the existence o f distinct
‘races’ - the fact that “all racial genes come from the same evolutionary gene pool” is
easily overshadowed by the assumption that different ‘races’ exist in nature. The problem
for Clark is that Rushton’s research pits the ‘races’ against each other according to a
postulated evolutionary hierarchy.
In addition to the sensational debate that falls short o f criticizing Rushton on the
premise that distinct ‘races’ exist scientifically, The S ta r’s coverage o f the issues succeed
in showcasing Rushton under a mass mediated spotlight. Moreover, the emotional tenor
of the coverage sparked by this debate circuitously promotes R ushton’s theories and
elevates his personage to the rank o f a sort o f infamous celebrity. As a now famous
scholar, Rushton’s work reaches a wider, more popular audience beyond the walls of
academia. Indeed, albeit largely negative, Rushton is given a greater voice through which
to express his ideas.
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On February 17th 1989, The Star published an article on the front page titled
“Rushton called a racist at Geraldo taping”. Dan Smith o f the Toronto Star reports that
“Canada’s most controversial academic steadfastly denied heated charges that he was a
racist” (p. A l). According to Smith, the Geraldo show titled “ Sex, Brains and Brawn: Is
there a Master Race?” was scheduled to air on March 8th 1989 on “more than 190 North
American TV stations, by far the biggest vehicle the formerly obscure Rushton has gained
to publicize his controversial views” (p. A2). Smith reports that the taping o f the show
was denounced as “a circus or worse” by “every major participant but the producers” (p.
A l). Ironically enough, however, although Smith’s tone appears to be critical o f the
media “circus” surrounding Rushton on the Geraldo show, as a venue to further propagate
his racist views, he nonetheless adds to Rushton’s publicity by alerting The S ta r’s
readership, in advance, to the exact time and date that the show was aired.
By further contributing to Rushton’s publicity, dominant points of his research are
highlighted in most o f the articles concerning him. Few articles, however, take the time
to systematically deride his work on the level o f sound scholarship. In a March 19th 1989
editorial titled “A weak reaction to academic fraud”, The Star is quite caustic in its
displeasure over Rushton’s right to academic freedom without detailing expert data that
proves his work fraudulent. According to The Star it is “without exception” that the
“academic community” has found Rushton’s conclusions to have no “scientific basis” (p.
A28). Although it is widely publicized that Rushton’s research is not based in science, as
it purports to be, there is no mention in this article that his research is based on secondary
sources that have been largely misconstrued. As a result, The Star has labelled Rushton a
“charlatan” and the UWO senate decision “preposterous” in their dereliction o f their
broader duty to protect society (p. A28). To further emphasize the perceived threat that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

70
Rushton poses to society, The Star employs sensational tactics to appeal to the emotions
of its readership.
Despite Rushton’s strong convictions towards his research findings, the financial
support he received to conduct his research, and the subsequent media hype that
inadvertently promoted his work, it is important to note, however, that not all science
surrounding notions o f ‘race’ is one sided. Despite The S ta r’s limited coverage o f sound
scholarly criticisms, some of the very evidence espoused by Rushton that he considers
conclusive, is subject to contested interpretations even within the very scientific
community that he claims membership to.

GENETICS OF ‘RACE’ - Science Fact or Fiction?
When using somatic factors like skin colour to group people into ‘races’,
Europeans can be interpreted as having more in common, biologically, with Chinese than
either o f them have in common with Africans. If the distributions o f blood-factors are
used, Africans and Europeans have more in common with each other biologically than
either o f them does with Chinese. Although similarities in physiological features within
regions can be used towards positing ancestry, current genetic research reveals that 90%
of human genetic variation occurs within a population whereas there is only 10%
variation between populations (Bamshad & Olsen, 2003).
University o f Utah physician Michael Bamshad and science writer Steve Olsen
(2004), use genetics to illustrate how common notions o f ‘race’ are actually clinal.
Bamshad and Olsen (2004) subscribe to the popular ‘out o f Africa’ theory which states
that over the past hundred thousand years, people had migrated all over the world from
Africa. The regions where people have settled, has created distinct genetic signatures in
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deoxyribo nucleic acid (DNA) based on environmental conditions. Their research further
reveals that variations in the base pairs that form the building blocs o f DNA polymorphisms - are common and do not directly affect physical traits.
Scientists who have sequenced the human genome (full set o f DNA) have
identified millions o f different polymorphisms. Although distribution o f these
polymorphisms across populations, reflect the history o f a population and the
environmental effects o f natural selection on them, 68% o f all genes are identical between
humans, exhibiting no polymorphic variation (Wise, n.d.). To use this data to group
‘races’ o f people would imply that certain polymorphisms would be present in all
members o f a group, while absent in all members o f other groups (Bamshad & Olsen,
2004).
According to Tim Wise o f Znet (n.d), people who are perceived to be on opposite
ends o f the ‘race’ spectrum - ‘blacks’ and ‘whites’ - share 96.8% of the genetic code
with a maximum o f 0.032 variations in genes between the perceived groupings.
Differences between perceived groups, on the basis o f genetic makeup, are far too
miniscule to indicate distinct speciation among human populations. Bamshad and Olsen
(2004) believe that groups have separated too recently, and mixed too much, for
differences based on natural selection to have any significance. Moreover, this research
shows that outward physical appearances are largely insignificant regarding a person’s
genetic makeup.
Although physical features such as skin colour and hair texture, combined with
geographical origin and culture, are commonly used to group people into racial
categories, common traits, such as skin and hair, can be regarded as “family resemblance
writ large” (Brace, 2000). Further more, these ‘family resemblances’ vary gradually
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between populations. Supporting this claim, population genetics provides evidence that
less than 1% o f genes can be linked to heritable somatic features like skin colour (Wise,
n.d.). Given this assertion, there are no bio-genetic racial differences; there are only
clines which make racial distinctions between neighbouring populations virtually
imperceptible. As a result o f widespread scientific consensus on the uselessness of
commonly perceived racial categories, the use o f physical features like skin colour and
hair texture to organize human populations are purely trivial. Despite this data, a
minority of scientists like Rushton continue to cling to these distortions o f racial
difference to make sweeping generalizations on intelligence and the predictability of
behavioural traits based on genes.
According to Bamshad and Olsen (2004), however, it is not only misleading to
assume that categorizing the human species into groups based on these traits is somehow
linked to the genes that a person is bom with; it is even more misleading to use these data
to determine intelligence or predict social behaviours. Genes cannot be used to group
people into racial categories. Furthermore, using genetic data one cannot interpret such
categories as universal or absolute. ‘Race’ is more so a product o f language than it is a
product o f science (Hall, 1996). This is seen in the ways in which different populations
interpret and label racial difference.
The definition o f what constitutes membership in racial categories varies from
region to region. The same person who may be considered ‘black’ in the United States,
may be seen as ‘w hite’ in Brazil or ‘coloured’ in South Africa - where ‘coloured’ is a
term used to categorize a group that is distinguishable from both ‘black’ and ‘white’
(Bamshad & Olsen, 2003; Daniels, 1996). How groups are distinguished in difference to
one another depends on what genes are isolated and examined. A person may be
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categorized into one group based on skin colour and at the same time considered part of
another group based on hair texture. This implies that there is greater genetic variance
within culturally perceived racial groups than there are between them. Although people
may appear similar on the surface, within the commonly perceived racial group, they can
be quite different genetically.
The people living in sub-Saharan Africa and the Aboriginal people o f Australia
share a similar skin complexion but are very dissimilar genetically. Likewise, two groups
that share a similar genetic makeup may be exposed to different environmental factors
that exaggerate their differences. Furthering this claim, in a study that isolated
polymorphisms used to estimate the percentage o f genes originating from a continental
region, it was discovered that on average, Americans who considered themselves ‘white’
had less than 90% European ancestry according to genetics (Bamshad & Olsen, 2003).
This implies that common perceptions o f ‘race’ are not absolutely reflective o f a person’s
genetic heritage. For Bamshad and Olsen (2003), the value and importance o f perceived
racial differences are shaped by social and political impressions and not scientific ones.
Despite these findings - amidst all the media hype propagated about racist scientists and
their research - the Toronto Star has not only been slow to report on these issues but
articles that question the reality o f ‘race’ have been scarce.
An article published on October 13 1996 titled “Scientists find we are all the
same under the skin: No genetic basis for race, say researchers”, offers rare coverage on
the genetic argument that proves all people evolved from the same ‘race’. According to
Robert Boyd, in a special article to The Star, “most scientists now reject the concept of
race as a valid way to put human beings into separate groups” (p. A 14). Despite
widespread public opinion on the issue, this general scientific consensus comes about
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through “spectacular advances in molecular biology and genetics” and is a culmination of
work that has been gathered since the 1970’s (p. A14). Quoting Yale geneticist Kenneth
Kidd, “DNA data supports the concept that you can’t draw boundaries around races” (p.
A 14). Contrary to widespread scientific belief, however, the article does mention that a
small number o f researchers - including Philippe Rushton - still cling to the flawed
genetic concept o f ‘races’. It is ironic that this article points out that Rushton still clings
to a distorted view that distinct ‘races’ exist, despite the fact that The Star reproduces the
same racialized distinctions in other stories.
Another rare Toronto Star article that reports on how current genetic studies have
disproved the bio-genetic concept of ‘race’ was published on June 30th 2000. This article,
titled “The other genome project: search for human diversity proves w e’re similar after
all”, was published in the midst o f the media’s coverage o f the Human Genome Project.
Although the Human Genome Project mainly focused on mapping the entire DNA code
for the purpose o f medical advancement, the Human Diversity Genome Project15 applied
much of this information to explore the nuances o f human differences between
populations. According to Delthia Ricks and Bryn Nelson, in their special to The Star,
“the project has found no biological basis for the concept o f race. Physical differences
such as skin colour and hair texture are adaptations to the environment spelled out in
infinitesimal variations of the same code we all share” (p. F2). This article, however,
makes no direct mention o f the White House press conference on June 26th 2000, where J.
Craig Venter - president and chief scientific officer o f Celera Genomics (the private

1 5 For more information on the Human Diversity Genome Project, please visit the website at
http://www.stanford.edu/group/morrinst/hgdp/faq.html.
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company that headed the government’s Human Genome Project) - announced that his
team o f scientist have sequenced the entire human genome.
At the press conference, Venter (2000) announced that his team o f scientists had
sequenced the genetic code of three females and two males. This sample of people
identified themselves as Hispanic, Asian, Caucasian, or African-American. According to
Venter (2000), “We did this sampling not in an exclusionary way, but out of respect for
the diversity that is America, and to help illustrate that the concept o f race has no genetic
or scientific basis” 16. O f the five genomes sequenced, the data remains conclusive that
there is no way to determine ‘race’ or ethnicity as genetically distinct from one another.
On the level o f genetics, individuals are all unique due to minute variations in each
genome. Population statistics, therefore, do not apply.
The fact that some o f these arguments only managed to gamer scarce coverage as
opposed to several articles questioning the social implications o f its research - as seen in
The S ta r’s earlier coverage of Rushton - illustrates a rather telling example o f the
mainstream m edia’s success in marginalizing the issue. This can be further insinuated in
The S ta r’s uncritical, yet continued use of racial categories in their expose' o f racial
profiling to be discussed in a later chapter of this thesis.
The S ta r’s continued use o f racial categories in their coverage exhibits a sort of
institutional amnesia. Either it does not remember that ‘race’ is a social construct or it
refuses to remember in order to create a more sensational story. As discussed earlier in
this chapter, the news is not a reflection of reality but an interpretation o f it (Ericson et al.,

16 For the full W hite House press conference, please refer to the Human Genome Project Information
website provided through the White House Office o f the Press Secretary at
< http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Hunian Genome/proiect/clinton2.shtml>
This w ebsite is sponsored by the U.S. Department o f Energy O ffice o f Science, Office o f Biological and
Environmental Research, and the Human Genome Program.
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1987). The Star continues to use ‘race’ as an analytic and discursive concept - commonly
interpreted as normal via consensus - as being rooted in an objective reality. Despite its
publication o f the two articles on the genetic studies that disprove ‘race’, in subsequent
accounts of ‘race’ The Star continues to reinforce a commonly distorted view that does
not essentially challenge the status quo.
Without challenging popular notions o f ‘race’ and re-educating the public in the
process, The Star misses its opportunity to reveal new truths that may have a profound
social impact in the struggle against racism. Even though it barely recognizes the fact
that other truths about ‘race’ currently exist in the form o f popular scientific knowledge,
these truths are marginalized and quickly forgotten. Indeed, ‘races’ and assumptions
surrounding ‘race’ are essentially ideological, discursive constructs. Despite beliefs now
popular among most scientists, distorted notions o f ‘race’ persist and have become deeply
enmeshed within the discourses o f our dominant myths that shape our perceptions of
reality and ourselves through language.
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VI.

LIVING THROUGH LANGUAGE

REALITY & ‘RACE’ - Making Sense of Our Existence through Language
To speak...means to above all assume a culture,
to support the weight o f a civilization
(Fanon, 1967, pp. 17-18)
The notion o f myth has many implications regarding the ways that we interpret
our experiences as subjects within the world. That being said, myth is intimately tied to
notions of knowledge and reality. Using terms like see and interpret, knowledge, myth,
and reality are revealed by the ways that meanings are constructed through language.
This is explored in the common discourses o f ‘race’ as historical constructs o f Western
imperialist ideologies.
Like social constructivist notions o f reality, ‘race’ exists as a fluid concept
constituted in a discourse o f ideas. This means that there is no physiological, bio-genetic
merit to its concept. It exists as an abstraction, through systems o f language and
representation that constitute ways o f ordering and interpreting the world through myth.
Given this assertion, ‘race’ is as real as the theories that bind it within the confines o f its
respective social framework. This theory has very salient implications for the ways that
‘race’ is represented in the mass media.
The following part o f this thesis continues from where my analysis left off in the
previous chapter. There, I outlined the ways that the Toronto Star reported on issues of
‘race’ through the hype generated about Philippe Rushton and its subsequent yet scarce
coverage of genetics and ‘race’. The information presented in this part o f the thesis
attempts to further explore the ways that myths construct a reality o f ‘race’ in the popular
press through a critical discourse analysis o f selected Toronto Star articles from its
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coverage of racial profiling. Here, I intend to further reveal myth by demystifying the
common meanings associated in the ways in which The S ta r ’s codes a language about
‘race’. Before proceeding with an analysis o f the ways myth works to construct and
perpetuate distorted notions o f ‘race’, it is important that a clear understanding o f the
terminology surrounding this study be elucidated.

LANGUAGE & DISCOURSE - A Brief Description
Language broadly refers to entire systems o f signs as “a principle o f
classification” (Saussure, 1996a, p. 39). The science o f linguistics, rooted in semiotics,
studies the structural anatomy o f signs and sign systems including words (spoken and
written), symbols, and images (Cohan & Shires, 1996). Incorporating the use o f language
and the practice o f how meanings are circulated through interpretive communities of
ideas, leads to discourse.

Discourse refers to the use o f language within a formalized, ideological
framework (Cohan & Shires, 1996). Articulated through the use o f language, it indicates
a form of cohesion in the relationship between signs and their meanings. Through this
cohesion, discourse contextualizes the ideas formed about an object or concept, as steeped
in relations o f power. For Paul Bove (1995), discourse in criticism is “the organized and
regulated, as well as the regulating and constituting, functions o f language that it studies:
its aim is to describe the surface linkages between power, knowledge, institutions,
intellectuals, the control o f populations, and the modem state as these intersect in the
functions o f systems of thought” (pp. 54-55). In this sense, discourse is an active vessel
o f ideology.
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CONCEPTUALIZING IDEOLOGY - From Ideas to Practice to Resistance
Although there are different definitions o f Ideology used to accomplish different
theoretical ends, it broadly refers to a system o f beliefs derived from the process of
producing meanings and ideas. These systems o f beliefs can be attributed to specific
classes or groups. Socially determined, ideologies carry the weight o f cultural values and
attitudes (Fiske, 1990). To understand the depth and scope o f ideology, it is useful to
articulate some o f the concepts that have evolved through its rich history.
Arising for the first time out o f the French Revolution, the term ideology is the
English translation for the French term ideologic. The term was coined by the French
rationalist philosopher Antione Destutt de Tracy to imply a ‘science o f ideas’ (Kavanagh,
1985). Since its first use during the French revolution, the term has evolved in its
complexity, beyond references to mere ‘ideas’, encompassing the driving force behind
real material and historical conditions o f existence. This notion o f ideology had since
gained popularity in Marxist theories (Fiske, 1990).
According to John Fiske (1990), Karl Marx used the term ideology to imply a set
of ideas that lead to a false consciousness. This notion o f a false consciousness attempted
to explain the ways in which the ideas o f the ruling class were imposed on the working
classes. This notion o f a false consciousness, however, is commonly misinterpreted in its
oversimplification and erroneously ascribed to the writings o f Marx.
According to Terry Eagleton (1991), Marx never actually used the phrase ‘false
consciousness.’ The phrase was used by his colleague Frederick Engels in a letter to
Franz Mehring in 1893 (Eagleton, 1991). Engels viewed ideology as a process o f false
consciousness, implying that the true motives driving the social agent was masked behind
sets o f surface motives. For Eagleton (1991), ideology in this regard is a form of
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“rationalization - a kind o f double motivation, in which the surface meaning serves to
block from consciousness the subject’s true purpose” (p. 89). In this context, ideology is
socially determined thought that essentially denies its determinacy.
Seeing that ideology is socially determined thought that denies its determinacy,
the veridical quality o f consciousness is layered in purity to the degree from which it is
based in the historical and material conditions o f existence. As a result, the ‘real’ or
‘true’ motives that impel social actors are a form o f consciousness derived from ‘real’
historical and material circumstances. Denying the social determinacy that such thoughts
carry, by distancing consciousness from the historical and material circumstances of
existence, ideology can be interpreted as a form o f self deception that masks the historical
and material conditions o f a class-based society. Ideology, in this regard, can be
interpreted as political rather than epistemological. The importance o f ideology,
therefore, lies in the function and origin o f such thoughts and not necessarily in the
veracity o f its character per se. Indeed, the “falsity o f ideology in this context, is the
falsity o f class rule itse lf’ (Eagleton, 1991, p. 90).
For Marx (1970), “the ideas o f the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas”
(p. 128). Indeed, Marx (1970) considered ideology to be a tool used by the ruling class, to
manage the working class population within a system that oppresses them. Being
intimately connected to the economic means o f production, Marx (1970) believed that the
rational science of historical materialism would eventually counter the ideology of the
ruling class, leading the working classes to realize their material conditions o f oppression
by virtue o f a class consciousness. Once the working classes could develop a class
consciousness - realizing the root and function o f their oppression - Marx (1970)
assumed that they would inevitably revolt against the very system o f oppression imposed
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upon them by the ruling class. As soon as this working class revolt against ruling class
oppression was to become successful, Marx (1970) envisioned that the working classes
would eventually usher in a new epoch o f a classless society that would no longer need
the ruling class ideology. As history progressed further into the 20th century, however, it
became evident that Capitalism would not be overthrown by a rational realization of the
economic forces of oppression. To accommodate for this anomaly, a second generation
Marxist, Louis Althusser, developed a more refined concept o f ideology.
According to Althusser ideology was not simply a set o f ideas but a ubiquitous,
ongoing practice in which all social classes were active participants (Fiske, 1990). To
clarify Althusser’s position, the ruling class participated in the production and
dissemination of ideology while maintaining their social status o f privilege over the
working class. The working class, likewise, also participated in the production and
dissemination of ideology, contributing to their position o f subordination and oppression.
As strange as it might have seemed that subordinated classes participated in their own
oppression, ideology, nonetheless, was understood as working implicitly from within the
deeply inscribed ways of thinking and living. As a result, ideology was believed to be
internalized by all classes (Turner, 1992) and it could no longer be considered the
exclusive tool that the ruling class used to explicitly subjugate the working class. The
process by which the working class contributed to their subordination was achieved
through what Althusser called interpellation (Fiske, 1990).
For Althusser, interpellation was the practice of calling or hailing readers of a
message to take a position within the ideological framework o f a respective social relation
(Fiske, 1990). Through interpellation, social relations o f power, dominance and
subjugation, were automatically maintained. Because of interpellation, subjects or
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readers would sometimes take the position o f an ideological category other than their
social one. This implied that the dominant ideology was working at its best especially
when it was accepted by all social classes while maintaining existing relations o f power
by consent. In this model o f inexorable ideological frameworks, resistance was seen as
futile and successful campaigns o f resistance were considered improbable due to a lack o f
agency on the part o f the interpolated subject. To account for the possibility o f successful
campaigns o f resistance, the work o f another second-generation Marxist, Antonio
Gramsci, deserves attention.
According Gramsci (1992), ideology was considered a terrain o f constant struggle
and was characterized by a concept known as hegemony (Fiske, 1990; Turner, 1992).
Placing emphasis on “resistance and instability”, hegemony involved a constant dialectic
of “winning and re-winning” of majority consent (Fiske, 1990) to the systems that
oppress them. The ideologies o f the dominant class (a social minority) were seen as
constantly working to win the consent o f the subjugated classes (a social majority). As a
result, continual resistance was created in the social relations o f class experience.
The experiences o f the subordinated classes - characterized by a combination of
race, gender, sexual orientation, etc. - would oftentimes contradict the material and
historical experiences that the dominant class imposed on them through an ideology about
them. These dominant ideologies about everyday social relations constituted what was
known as commonsense (Fiske, 1990). In short, although the real material conditions,
experienced by the subjugated, were not necessarily consistent with what the dominant
class told them their experiences should be, hegemony created a model o f ideology where
commonsense prevailed through the constant struggle for consent. This created gaps in
the apparently seamless production and dissemination o f ideology. These gaps allowed
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the perfect opportunities for conflict, struggle and resistance. Ideology was therefore
marked by volatile social relations.
In Gramsci’s (1992) model, although resistance has created the possibility to
overcome various struggles, such struggles could never completely be eliminated.
Considering a hybrid definition o f all three o f these models o f ideology, it is safe to
explore the ways that ideologies work through Roland Barthes’ notion o f myth as a class
based structure that naturalizes existing social relationships.

THE SEMIOTICS OF MYTH - Meaning & the Process of Signification
Myth refers to ‘a chain o f related concepts’ (Fiske, 1990), appropriated by a
culture or group, that provides a framework for interpreting experience. According to
Roland Barthes (1972, 1984), ideology is the source o f second-order meanings
manifested through myth. As a result, myth is seen as a central part o f cultural
perspective that is unquestionable. Taken-for-granted as reality, myth informs a world
view. Following a tradition o f semiologists like Ferdinand de Saussure (1996), Barthes
(1968, 1972, and 1984) extends the field o f semiotics, conceptualizing myth as a secondorder among two orders o f signification.
The first-order o f signification refers to the systematic relationships created
between the sign and the mental perception or image o f the object that it is understood to
represent in an external reality (Barthes, 1968). The sign is split into two parts, the
signifier and the signified. The signifier is the physical representation o f the sign itself
constituting its form (Barthes, 1968). ‘TREE’, in its physical written form, is a
combination o f marks forming letters on a page. These marks on the page can be taken
further to represent letters forming a word. If taken for more than just marks on the page,
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the word ‘TREE’ becomes signified in a mental concept that alludes to tree-like qualities.

Signified represents the content o f a sign through the mental concept formed about the
word ‘TREE’ (Barthes, 1968). The process o f first-order signification is the theoretical
correlation o f the physical sign (‘TREE’- signifier) to the mental image (signified) that is
understood to refer to an object in reality (mental image o f a wooded plant that exists in
an external reality - exuding tree-like qualities signified). At an elementary level, the
process o f first-order signification is one way o f organizing reality. The term that Barthes
(1996) used to refer to Saussure’s (1996) notion o f first-order signification is denotation.

Denotation, as a first-order o f signification, becomes the most obvious,
commonsense meaning attributed to a sign (Barthes, 1996). The word ‘TREE’ denotes a
mental image that is understood as referring to a physical object in an external reality that
exudes tree-like qualities. Regardless o f the possible ways that a specific word is written
(TREE, TREE, tree, tree), it denotes the same object. This order o f signification,
however, does not address the ways that signs can be interpreted beyond their relation to
other signs. It does not take into account how signs are used to create meanings within
culture.
Although Barthes (1972, 1984, and 1996) was not only concerned with signs and
their relation to other signs, he was primarily concerned with the relationships that these
signs had once inserted into culture. In order to address this concern, Barthes (1968,
1996) extended Saussure’s (1996a) process o f signification to a second level. In the
second-order o f signification, Barthes (1972, 1984, and 1996) studied the ways that signs
worked in two ways: myth and connotation.

Connotation occurs when a sign is absorbed into the value system o f a culture
(Barthes, 1996). Because o f this, meanings become more than objective reflections o f an

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

85
external reality. They become inter-subjective. The sign alone does not affect the reader.
Readers are affected as much by the sign itself, as they are in the ways that the sign is
presented to them. For example, a picture o f a tree may focus on its foliage bearing fruit.
This image may connote food. Another photograph o f the same tree may frame it in such
a manner that it casts a long shadow over the ground. This image may connote refuge.
Denotation addresses what a sign represents, whereas connotation addresses how a sign is
represented (Fiske, 1990). Connotation is the second-order meaning o f the signifier,
whereas myth is the second-order meaning o f the signified.
In contemporary Western vocabulary, myth has come to be conceptualized in
reference to false stories or fables. Contrary to this notion, Barthes (1972, 1984) used the
term myth to imply “a story by which a culture explains or understands some aspect of
reality or nature [...] a chain o f related concepts” (Fiske, 1990, p. 88). According to
Barthes (1972, 1984), the concept o f myth has many implications about the perceptions of
knowledge and reality within society:
Semiology has taught us that myth has the task o f giving an historical,
intention a natural justification, and making contingency appear eternal.
What the world supplies to myth is a historical reality, defined ... by the
way in which men [sic] have produced or used it; and what myth gives in
return is a natural image o f reality ... A conjuring trick has taken place;
it has turned reality inside out, it has emptied it o f its history and has filled
it with nature, it has removed from things their human meaning so as to
make them signify human insignificance (Barthes, 1972, pp. 142-143).
One o f the most salient features o f myth is the ways in which it takes hold o f an
object or subject and works to naturalize it, distancing it from a culture or history about it.
According the second-order of signification, the reality o f objects is articulated in and
through language; and language is ideologically entrenched in the social classes of
tradition. While, history becomes socio-politically distinguished from nature, myths
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serve to naturalize a language about objects, disguising their socio-political roots as ahistorical. As a result, Barthes (1984) considers myth to be de-politicized speech.
As a form o f depoliticized speech, myth masks the objects they refer to under the
guise o f natural semblance. This obscures any cultural link that an object may have to the
material and historical conditions o f its class-based, interpretive dimension. Because of
its natural semblance, myth makes the objects it colonizes appear eternal and absolute.
According to Edward Said (1978), “myth does not analyse or solve problem s.. .It presents
them as already analysed and solved; that is, it presents them as already assembled
im ages.. .”(p. 312). As uniform as these qualities appear to present myth, it would be a
mistake, however, to assume that all forms o f myth are the same. Towards the end of
Mythologies, Barthes (1972) conceptualized differences between ‘myth on the right’ and
‘myth on the left’. Before unpacking what is meant by ‘myth on the left’ versus ‘myth on
the right’, it is important to preface their meanings as forms o f speech that reveal what
myth is in relation to what myth is not.
If we recall, Barthes (1972) considers myth to be depoliticized speech. An
inversion o f this definition would posit political speech as the direct opposite o f myth. To
clarify what is meant by political language is to articulate forms o f speech that attempts to
transform nature/ reality. By this I mean that political language is transitive in its relation
to nature/ reality. Contrary to this notion, however, de-politicized language is a secondorder language that articulates the actions o f the first. Indeed, it exhibits an intransitive
relationship to nature/ reality. Although this second-order language is not entirely
mythic, it does form the environment where myth can colonize objects already mediated
through the first-order o f signification. In this respect, a language that is not mythical can
be seen in the acts o f revolutionary speech as highly politicized and transitive. They are
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transitive in so much as they try to affect change in nature/ reality as opposed to
preserving an image o f nature/ reality. Indeed, not all forms o f language are mythic
however.
According to Barthes (1972), revolutionary language cannot be mythic in the
sense that revolutionary acts are intended to reveal the material and historical dimensions
of nature/ reality through politicized articulations as opposed to naturalized
presuppositions. Indeed, it does not attempt to mask the political aspects of objects as
natural, producing myth; rather it attempts to reveal the political aspects of objects,
demystifying myth. Now that myth is determined in relation to what it is not, different
forms o f myth can be discussed by distinguishing ‘myth on the right’ from ‘myth on the
left’.
For Barthes (1972), ‘myth on the left’ - once characterized by revolutionary
speech - attempts to distort and mask its revolutionary qualities. As a result, it settles, ex
nominated, as an alternative form o f naturalized, de-politicized speech. ‘Myth on the
left’, however, is not essential in its propagation throughout the vast scope o f everyday
social relations. As a matter of convenience, it invests its focus in the rarities of political
life. As a result, it is ephemeral and limited in scope. This is due in large respects to its
association with the oppressed classes, whose primary language is that o f a revolutionary
quality. In this respect, ‘myth on the left’ is obvious and not as discrete as ‘myth on the
right’.
‘Myth on the right’ is characterized by de-politicized speech from the first
moment it takes hold o f objects in culture. There are no forms o f revolutionary speech
that preface its existence. As such, ‘myth on the right’ essentially proliferates itself
ceaselessly, remaining ex-nominated in its process o f colonizing the nuances o f everyday
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social relations. Indeed, language used by ‘myth on the right’ does not intend to
transform; rather it aims at masking the social, historical, and political dimensions of
objects by eternalizing them as natural.
Although there are no significant inner differences between the respective myths,
there are varying degrees o f proliferation within them. As a result, some myths expand
better than others depending on their respective social atmosphere. For instance,
apartheid - in its institutionalized form o f segregated differences - is a system where a
master ‘race’ would exclusively reap the benefits o f social, political and economic
privilege. In this respect, the myths central to apartheid could only proliferate within the
confines o f an overtly racist society. In comparison, multiculturalism - in its
institutionalized form o f segregated differences - is a theory where the notion that
different cultures/ ‘races’ are believed to equally exist in privileged competition for
social, political, and economic benefits. In this respect, the myths central to
multiculturalism could proliferate widely throughout all societies that subscribe to a
‘liberal’ ideology. Both o f these scenarios are bound by myths about ‘race’. They vary
slightly, however, in the ways in which such myths are interpreted and used within their
respective social context. Either way, myth offers a useful subject to critically explore
cultural narratives through a detailed textual analysis.
A textual analysis that reveals myth in cultural narratives, attempts to demystify
the stories cultures use to understand their reality. As discussed above, there are varying
levels o f effectiveness in the proliferation o f myth. As seen in the example using the
proliferation o f racial myths in multiculturalism, myths used in ‘liberal’ societies are
often very discrete. In order to demystify discrete myths, as seen in more ‘liberal’
settings, Barthes (1972, 1984) offers some useful rhetorical forms to analyze through
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which mythic signifiers can be arranged. An example o f a rhetorical form can be seen
through Barthes’ (1984) notion o f inoculation.
Through inoculation, myth incorporates an incidental flaw within a class-based
society in order to better conceal a principle flaw. For example, the racist practices of ‘a
few bad apples’ are sacrificed in the interests o f preserving the racisms lived within the
greater ‘liberal’ society. As discussed in an earlier chapter o f this thesis, the beating
death o f a Somali youth by a Canadian soldier was punishable as an individual act of
racism. Even though the Canadian soldier who murdered the Somali youth was
considered by most people to be a member o f an oppressed class, subsequent inquiries
about the individual act did not raise questions as to the ‘impressive ideological
formations’ that enabled the act to occur within a broader structure o f imperial racisms.
The individual act, as a signifier o f the broader lifestyle was removed from the larger
historical context of colonization. This brings us to a second rhetorical form o f myth.
Myth positions the object or subject that it speaks o f as separate from history. In
the example using the beating death o f the Somali youth, any sense o f a colonial memory
evaporates during a formal inquiry into the events leading up to the tragedy. It is as
though the events transpired in a vacuum, robbing a Western institution of any sense of
collective responsibility. As a result, myth appears as a statement o f fact, leading us to a
third rhetorical form.
As a statement o f fact, myth appears without any further explanation. The
Canadian soldier who beat the Somali youth to death was not just practising an act of
racism - racism being a practice external to who he is, already fully defined. The
Canadian soldier practiced an act of racism because he is a racist. Not only is racism a
part o f who he is, it is also a part o f the collective history he shares with other members of
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armed services who have been socialized within a racist society. Racism, in this case,
does not offer a self-contained definition. There is more to racism than the individual act.
In this scenario, notions about racism had been colonized by myth.
Myth colonizes an object or subject within culture as a fully formed sign that
requires no further definition beyond the way it is presented. As a result, myth becomes
invisible, working beyond the conscious perceptions o f the groups that employ them
within their given context. Latent beneath the historical layers o f its conception, myths
mask the roots of its social construction by appealing to convention.
Myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about
them, makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal
justification, it gives them a clarity which is not that o f an explanation but
that o f a statement o f f a c t... it organizes a world without contradictions
because it is without depth, a world wide open to and wallowing in the
evident, it establishes a blissful clarity: things appear to mean something
by themselves (Barthes, 1972, pp. 142-143).
Considering myth in a textual analysis o f cultural narratives, the analyst is
primarily concerned with unveiling the historical dimensions o f reality. In order to
achieve this task, the analyst must expose and articulate the relationships between
language’s content, and the ways that meanings are constructed around the cultural
assumptions imbedded in language’s form. In so doing, the analyst must be aware that
language carries ideological assumptions that appear to be natural; void o f historical
context. This type o f analysis reveals the gaps intrinsic to class struggle that ideology
attempts to mask through myth itself. Given this fact, myth necessarily shifts as soon as it
enters a stream of consciousness as myth. The existence o f myth relies on a conception
of knowledge and reality that necessitates its latency. In order to exist as such, myths
must essentially be undetected.
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In order to become aware o f myth, the analyst must shift focus from the content of
the story, to the relationship between the form and content o f the story. Analyzing myth
in cultural narratives requires a shift in perspective from the natural to the socially
constructed. As a result, the analyst must focus on the rhetorical forms in which mythic
signifiers become situated through a meta-language.

DISCOURSE, A MYTHIC META-LANGUAGE
According to Barthes (1968, 1972,1984, and 1996), mythic language is a meta
language. In this regard, a meta-language is a second-order language used to articulate
the first (Gaines, 2001). Analyzing meta-language can reveal the historical and
ideological context that meanings are constructed in. Seeing that meanings are imbedded
within cultural texts and become naturalized through convention, the focus on meta
language in textual analysis, allows the analyst to interpret the everyday aspects of
cultural life in new ways. Through a critical perspective, the obvious, mundane aspects
o f everyday life are made to appear extraordinary in relation to the form and content of its
social, political, and historical constitution. These common aspects o f everyday life are
articulated through language in the practices of ‘text’ and ‘talk’. As an embodiment of
‘text’ and ‘talk’, discourse can also be interpreted as a meta-language, and can be a useful
focus in textual analysis to demystify a ‘mythic language’.
According to Edward Said (1978), “mythic language is discourse” (p. 321). This
implies that there is a systematic quality to the ways that myth works in culture and
society. As discourse, the production and practice o f myth is not necessarily an effect of
conscious individual or group agency. The production o f myth occurs largely
unconsciously and involuntarily through ideology and its manifestations in the institutions
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that help to order society. This is how the existence o f myth, as discourse, is maintained
in the process. Narrowing the broad approach o f textual analysis to reveal myth in
cultural narratives, it is the opinion o f this author that critical discourse analysis (CDA) is
the best methodology that can be employed towards these ends.
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VII.

CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

THEORY AND METHODOLOGY REVISITED - From Semiotics to CDA
What a man [sic] sees depends both on what he looks at and also upon
what his previous visual-conceptual experience has taught him to see.
(Kuhn, 1962, p. 113)
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) provides an excellent methodology for studying
and revealing the ways that myth works within cultural narratives. Similar to the ways
that Barthes’ (1972, 1984) work extends the field o f semiotics by expanding on the work
o f early semiologists like Saussure (1996a), CDA methods, used by theorists like Bret
Dellinger (1995), Teun van Dijk (1998), and Thomas Huckin (n.d.) offer some tools that
can be useful to locate myth. By taking a moment to recap the work o f these theorists, I
intend to highlight the theoretical evolution o f the methodology that I plan to employ.
The earlier textual theorists focused on the production o f meaning within
structured languages. As a linguist, Saussure (1996b) focused primarily on the relations
of signs with other signs. He established a theoretical model o f signification that focused
on the differential relationship of signs as they are composed by parts known as signifier
and signified. This model laid the groundwork for studying systems o f signs and their
meanings. Barthes (1968, 1972,1984, and 1996) furthered this system o f signification,
conceptualizing a second-order in the production process o f meaning. He primarily
focused on studying orders of signification and how meaning is created in the relationship
between sign systems and culture. His model examined how meanings were structured
within cultural stories through “chains o f related concepts” known as myth (Fiske, 1990,
p. 88).
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Expanding on Barthes’ (1972, 1984) work with myth, CDA theorists offer tools
that can be useful towards a textual analysis o f cultural narratives. In short, CDA
incorporates an analysis of the social relations of power that exist, within the formal
structures o f language, through everyday practices o f ‘text and talk’ (Dellinger, 1995;
Huckin, n.d.; Van Dijk, 1998). By analyzing aspects o f cultures in their narrative form,
cultures, in this sense, can be read as texts and interpreted through speech acts and
dialogue. CDA offers a critical reading o f cultural texts - and the subsequent dialogue
bom o f these texts - by analyzing the ways in which meanings are articulated,
disarticulated, and re-articulated through discourse. In the process, this method also
examines the ways in which contested cultural narratives are structured in social relations
o f power. In order to better understand CDA, a brief description on discourse is
necessary at this juncture.

THE ROLE OF DISCOURSE & POWER IN CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Previously described as a sense o f cohesion between signs and their meanings,
discourse enters as an intermediary between ideology and language. Drawing upon
Michel Foucault’s (2003) ‘strategic model o f intelligibility’17, discourse contextualizes a
power dynamic through ideas about an object or concept. Constituted in social
interaction, discourse is not merely language - as characterized by the empty signifiers
within sign systems. Discourse is a force in itself that functions as a weapon; effectively
producing powerful social effects (Foucault, 2003). By virtue o f Foucault’s conception of

1 7 Discourse as a ‘strategic m odel o f intelligibility’ refers to the power relations intrinsic to its ontology.
These power relations imply an internal logic or ‘strategic coherence’ that operates beyond formal linguistic
structures to analyze how statements function socially as opposed to how they function semantically.
(Foucault, 2003, pp. xix-xx)
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discourse - as a form of ‘strategic intelligibility’ - power, therefore, becomes a central
notion to critical methods o f research that analyze discourse.
Power, according to Teun Van Dijk (1998), is a form o f control. Dominant
groups, therefore, are defined as such in relation to the control that they effectively
exercise over the thoughts and actions of other groups. The other groups that are
subjugated, under the control exercised by the dominant, are ultimately subordinated in
the interests o f maintaining this relationship o f power. This is not to say, however, that
power is absolute.
Many forms o f social control vary, relative to the respective social relationships of
privilege that it operates within. Access to specific presupposed bases o f social resources
like information, money, legislation etc (Van Dijk, 1998) are all resources through which
power can be exercised. Coupled with conventions surrounding social interaction, these
resources can help to determine the form o f power. As a result, various groups may
exercise a relative degree o f control over others depending on the situation or social
domain.
For example, as a professor, Philippe Rushton embodies a form o f scholarly
power over his lectures. As a professor, it is determined through the conventions of
tenure and the academy that his job is to control the information disseminated to the
students who participate in his lectures. Within this relationship o f power, Rushton
subjects his students to the information that he chooses to lecture about. The students do
not choose the information that Rushton will lecture about. As a result Rushton exhibits a
form o f control over the education o f his students. This control is exercised as a result of
the presupposed expertise that he is believed to possess and is agreed upon through the
conventions o f his position within the academy.
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Although the exercise o f power may oftentimes seem explicitly universal - as in
common cases o f crime and punishment through the rule o f law - power, however, is
rarely absolute. In order to illustrate this point, it would be useful to expand upon the
example using the professor above. Even though professor Rushton can exercise a form
of power over his students within a lecture setting, his powers as a professor do not
extend far beyond that setting. His powers, regarding access to the information used in
his research, become less defined when confronted by the powers o f his peers who
produce information to refute his research. Moreover, his powers as a psychology
professor would have no merit if he were to face criminal charges in a court o f law. This
illustrates that the type o f power exercised is relative to the situational aspects of
interaction within the overall social context. Indeed power embodies many forms of
social action.
Power can be explicitly embodied through social action, as a judge sentences an
offender to time in jail or a president declares war on another country. Power can also be
implicitly embodied, in actions guided by everyday social etiquette, common
presuppositions, and myth. It is the opinion o f this author that the latter embodiment of
power, as implicitly formed, is very common yet overlooked, and is therefore most
saliently deserving o f our attention in the ways that it engenders dominance at the
expense o f others. In both instances, however, power is exercised, embodied, or
committed - intentionally or not - through discourse.
In this sense, discourse is “the unit of actual language use in which power is
enacted” as a form o f social control (Van Dijk, 1998). Those who are considered to be in
a privileged position o f dominance are said to exhibit a degree o f social control in relation
to those who lack the necessary degree o f social control and are often subjugated to the
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will of the dominant. As in the above example, those who exercise more control over
discourse - like a professor - can be said to have more power and are, therefore,
perceived to be more dominant than those who exercise less control over discourse - like
the students in the professor’s class. For Van Dijk (1998), “CDA attempts to focus on the
abuse o f such power ... on the ways control over the discourse is abused to control
peoples beliefs and actions in the interest o f dominant groups, and against the best
interests and the will o f others”. An example o f an abuse o f power, in this respect, could
be seen in the ways in which professor Rushton’s control over discourse promoted racist
beliefs. For the purposes o f this thesis, however, I will be primarily using CDA to focus
on the implicit quality of power - the ways it is made to look natural and taken for
granted in everyday discourse - as embodied in social myth and manifest through the
practices of ‘text and talk’.
The practices o f ‘text and talk’ reveal that a multiplicity o f discourses exists.
These discourses, some o f which are contestable or amendable to each other respectively,
are only accessible through language. The most common pallets, through which
discourse can be dissected, exist in the form of artefacts that can be read as texts. A
newspaper article, for example, can be used as an excellent sample artefact to illustrate
the ways through which discourse works within a text. It is important to note, however,
that although discourse can be analyzed through a critical reading o f a newspaper article
(Van Dijk, 2000); the power of discourse is not limited to the written word. It also exists
in speech, ethics, images, and institutions. CDA, therefore, is primarily concerned with
the ways in which power is distributed between individuals and groups, within society,
through forms o f social exchange. As a central tenet o f CDA, a ‘context-sensitive’
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approach to analyzing the social distribution o f power is highly ethical in the ways in
which its method is ultimately used towards improving society.
According to Huckin (n.d.), the use o f CDA pays close attention to “power
imbalances, social inequities, non-democratic practices, and other injustices in hopes of
spurring readers to corrective action”. In its broad outreach towards social justice, this
method o f analysis locates specific relations o f power within an overall social context
through which the text and the theorists alike are ultimately situated. Because of this,
theorists working with tools from CDA oftentimes make no apologies - and in my
opinion rightly so - for the polemical tone o f their research. This can perhaps be
attributed to a view o f discourse, which assumes that people’s perception o f reality is
primarily formed in and through social interaction.
Acknowledging the fact that social interaction is mediated through language,
CDA examines the complex power relationship between what the author of the text
brings to bear on the production o f a message, and what the reader o f the text brings when
interpreting a message (Dellinger, 1995). This does not imply, however, that power is
necessarily distributed equally in any form o f social interaction. Recognizing that texts
are produced within a social and historical context, the analyst interprets the creators of
texts as socially and historically situated subjects, driven by their own ideological
agendas. Because o f this, members o f a dominant group (i.e. professors) consistently
construct and communicate dominant versions o f reality that effectively work to secure
their own interests (i.e. lecture on topics that exclusively support their research). These
dominant (research) interests are oftentimes secured at the expense o f subjugating the
subordinated (research) interests o f others. This process, however, is not always as
explicit as it may initially sound. Indeed, the interests o f the dominant group are often
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procured in subtle ways that are often taken-for-granted as natural and common-place. A
theorist will often use CDA to reveal and make explicit these subtle practices of
domination and subjugation, in the interest o f siding with the victims o f oppression
(Huckin, n.d.).
In order to maximize the efficacy of siding with victims o f oppression, it is a
common goal o f the CDA theorists to try and make their work accessible to a large
readership. According to Huckin (n.d.), the research produced by these theorists must be
as clear as possible, avoiding unnecessary jargon and highly specialized scientific
language without sacrificing too much accuracy at the conclusion o f analysis. As ideal as
this goal may appear, there exists an irony intrinsic to this task, especially within
scholarly circles.
To clarify and perhaps expand upon Huckin’s (n.d.) proposition, the research
produced by theorists working with CDA must be accessible to a target readership.
Indeed, the theorist’s research must not only be relatively accessible but more importantly
the theorist must be conscious o f an intended readership when producing research. For
example, data collected by scholars and academics, if produced for scholarly or academic
purposes, must be presented in a commensurate scholarly or academic discourse in order
for their research to be seriously engaged by the intended readership. In so doing, the
relative success o f the message is contingent upon how accurately the encoded objective
is decoded by the reader o f the message.
Keeping in mind that the theorist is also situated within a larger ideological social
context, this relative success can be measured by the degree to which the reader is
interpolated by the inscribed ideologies of the text. Although the theorist must employ a
similar process o f communication used by dominant groups to subjugate subordinated
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groups, the struggle over meaning is reversed to affect the process’ liberating potential.
This is usually done by demystifying an appeal to convention through myth.

MYTH, IDEOLOGY, KNOWLEDGE - Multidisciplinary Discursive Approach
Objects and subjects, communicated by convention through myths, are understood
in and of themselves to be natural and commonsense. Discourse arms the analyst with a
useful conceptual tool to reveal myth by demystifying its commonsensical appeal within
the cultural perception of reality. As a result, CDA is useful in analyzing both the form
and content o f media texts. This creates a broader base for a multidisciplinary approach
to textual analysis.
A multidisciplinary approach to CDA contrasts with the notion o f ideology as
false consciousness. This method perceives ideology as a foundation o f interpretive
frameworks that organize the attitudes and values o f a social group or culture. In contrast
to previously held notions, ideologies are not arbitrary beliefs, but specific group systems
(Van Dijk, 2002). These systems are organized by cultural characteristics that represent
identity, social structure, and the position o f the subject or group within an interactive
environment. Ideologies are the foundations that determine the content and form o f all
social representations. This definition o f ideology may lead one to believe that
knowledge is essentially ideological. According to Van Dijk (2002), however, not all
knowledge is ideological.
For Van Dijk (2002) it can be argued that every culture or group relies on a
commons o f shared, undisputed information that they accept as fact. Knowledge,
therefore, is a shared belief, relative to the culture or group in their present state of being,
that is socially justified through consensus. Knowledge is a belief that becomes
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understood as indisputable within the confines o f the group. Because o f this, shared
knowledge is usually assumed to be rooted in the material conditions o f existence. In this
sense, Van Dijk (2002) considers knowledge to be ‘pre-ideological’. Without this notion
of knowledge as ‘pre-ideological’, Van Dijk (2002) believes that groups would not be
able to communicate among each other.
Although the concept o f ‘pre-ideological’ knowing makes sense according to the
framework theorized by Van Dijk (2002), it is the opinion o f this author, however, that no
such claims are absolutely accurate in the entirety o f their formulations as such. In order
for information to be labelled as knowledge, it must involve a cognitive process of
interpreting and articulating reality.
According to Ericson et al., “reality is a result o f cognitive processes of
interpretation, and social processes o f construction” (p. 18). These processes cannot be
articulated as knowledge before passing through the mechanism o f language and cannot
be initially conceived before passing through the mechanisms o f cognition. As a result,
knowledge must essentially be a form o f thought. According to Terry Eagleton (1990):
“There is no such thing as presuppositionless thought, and to this extent all o f our
thinking might be said to be ideological” (pp. 3-4).
The form o f knowledge that Van Dijk (2002) theorizes can be used
interchangeably with Barthes’ (1972, 1984) notion o f myth. To state this point more
explicitly, all knowledge can potentially contain mythic qualities and all myths attempt to
articulate some form o f knowledge. This being the case, it is impossible then for
knowledge to exist beyond ideology simply for the reason that myths - according to
Barthes (1972, 1984) - are essentially ideologically loaded, social constructs. Myth
essentially works to mask language’s ideological foundations through a discourse that de-
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contextualizes an object or subject o f all historical contingencies. Knowledge - even that
of a scientific pedigree - is contingent upon the cognitive process o f interpretation and
must be subjected to articulation through a system o f language, if it is to be
communicated as such. As a result, that which is considered as empirical knowledge can
also be susceptible to colonization by myth. For example, using the principle of
uncertainty in quantum theory, knowledge cannot be perceived as absolute (Ericson et al,
1987).
18

Quoting W erner Heisenberg , Ericson et al. (1987) emphasizes the relative
quality o f knowledge in the empirical sciences by stating that: “What we observe is not
nature itself, but nature exposed to our methods o f questioning” (p. 18). The similarities
between myth and knowledge are too glaring to overlook especially in the ways that
discourse, as a communicative practice, works among the two concepts. Discourse plays
an important role in the way that ideology is perceived and can illustrate that Barthes’
(1972, 1984) theory o f myth is compatible with Van Dijk’s (2002) theory of knowledge.
For Van Dijk (2002), discourse among groups requires a base o f common
knowledge that is perceived to be free o f ideological bias in order to maximize
commensurability in communicative action. Although he believes that some knowledge
is ‘pre-ideological’, it essentially boils down to the ways in which ideology is perceived
in relative terms, that holds his argument together, and not necessarily how it actually
exist in absolute terms. This point is illustrated further when Van Dijk (2002) explains
that once shared knowledge is manifest in discourse, and articulated through language, it
becomes susceptible to scrutiny from other groups that do not share the same knowledge

18 For more information on Werner Heisenberg and the uncertainty principle in quantum theory, please
refer to the American Institute o f Physic website: < http://vvww.aip.org/historv/heisenberg/p01 ,htm>
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base. Outside groups may find such knowledge ideologically biased, leading the
perception o f knowledge to shift in the same ways that myth shifts when revealed by the
analyst. In sum, as knowledge is articulated through language, it automatically becomes
subject to a historical context. If history is “ideologically and politically inflected time”
(Dellinger, 1995), knowledge - like myth - becomes susceptible to ideological bias when
articulated through language in spite o f how ideologically neutral it may appear.
Knowledge, therefore, is not ideologically neutral.
Articulated through language, knowledge claims are ultimately subject to the
same historical context that language is. This leaves meaning open to possible change.
Knowledge, in this respect, is evolutionary. Even members o f the same group or culture
may find knowledge from a previous time period, within their group or culture,
ideological. It is important to note however, that although knowledge may be deemed
ideological from the standpoint o f another culture at another time, it can still be
considered knowledge from the perspective o f the culture that accepts it as such. This
epistemological relationship is referred to as ‘relative relativism’ (Van Dijk, 2002).
Relativism as a concept is also subject to relative critique. Knowledge is always
knowledge relative to the perceptions o f the respective epistemic community. Once
accepted as knowledge within a given culture, in the given temporal context, meaning
becomes obvious and taken-for-granted as fact by virtue of convention based on
consensus a priori. This taken-for-granted nature is characteristic o f Barthes’ notion of
myth. Once the knowledge o f a community is considered a belief by an outside
community, the discourse o f that knowledge is interpreted as having an ideological bias.
In contrast, if the knowledge of a community is deemed to be factual within the said
community, the discourse o f that knowledge is reflected in the belief systems o f that
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community. This shows the complexity o f a multidisciplinary approach to textual
analysis when deconstructing cultural narratives through a context-laden, evaluative
methodology like CDA.

THE FLEXIBLE QUALITY OF CDA - A Malleable Methodological Approach
As a highly contextual, multidisciplinary approach to textual analysis, CDA offers
a broad repertoire o f analytic tools that can be used for analysing a number o f different
cultural artefacts as textual subjects. According to Huckin (n.d.), “not every concept
found in a linguistics textbook.. .is equally useful when it comes to doing critical
discourse analysis, and even CDA analysts differ somewhat among themselves in the
kinds o f tools they employ”. Depending on the subject analyzed, the tools o f analysis
may differ in combination and type. For example, CDA analysts with a strong
background in Structural Linguistics may employ tools from semiotics when analyzing
the signs and sign systems o f a cultural text whereas CDA analysts with a background in
Economics may use tools derived from political economy when analyzing the
commodification of cultural practices. As a result, “there is no standardized form of CDA
methodology” (Huckin, n.d.).
Although there is no consistent form o f CDA methodology, there are, however,
common elements and objectives that unify CDA as an analytical approach to research
methods. Like any other analytical approach to research methodology, CDA employs a
wide range o f tools to conduct precise analyses as mentioned above. It is at the discretion
of the researcher, therefore, in conjunction with the subject being studied, to determine
the appropriate tools for analysis that would best suit the thesis being researched. For the
purposes outlined in this thesis, I will borrow from some o f the tools and analytical
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approaches used by the aforementioned theorists (Huckin, n.d.; Van Dijk, 1998) that have
used CDA to analyze the written texts of newspaper articles.

LEVELS OF ANALYSIS - A Multi-layered Technique
Common to the research conducted using CDA on newspaper articles, are the
levels and approaches to reading the text. Van Dijk (1998) draws from some basic
concepts o f CDA to formulate a theoretical framework that identifies the relationship
between discourse, cognition, and society. For Van Dijk, there are at least two levels of
reading a text that must be bridged by some basic conceptual tools in order for CDA to be
useful as a unified method o f analysis. These two levels o f analysis include macro and

micro approaches to reading a text.
At the micro level o f analysis, the reader is primarily focused on the ways in
which meanings are structured within the text itself. This is seen by analysing the use of
language and formal aspects o f communication as interpreted within a personal and group
context. The macro level of analysis deals with notions o f power and the ways in which it
is distributed among various interpretive communities within society at large. This level
focuses on issues o f inequality and dominance, inscribed in the text, as it is situated
within the broader social context. Although Van Dijk (1998) conceptually formulates
these levels o f analysis as existing on two separate plains, he makes clear the fact that
both these levels o f analysis are by no means absolute or mutually exclusive. Both macro
and micro levels are present in any common social interaction. This will become more
evident through a critical reading o f the Toronto S ta r’s articles on racial profiling and the
larger multicultural context through which the articles are situated. Macro and micro
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levels o f analysis, used by Van Dijk (1998) are similar to the three levels of analysis used
by Thomas Huckin (n.d.).
According to Thomas Huckin (n.d.), there are three main levels o f analyzing a
written text. For Huckin (n.d.) the text is first read as a whole, keeping the possible
perspective of the ordinary reader in mind. This is the level where myths are most
effectively inscribed within the public psyche as knowledge. Ideological manipulations
are more effective at this stage through the types o f discourse used. Once the text is
recognized and read as a whole - within the formal structures and conventions of a
specific genre - the reader can proceed to interpreting the text on a sentence by sentence
level.
Reading the text as a collection o f separate sentences is the second level from
which a text can be analyzed. By reading a text sentence by sentence, the meanings of
sentences are constructed to fit within the conventions o f the overall genre. This sentence
by sentence level o f analysis pays close attention to the ways in which sentences are
structured into topics that identify and reinforce important meanings. These meanings,
reinforced through sentence topic, reveal important ways that bias or perspective is
created in the issues reported. Writers often use sentence topics to articulate their bias in
their efforts to sway or influence the reader’s perspective towards the interests encoded in
the text. Once meanings are constructed and interpreted at the sentence level, the reader
can proceed to analyzing the text at the level o f words and phrases.
The third level o f reading texts is the most detailed o f all three levels o f analysis.
Reading a text at the level o f words and phrases opens up room to explore additional
meanings inscribed in the text. These additional meaning are commonly revealed through
tools derived from semiotics. Understanding the orders o f signification with tools like
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denotation, connotation and myth is especially useful when analyzing words and phrases
in relation to their broader social and cultural contexts. Although these levels o f analysis
are specifically used to analyze single news articles, they can be applied broadly in an
analysis o f an entire news paper series. Bellow are some tools that may be useful for
analyzing news paper texts.

TO O LS O F TH E TRADE FO R ‘TE X T AND T A L K ’
All o f the aforementioned levels o f analysis can reveal the pervasiveness o f myth
as they are hidden within cultural texts. These myths, masquerading as objective
knowledge through discourse, can be revealed through tools that assess qualities o f the
text such as: framing, to determine the overall tone, bias, perspective, and conceptual
parameters o f the news article; visual aids, to determine the intentional use of
photographs, illustrations, graphs, charts, diagrams, and or font to attract the attention of
the reader to certain aspects a news article; foregrounding and back grounding, to
determine an order o f emphasis on details and information within a news article;

omissions, to determine what critical information a news article may be leaving out;
presupposition and insinuation, to determine the ideas or concepts that are taken for
granted as facts within a news article; discursive differences, to determine the genres and
variations of language, as they are to be used to their degree o f formality, in a specific
social or group context (register) within the news article; topicalization, to determine the
value o f the subject being placed at the beginning o f the sentence in a news article, and;

connotation, to determine the second-order meanings inscribed within the text through
metaphors, myths, and metonyms within the news article. All three levels o f analysis
employ a combination o f the analytic tools described above.
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Although these tools are useful when analyzing written texts, they are not absolute
in their methodological application. As mentioned above, there is no standardized
methodology to CDA. As a result, the aforementioned tools are relative to the expertise
o f the analyst in conjunction with the subject o f analysis being considered. These tools
form the textual area o f analysis, and are in no way conclusive without careful and critical
consideration to the overall social, political and historical context o f the written
document. Once a thorough textual analysis is complete, CDA theorists must sum up
their research by providing a “contextualized interpretation” (Huckin, 2002) o f their
findings. This methodology rejects notions o f objective research and value free
knowledge claims.
For CDA theorists, knowledge is a product o f continually evolving discourses of
social interaction. Articulated, disarticulated, and rearticulated through language,
knowledge is considered as such, by gaining a relative degree o f imagined consistency in
its conquest over scrutiny among a contested field of discursive negotiation. As a result,
knowledge claims cannot be interpreted as absolute formulations o f objective reasoning.
Such claims are coded in discourse and validated through myth by virtue o f popular and
authoritative consensus.
Articulated through language and communication, a dominant conception of
knowledge, or myth, is essential to making sense o f reality. As a dominant
communicative institution, the mass media plays an important role in the production of
knowledge and the perpetuation o f myths. Likewise, knowledge and myths constitute a
form of collective consciousness that is used as a framework through which to interpret
reality. Indeed, understanding the role o f the mass media in society is crucial to
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understanding dominant perceptions o f reality through a mediated stream of
consciousness.
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VIII.

A MEDIATED STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS

REALITY AND THE MEDIA’S PRODUCTION OF PERCEPTION
I am an invisible man ... I am invisible, understand, simply because people
refuse to see me... That invisibility to which I refer occurs because o f a
particular disposition o f the eyes o f those with whom I come in contact. A
matter o f the construction o f the inner eyes, those eyes with which they
look through their physical eyes upon reality.
(Ellison, 1947, p. 3)
Reality is constructed in and through communication (Littlejohn, 1996). As a
result, reality is agreed upon through language common to a collective community of
ideas. This collective community o f ideas emerges through perpetual dialogue among
competing and negotiating discourses. Because o f this, interpretations o f reality as a
product o f discourse, manifest in the production and reproduction o f cultural artefacts, are
articulated and interpreted through language and can therefore be read as texts. The
meanings generated by these texts are created in the negotiation o f discourse through
social interaction. Meanings are dialogical. And as a result, we are said to live in and
through systems o f meanings and representations (Shohat & Stam, 1995).
In short, reality is formed in meanings produced by the discourses, negotiated as
dominant, that emerge out o f our social interactions. These discourses are communicated
through systems o f representation. Indeed, systems o f representation are usually
mediated through powerful social institutions. It is the opinion o f this author that the
mass media are o f the most powerful social institutions today, perpetuating dominant
discourses that shape popular perceptions o f who we are and our notions of reality. As
such, the media are socializing forces through which power is exercised and can be seen
as dominant institutions o f social control (Kellner, 1995a; Real, 1989).
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Building upon W acquant’s (2002) thesis, that four ‘peculiar institutions’ helped to
shape racisms in contemporary American society; I would place the mass media as a fifth
‘peculiar institution’, which works in a similar way to the previous four. To further this
claim on the profound role o f the media, in providing materials that influence our
perceptions o f our identities and our world, Douglas Kellner (1995) is worth quoting at
length:
Radio, television, film and the other products o f media culture provide
materials out o f which we forge our very identities, our sense of selfhood;
our notion o f what it means to be male or female; our sense o f class, of
ethnicity and race, o f nationality, o f sexuality, o f “us” and “them.” Media
images help shape our view o f the world and our deepest values: what we
consider good or bad, positive or negative, moral or evil. Media stories
provide the symbols, myths and resources through which we constitute a
common culture and through which we insert ourselves into this culture.
Media spectacles demonstrate who has the power and who is powerless,
who is allowed to exercise force and who is not. They dramatize and
legitimate the power o f the forces that be and show the powerless that they
must stay in their place or be destroyed, (p.5)
As illustrated in the passage cited above, the mass media can be seen as pervasive
pedagogical tools that - among other things - teach us: who we are, how to act, and how
to interpret our surroundings. Michael Real (1989) neatly sums up the pervasiveness of
these institutions in what he calls super media that serve “as the central nervous system of
modem society” (p. 13). As a constant reminder o f the super m edia’s role in shaping and
producing collective and individual consciousness, Real (1989) frequently inserts the
phrase: ‘our media, ourselves’ throughout the pages o f his book Super Media. This
illustrates how individual identities blend into media identities in an ongoing dialectic of
myth making. Identities, therefore, are not individually produced but are social products
developed in and through the mechanisms o f language and representation (Turner, 1992).
As a result, the super media are instrumental to the ways in which meanings are
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constructed through language and representation. Although the mass media provide us
with the tools that we use to organize our existence (reality), a dialectical relationship
between the society, individuals and the media, was not always taken into consideration
regarding the production o f meaning.

MASS MEDIA AND MASS AUDIENCES - Homogeneity to Heterogeneity
Some early theories o f the mass media, deriving out o f positivistic schools of
thought, including instinct psychology, interpreted the notion o f the audience as a
homogeneous mass (Defleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). It was assumed further that this
homogeneous mass was uniformly influenced by any message transmitted through the
mass media. In this sense, the mass media were, and in some cases still are, perceived as
powerful and all pervasive propaganda machines that leave little room for dissenting
voices. This implied a perception that a singular universe o f ideas formed the basis of an
objective reality. As societies became increasingly diverse, however, theories o f cultural
studies demonstrated that the audience is not a homogeneous mass but a heterogeneous
mix o f diverse interpretative communities (Agger, 1992; Kellner, 1995; Real, 1989;
Turner, 1992).
Through greater focus on the role o f language, it became more apparent that
various interpretative communities exist, simultaneously, in a multi-verse o f ideas. This
multi-verse of ideas forms the basis o f a subjectively interpreted reality. For Turner
(1992), the power o f language creates and locates social relations through its own
relational systems o f representation. As a result, reality is created as relative through the
mechanisms of language in culture that sets out to order and define it. Turner (1992)
sums up this relation by stating that “culture, as the site where meaning is generated and
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experienced, becomes a determining, productive field through which social realities are
constructed, experienced and interpreted”(p. 15). As logical as this statement may
appear, it is the opinion of this author that such a perspective dangerously teeters on the
brink o f a linguistic determinism, throwing away any claims for a material reality that
exists beyond language. Although language offers a strong argument for the discursive
construction o f meaning, it does not necessarily follow that it creates reality per se. In
order to clarify this point, it is worth briefly returning to Stuart Hall (1997).
Hall (1997) states an important distinction between claims that language creates
reality, and the claims that language creates meaning in reality. Hall (1997) uses two
distinct phrases to illustrate his point. The first phrase, “nothing meaningful exists
outside o f discourse” is more accurate than the second phrase that states “nothing exists
outside o f discourse”. These statements illustrate H all’s (1996) distinction between
linguistic and discursive interpretations of reality. While language and discourse are very
powerful agents o f culture, they do not take away from the fact that there are real
historical and material conditions that form the basis o f reality. O f great interest to Hall
(1996, 1997) are the ways in which the historical and material conditions of reality are
interpreted as meaningful within diverse interpretative communities. By stating that the
only way to understand the world is through representation by no means implies that the
world only exists through representation.

UNIVERSE AND OR MULTIVERSE - A Many Sided Reality
Communicated through systems o f representation, reality is interpreted as a social,
cultural, and historical concept experienced and understood in and through discourse.
Discourse, as a culturally contingent practice, allows for multiple interpretations o f reality
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to exist simultaneously. This relationship is oftentimes misperceived by some cultural
studies theorists in their beliefs that multiple realities exist. A multi-verse is an
interpretative condition and is by no means absolute. This can be misleading when
analysing the power o f the media in society.
The interpretation that multiple realities exists, does not presuppose that power is
concentrated primarily in the actions and interpretations o f the audience and that the
media have superficial effects that are only symbolic within the subjective interpretation
o f the reader. Communications, and therefore the media, are intrinsically linked with
power. This power, intrinsic to the media, has the potential to effect real historical and
material conditions on the populations that participate in them by virtue o f their
socializing mechanisms. Furthermore, understanding that communication is linked with
power (Hall, 1997), all interpretations or perceptions o f reality are not considered equal.

ACTIVE AUDIENCE AND THE POWER OF MEDIA - Negotiated Dominance
Kellner (1995) warns against placing too much emphasis on an ‘active audience’
theory, in the interests o f maintaining the fact that the media have very ‘powerful
manipulative effects’. For Kellner (1995), cultural artefacts are situated within
ideologically loaded relations o f production and reproduction. These ideological relations
essentially position cultural forms by the way o f either perpetuating or resisting
dominance or oppression. This occurs as a result o f the discursive process o f competition
and negotiation where dominant perceptions o f reality persist in contention with
negotiated and oppositional perceptions o f reality (Hall, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2002).
Reality, therefore, is a fractured, interchangeable, and fluid contested terrain. Reality is
what this author considers to be negotiated potentiality.
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As dominant discourses emerge, in the negotiation o f dominant interpretations of
reality, the ideologies implicit to its formation serve to fix the dominant discourse as
absolute. This attempt at fixing meaning through discourse makes the dominant
interpretation o f reality appear to be natural. Indeed, as contingent as reality is, these
dominant perceptions remain highly influential in the ways that audiences make sense o f
the world around them through myth.
Myth naturalizes objects and subjects that become encoded into cultural texts as
knowledge claims. Some o f these knowledge claims stand out in culture as a form of
conceptual and ideological shorthand. As contextual as reality is, when interpreted
through forms o f communication and representation like language, power intervenes in
the interest o f fixing meanings as absolute and natural (Hall, 1997). And although reality
exists in a multi-verse o f interpreted ideas, myths contain a universe o f ideological
assumptions that exist through the practice o f discourse. Indeed, dominant perceptions o f
reality that monopolize media messages constitute what James Winter (2002) terms
MediaThink.
Based on George Orwell’s ‘prevailing orthodoxy o f ideas’ and continuing in the
tradition of the ‘propaganda model’ (Achbar & Wintonick, 1992; Chomsky, 2002;
Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Podur, 2002), MediaThink embodies the dominant
perspective of reality as perceived through the minds o f those who control the media
(representatives o f a dominant class). It is important to note, however, that dominant
perspectives are by no means uniform or absolute. In the competitive process o f constant
discursive negotiation, there are often cracks and fissures in myth that allow for
alternative perspectives to emerge. In this process however, alternative perspectives are
often marginalized and or silenced altogether, constantly losing to the overpowering

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

116
presence of the dominant perspectives (Podur, 2002; Winter, 2002). Furthermore, in very
rare circumstances, dominant perspectives can temporarily shift appearing to embrace and
incorporate alternative perspectives as a part of the dominant discourse. This is
sometimes seen in more ‘liberal’, popular media sources. Accompanied by a relative
amount o f backlash, this shift is usually marginal and does not end up straying too far
from deeper layers o f dominant ideologies that remain entrenched in its overall message.
As we will see, this is demonstrated in the Toronto S ta r’s coding o f ‘race’ in their
coverage of racial profiling.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

117

IX. ANALYSIS OF INCORPORATED RESISTENCE
CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGIES AND THE LIBERAL MEDIA
The white man is sealed in his whiteness.
The black man in his blackness.
(Fanon, 1967, p. 9)
Although the Toronto S ta r’s groundbreaking expose on racial profiling,
practiced by the Toronto Police Service (TPS), appears to be critical o f racism on a
surface reading, a critical reading o f selected articles from its series on ‘Race and Crime’
indicates that despite its best intentions, its coverage o f the issues actually serves to
propagate racist narratives. These racist narratives are a culmination o f the deep rooted
sentiments o f a colonialist ideology that has evolved to a current state o f unquestioned
normalcy. Naturalized through ‘official’ multiculturalism’s ‘liberal’ discourse of
tolerance and diversity, The S ta r’s normalized brand o f racism has been incorporated
within the overall language of divisiveness and oppression that it so stridently attempts to
eradicate. Its underlying message continues to bear the ‘strange fruit’ o f racist ideologies
that undermine attempts at significant change towards social justice and equality. In
order to examine this perception further, a textual analysis, considering Barthes’ notion of
myth through some o f tools derived from CDA will be used to explore racism, as a
systemic way o f life, institutionalized through myth within Canada’s multicultural
society. Moreover, I will be applying these theories to the ways in which ‘race’ is coded
in The S tar’s coverage o f racial profiling as practiced by the TPS.

CDA - An Applied Methodology
As outlined in an earlier chapter o f this thesis, tools from CDA can be equally
useful when analyzing news stories both in series and as individual articles. Usually
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when there is enough information and interest (corporate and or public) to publish a
number o f stories on a particular subject or issue, common themes can be linked to group
these stories into a series. As a result an entire series can be read in similar ways to a
single article. This chapter will apply some o f the tools from CDA, discussed in a
previous chapter o f this thesis, to a broad analysis o f some o f the major themes in selected
articles from The S ta r’s series ‘Race and Crime’. Once the common themes about ‘race’
are analyzed within its broader social context on a macro level, a more specific analysis
of excerpts from five selected articles, published as a part o f the series, will be analyzed
semantically on a micro level.
When conducting a macro reading o f The S ta r’s coverage o f racial profiling as a
series, it appears on the surface that the newspaper is attempting to perform its role as the
‘fourth estate’. The ‘fourth estate’ is a term that positions the mass media as a
‘watchdog’ to government or ‘state’ abuses o f power (Winter, 2002, p. ix). In this case,
the police service functions as an extension o f the government or state apparatus that
works to enforce its laws on the public. In so doing, however, it has become commonly
perceived by marginalized voices in Toronto that the practices o f law enforcement
agencies have become selective to the point o f discrimination (Ontario Human Rights
Commission, 2003). As a result public trust in the police service - as an extension of
government - has been violated by the unjust practice o f racial profiling that an
organization like the TPS carries out. Under these circumstances, the erstwhile ‘liberal’
news media, as ‘watchdogs’ for the public interest against the state’s abuses o f power,
had a duty and responsibility to the public to report on the issues. In this case, it can be
argued that The S ta r’s coverage on racial discrimination practiced by the TPS is purely
responsible journalism in the way that it appears to take a position against the agents of
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power (TPS) in the racial profiling debate. However, something is missing in this
assumption involving the broader role o f racism and the mass media in society.
If we will briefly recall from an earlier section o f this thesis, the mass media have
a relatively large role in the socialization o f the status quo - being a consciousness
producing industry (Ericson et al., 1987; Kellner, 1995; Real, 1989). Moreover, the
media have been highly theorized as a form o f social control (Ericson et al., 1987). On a
surface reading, The S ta r’s coverage o f racial profiling appears to counter this assumption
about the media. A more critical reading o f The S ta r’s coverage, however, reinforces the
claim that posits the media as a form o f social control in the ways in which it reports the
issues. Although The Star ostensibly appears to side with the victims o f oppression, it
nonetheless propagates distorted perceptions of ‘racial’ differences that can be used to
further segregate society.
In an October 20th 2002 article titled “Police target black drivers”, The Star
investigative team reported on the issues o f racial profiling by using statistics based on
rigid categories o f ‘race’ (see Appendix I). According to the investigative team19:
Almost 34 per cent o f all drivers charged with out-of-sight violations were
black, in the group where race was listed. Yet according to the latest
census figures, Toronto’s black community represents just 8.1 per cent of
the city’s population. By contrast, 62.7 percent o f Toronto’s population is
white, but whites account for 52.1 per cent o f the motorists charged with
out-of-sight traffic offences, (p. A9)

Although the example above highlights a case study o f racial discrimination, it
further perpetuates distorted notions o f difference in the process. A closer look at the
1 9 The Star investigative team that headed up the coverage on racial profiling consisted o f : Jim Rankin,
Jennifer Quinn, M ichelle Shephard, John Duncanson, and Scott Simmie. A full archive o f related stories
can also be found by visiting the follow ing Toronto Star website:

<h ttp://w w w .thestar.ca/N A SA pp/cs/C ontentServer?pagenam e=thestar/R ender& =Page& cid:=
1034935301156>
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example above demonstrates that racial lines drawn between different populations in
society can be reduced to ‘black’ and ‘white’. Indeed, Toronto is depicted as a segregated
city that is divided between people perceived as ‘black’ and people perceived as ‘white’.
As a result, The S ta r’s use o f rigid racial categories reinforces dominant distortions of
‘race’, contributing to the racial socialization o f the public in the process. It is a
distortion, however, to imply that such rigid categorizations exist according to popularly
perceived notions o f ‘race’. As discussed earlier in this thesis, it is problematic to assume
that the entire populations can be reduced to ‘races’ that are either ‘black’, ‘white’ or
‘other’. This is problematic primarily because such rigid categorizations of ‘race’ do not
neatly correlate to nature as it is implied. Nowhere does the above statement address the
issues o f ‘race’ as an imaginary attribute o f racialization nor does it address the effects of
racialization on progressive social relations.
Although The Star convincingly exposes the existence o f racial profiling, it does
little to report on the underlying causes o f racism as a way o f life that fuel racist practices.
As a popular part o f one o f society’s dominant ‘peculiar institutions’, whose role is to
watch the power brokers so to speak, should not a part o f this responsibility also entail
greater care when reporting on the issues that could potentially affect positive social
relations? As a result, it is the opinion of this author that The S ta r’s expose on racial
profiling is not only incomplete but is also negligent in its social responsibility to
accurately inform the public. To clarify what I mean by negligent, The S ta r’s coverage
continues to reify dominant discourses about ‘race’ while outright ignoring processes of
racialization that enable it to do so in such a normalized fashion.
An earlier chapter of this thesis reveals that The Star is aware that ‘race’ is a
scientifically useless construct for categorizing populations o f people. Despite this
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awareness, it continues to publish articles that sensationalize social differences along the
lines o f ‘race’. Many years have passed between The S ta r’s coverage on Philippe
Rushton, and the genetic studies disproving the scientific existence o f ‘race’, however,
what remains the same is the Star’s coding o f racial difference. It is my contention that if
The Star were to critically explore the deep structures o f racialization, there would be no
buffer to prevent its analysis from turning on itself as another organization where racism
can be found. In a series that spans at least four months o f coverage, The Star appears
content to immerse itself within the sensationalized debate on whether or not racial
profiling exists.

EXISTENCE OF RACIAL PROFILING - Does it Occur in TPS Practices?
Cognizant or unaware, not only do arrest statistics speak volumes about the social
reality o f racial profiling as a systemic form o f racism (Friendly, 2002; Podur, 2002) but
so does personal testimony (Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2003). Even for those
who find The S ta r’s research methodology to be unscientific and inconclusive, the
practice o f racial profiling by the TPS is still a plausible assumption to say the least
(Melchers, 2003).
Racial profiling exists, and I intend to move beyond this claim to shift focus from
the overt racist actions o f individuals within the institution (a few bad apples as they are
often referred to) and concentrate on exploring the more subtle nuances o f racisms that
are produced and produce such individuals within the institution itself. In so doing, it has
become evident that institutional forms o f racisms - as seemingly invisible products o f a
deep seated socialization that is internalized in the everyday policies, practices, and
silence - directly and/ or indirectly contribute to more visible overt acts o f discrimination
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and inequality (Wise, 1999). This is evidenced by the ways in which The S ta r’s own
subtle racism is overlooked in their accusations that the TPS is an overtly racist
organization. This is further compounded in the TPS reaction to The S ta r’s accusations
that systemic racism exists within their organization.
Although an organization like the TPS denies systemic racism based on the flawed
logic that their policies prevent such acts, the fact that these policies perpetuate the myth
that distinct ‘races’ exist in our multicultural society eludes critical scrutiny. As
discussed earlier, if ‘race’ is an attribute o f racism (Darder & Torres, 2004), then the very
policies erected by the TPS to protect citizens from racial profiling are essentially racist
and therefore institutionalized. Furthermore, these policies are used to identify racism as
individual acts carried out through isolated occurrences and do not examine the systemic
qualities of racism overall. Due to the narrow reasoning and understanding o f racisms
within TPS policy, it becomes almost impossible for the TPS to see that they are a racist
institution because the logic o f their internal policies negates the possibility that such a
form o f systemic discrimination can even exist. It can be said, therefore, that sometimes
the policies which are created to protect against racial discrimination end up perpetuating
the existence o f separate ‘races’ as natural. Discussed in an earlier chapter o f this thesis,
a clear example o f this is seen through the notion o f ‘official multiculturalism’ in Canada.
As a result, ‘race’ becomes reified, narrowing the possibilities o f racisms to individual
and organizational practices while ignoring the subtleties intrinsic to its systemic form as
a way of life. In this instance, institutional racisms not only becomes perceived as
impossible for the TPS but also becomes overlooked in The S ta r’s coverage o f the TPS
discriminatory practices.
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Like the TPS, The S ta r’s coverage o f racial profiling reifies ‘race’ as a natural
factor, without giving attention to the process o f racialization that normalizes a dominant
discourse about ‘race’. A clear example o f this can be seen in the previous section of this
chapter. Indeed, racisms are more than just practiced. They are lived through myth and
discourse. As can be seen in the selected headlines and articles that follow, The S ta r’s
coverage merely targets the actions o f individuals within the institution without fully
analysing the racist structures o f the institution itself that produces these individuals and
their respective actions. As a result its coverage alludes to systemic racisms without
critically engaging in the debate about systemic racism and what it means to society as a
whole.
In a March 18th 2003 article titled “Singled out”, The S ta r’s investigative team
reports that: “The Toronto crime data also shows a disproportionate number o f black
motorists are ticketed for violations that only surface following a stop. This difference ...
suggests police use racial profiling in deciding whom to pull over” (p. A l). This
information alludes to systemic racism as the organized actions o f members within an
institution that single out citizens based on notions o f ‘race’. This, however, merely
addresses the practice o f racism without challenging the broader social lifestyle that
enables the practice. The practice o f racial profiling is only one aspect o f systemic
racism. It does not address all the issues necessary to eradicate racism from society. As a
result, The Star only addresses the fact that certain citizens are targeted for criminal
activity based on perceived racial differences. It does not address the depth and scope of
racism as a way o f life within society. In the process, systemic racism is made to look as
a though it is a simple matter o f police abuses o f power. The S ta r’s coverage does little
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beyond this report to expose the underlying social structures, engendering racist ways of
life, which impel racist actions - individual or collective.
Although The Star appears to acknowledge that racisms exists beyond the
individual acts practiced by ‘a few bad apples’ within an organization, it still does not
present a clear depiction o f the depth and scope o f systemic racisms as a way of life. As
depicted in the example above, The S ta r’s understandings o f systemic racisms are merely
conflated from the actions of individuals to the practices o f an entire organization that can
be as one ‘bad apple’ organization. By focusing on the racist practices o f the TPS, The
Star’s narrow view o f systemic racism excludes its own practices from critical scrutiny.
Indeed, its accusations o f the overtly racist practices o f the TPS serves to mask the more
subtle racisms found in the discourse o f its own coverage.
Both The S ta r’s evasion o f its own racisms and the TPS denial o f racisms among
its ranks, exist as testaments to the pervasive quality o f institutional racisms that exists
within the myth o f a multicultural society that is rooted in colonialist ideologies. Being
so immersed and consumed within the ideologies o f the dominant myths about ‘race’
makes it hard to realize the ubiquitous systems o f oppression that serve to sustain the
dominant relations o f power through the process o f racialization. As a result racisms are
not always a conscious practice and it is not always recognized due to its subtleties within
a normalized discourse about ‘race’.
As evidenced by the way myths work through normalized discourse, acts of
racism are not necessarily predicated on conscious intent. Entire organizations and
institutions can practice and live racisms without being consciously aware. As long as the
possibility o f a subconscious collective agency continues to be negated, systemic
‘racisms’ will not only remain difficult to prove but also impossible to eradicate. In the
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case o f the TPS response to allegations o f racial profiling, denial has been the preferred
way o f dealing with social anomie. The TPS has denied allegations o f racial profiling to
the extent that the Toronto Police Association tried to sue The Star for libel.
In a June 25th 2003 article, The S ta r’s legal affairs reporter, Tracey Tyler, reported
that an Ontario Superior Court judge had dismissed “a $2.7 billion class action libel
lawsuit brought against the Toronto Star”. The Toronto Police Association had filed the
lawsuit claiming that The S ta r’s series on ‘Race and Crime’ implied that all members of
the TPS were “racists” thus tarnishing the reputation o f every officer on the force. The
lawsuit was dismissed on the grounds that it there was no “reasonable cause o f action” (p.
A l). While the TPS took legal action to deny their practices o f overt racisms, The S ta r’s
more subtle racisms can be found throughout its coverage on the issues.
The S ta r’s subtle forms o f racism can be found in its incomplete expose of
institutional racisms. By focusing on overt racist actions practiced by the TPS, The Star
essentially avoids the more subtle racisms innate to the way that they report on such acts.
As a result, I will not engage in the debate about whether racial profiling exists, but I will,
however, examine the power dynamic intrinsic to these debates through myth generated
about common notions o f ‘race’. In so doing, the focus o f this analysis turns to the more
subtle and systemic racisms practiced by the Toronto Star.
As mentioned above, The Star is not exempt from the grasp o f institutionally
racist practices. This becomes apparent from a closer examination o f the ways in which
‘race’ is coded in the language o f its texts. For the purpose o f textual analysis, I am more
concerned with the type o f socio-political assumptions imbedded in the language of a
commonsense racial discourse. More specifically, I am interested in the ways that myths
about ‘race’ are perpetuated within our commonly held assumptions about it. By
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examining the ways in which The Star perpetuates a common discourse about ‘race’, the
depth of racisms through myth becomes particularly revealing. As a result, close
attention is paid to the ways that myth incorporates the Toronto S ta r’s seemingly radical
coverage of racial profiling within the dominant ideological framework about ‘race’.
These myths that fuel common perceptions about ‘race’, as seen through the Toronto
S tar’s coding o f racial difference, present a unique and perhaps startling perspective that
delves deeper into the roots o f racisms as a systemic problem, couched in a racist colonial
discourse and appropriated within the ‘liberal’ ideologies o f difference as it is
institutionalized and tolerated within a Canadian ‘multicultural’ environment.

COLOUR-CODED - Visualizing ‘Race’ and the Perpetuation of Myth
In the Toronto S ta r’s series on ‘Race and Crime’, ‘race’ is represented through
skin colour and crime becomes racialized only when people o f colour are involved in the
discussion20. In this case, the language o f ‘race’ used to expose and resist the dominant
ideology of oppression, unwittingly shares a common myth about ‘race’ as practiced
through a common racial discourse signified through colour. These representations of
‘race’ reinforce a dominant myth about ‘race’ by utilizing a mythic language about ‘race’.
Invoking some o f the aspects o f ideology discussed early on in this thesis, Fiske
(1990) articulates the concept of incorporation. According to Fiske (1990), incorporation

2 0 For more on how crime is racialized, see the Znet articles written by Tim W ise. In these articles Wise
lists many acts o f deviance com m only committed by people perceived as ‘w h ite’. For the m ost part, when
regarding the crimes committed almost exclusively by ‘w hites’, ‘race’ does not appear to be a factor nor
does it appear to be a cause for concern. For example, ‘race scientists’ like Philippe Rushton and neo
conservatives like D inesh D ’Souza, do not race to prove a genetic or cultural deficiency that can be
generalized to the entire group o f people perceived as ‘w hite’. For crimes committed by people perceived
to be grouped by colour, however, ‘race’ becom es treated as a causal factor for deviance. This shows that a
colour-blind discourse links ‘w hiteness’ with individuality whereas ‘colour’ or ‘blackness’ designates group
generalities. D iscussed throughout this thesis, racist perspectives that attempt to draw connections between
‘race’ and crime are reflective o f our deeper social consciousness. A colour-blind discourse is also evident
in the notion o f ‘official multiculturalism’ in Canada as illustrated through the ‘m osaic’ metaphor.
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accounts for the ways in which “the dominant classes take elements o f resistance from the
subordinate and use them to maintain the status quo, rather than to challenge it” (p. 181).
This demonstrates how aspects o f The S ta r’s coverage on racial profiling can be
hegemonic while at the same time maintaining the appearance o f being counterhegemonic. This can occur when the avenues o f resistance contradict a dominant
framework through a common discourse. When this happens, elements o f resistance can
become susceptible to incorporation within the dominant framework, thus robbing the
text o f a radical voice. In this case, The S ta r’s attempt at resistance is incorporated within
the dominant framework about ‘race’ through practising a shared discourse that is
supported through the common language o f colour-coding. As a result, resistance and
dominance become equally intelligible through the utilization o f the same language about
‘race’. This epitomizes the process o f hegemony at its best.
Through the process o f hegemony, elements o f resistance that are historically and
culturally produced in social relations o f power are susceptible to inoculation into the
culture of the majority by the dominant minority. Discussed in a previous chapter of this
thesis, inoculation is one o f Barthes’ (1984) rhetorical forms o f myth. As a result, the
subordinate surrenders to the will o f the dominant by consent and further perpetuates
dominant meanings as they become produced in social relations o f power. Moreover,
resistant forces are positioned, a priori, by virtue o f the shared meanings produced by the
dominant in these social relations o f power, to articulate and perpetuate their own means
of subordination and oppression. Focusing on the language within a text, as well as its
social implications, colour-coding calls on the readers to adopt and accept dominant
positions that lead us to believe there are fixed and clearly delineable racial differences
among us.
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Throughout The S ta r’s coverage on racial profiling, ‘race’ is never directly
defined. It is alluded to through skin colour classification, as a part o f the dominant myth;
it is assumed as obvious that ‘race’ is based primarily on physical appearance. Despite its
racist implications rooted in a racist science (as discussed in a previous chapter of this
thesis regarding Philippe Rushton), skin colour, therefore, becomes the prominent
signifier o f ‘race’. In order to clarify this relationship, let us examine the process and
orders o f signification as they relate to the mythic sign ‘black’.
‘Black’ as a sign, constructed within a process o f signification, is robbed o f its
historical and political context once myth takes hold o f it. As myth colonizes the sign
‘black’, it emerges fully developed as a statement o f fact and appears to have meaning all
by itself. Seeing that the sign has been colonized by myth, its significance is made appear
eternal. ‘Black’ as a sign related to the concept o f ‘race’, for instance, appears as though
it has always been a natural designation o f difference along the lines ‘blackness’ which is
culturally related to skin colour. This however, is a distortion o f history. Examples o f
this can be seen in a previous chapter o f this thesis that outlines shifting histories of
‘race’. Indeed, this history has been obscured and the sign ‘black’, when used in common
discourse, has been emptied o f any political significance. Myth makes ‘black’ look
natural, by ignoring its cultural significance.
Umberto Eco (1996) speaks about how cultures condition the colours we see. The
interpretation o f colour is a cultural matter. According to Eco (1996), the “content o f a
signification system depends on our cultural organization o f the world into categories” (p.
155). Notions o f ‘black’ and ‘white’ are cultural categories used to designate difference
within a sea of relational differences. When colour is used as a designation o f ‘race’, it
becomes one o f many signifiers that float within this sea o f relational differences. For
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instance, the name ‘black’ - as a signifier - has no exact colour content. It is a label that
is arbitrary and empty. It becomes fixed by the meanings attributed to it through a
network o f relational differences that provoke a mental concept about it. For example,
the signifier ‘black’ provokes a concept o f ‘blackness’ that it signifies. It gains
significance once it becomes inserted into culture where meanings surrounding the sign
‘black’ is opened up to a second-order o f signification. Indeed, colour must be viewed
within the context o f the interacting semiotic system through which it bears significance.
Colours are semiotic devices that are communicated through the process of
signification. As a result colours are not physical pigments in and o f themselves but
expressions correlated to culturally appropriated units. This is how they become strongly
categorized. The Star uses colour as already categorized and meaningful in and of itself
without acknowledging that it represents notions o f ‘race’ that are situated within a chain
o f related concepts. ‘Black’ as a sign of ‘race’ is written and spoken in ways in which it
appears to be a fixed and naturalized category robbed o f political, social, and cultural
significance. It appears to have meaning all on its own without any cultural context. This
is how ‘black’ is used within The S ta r’s coding o f racial difference. This occurs when
myth captures and eternalizes the object signified, through the orders o f signification.
The mental concept created within the first-order o f signification is conjoined with
other mental concepts invoked from the second-order o f signification. These concepts are
then combined, constituting ‘a chain o f related concepts’. Myth colonizes the sign
‘black’ by eternalizing and naturalizing a notion o f ‘blackness’. Once colonized, ‘black’
triggers a chain o f related concepts can be seen through the ways in which myth conjures
notions o f ‘blackness’ as a ‘race’ o f people who have ‘dark skin’ and are ‘culturally
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different’ from ‘w hite’. It is important to mention, however, Barthes’ (1972, 1984)
notion that myth does not falsify the truth but distorts it.
If we take ‘black’ as a signifier that designates ‘blackness’ to a ‘race’ o f people,
this is not an outright false claim in the way in which difference among groups of people
are categorized and ordered in the world. It does however distort the ways in which this
method of categorization can be interpreted as a natural fact. For example, there are no
‘black’ races with respect to the significance o f ‘blackness’ bearing any physical
correlation to a shade on a colour spectrum. There are however, groups o f people who
are racialized as ‘black’ and therefore personify a notion o f ‘blackness’. Even at this
level, myth still tries to accomplish a natural and absolute resolution to this assertion by
letting ‘black’ stand on its own. As discussed in detail throughout the thesis, what
constitutes ‘race’ is a highly contested terrain o f shifting significance. Despite this
notion, the use o f the sign ‘black’ to refer to a ‘race’ of people is still quite common,
especially in The Star.
The use o f skin colour, to group differences among a population, is deeply rooted
within a myth about ‘race’ that has been widely proliferated throughout the everyday
aspects o f society. Grouping one another according to skin colour has become a
trademark signifier o f our socialization within racist frameworks. Throughout the articles
published in the Toronto S ta r’s series on ‘Race and Crime’ the text reveals that: the
police use skin colour to identify assailants as seen in arrest records databases (CIPS);
The Star uses skin colour to refer to groups, or communities o f citizens, victimized by
TPS practices, and; individual citizens and community groups use the same skin colour
descriptors to identify themselves in relation to others.
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Skin colour is disguised through myth and is presented as pre-ideological social
knowledge. This becomes clear through a micro analysis o f the semantic features of
excerpts taken from specific Toronto Star articles on ‘race’ and crime. The tools from
Huckin’s (n.d.) CDA methodology, combining both sentence level and word/ phrase
levels o f analysis, can be used to conduct Van Dijk’s (1998) micro reading of the text. I
have taken the liberty o f highlighting the key words and phrases in bold text to better
illustrate my point.

1) Police target black drivers. Star Analysis o f traffic data suggests racial profiling. October 20th 2002.

Black drivers confronted by the flashing lights o f a police cruiser often worry if
they’re being pulled over for the colour o f their skin ... Police traffic offence
data, obtained and analysed by The Star, shows a disproportionate number of
blacks ticketed for violations that routinely surface only after a stop has been
made ... Toronto’s police services board has ordered its officers not to analyse raw
race-based crime data, arguing racists might use the resulting statistics to
stigmatize ethnic communities. Police follow that rule, and don’t record race
statistics for the purpose o f ethnic analysis. They do, however, list skin colour in
most arrest reports when describing a person charged. Its routine in arrests for
major crimes, while a record o f skin colour occurs less often for simple traffic
offences ... An analysis of more than 7,500 out-of-sight violations found that skin
colour was listed in about two-thirds of cases where drivers were ticketed with
only this type o f offence. And black drivers were carrying a heavy load of
charges. Almost 34 percent o f all drivers charged with out-of-sight violations
were black, in the group where race was listed. Yet, according t the last census
figures, Toronto’s black community represents just 8.1 percent o f the city’s
population. By contrast, 62.7 percent of Toronto’s population is white, but whites
account for 52.1 percent of the motorists charged with out-of-sight traffic offences
... More than a dozen young black Torontonians shared their experiences with
Star reporters. (October 20th 2002)

2) Racial bias ‘a reality’: Eves. Premier backs talks on treatment o f blacks by police.
- October 23rd 2002
The investigation showed blacks charged with simple drug possession received
harsher treatment than whites facing the same charge, and that the
disproportionate number o f blacks were ticketed for offences that would come to
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light only after a traffic stop was made - a pattern consistent with racial profiling.
(October 23rd 2002)

3) Black leaders want a say. Not consulted on Dubin move, they charge. - October
26th 2002
Black community leaders say they should have been consulted before the
Toronto police C hief Julian Fantino announced a review o f the force’s race
relations practices that was prompted The Star’s stories on racial profiling ...
The move follows Star stories that analyzed a police database recording more than
480,000 incidents. It concluded that blacks charged with simple drug possession
received harsher treatment than whites facing the same charge and that a
disproportionate number of blacks were ticketed for offences that would come to
light only after a traffic stop was made - a pattern consistent with racial
profiling. (October 26th 2002)

4) Black arrest rates highest. - October 30th2002.
A Star investigation, conducted by analyzing police arrest records, showed that in
certain cases where police have discretion to use personal judgement, blacks
receive harsher treatment than whites. Last weekend’s stories prompted by a
flood o f letters and phone calls from black readers who say they have been
subjected to racial bias by police ... The same analysis o f a police database also
reveals that a disproportionate number o f blacks were charged with violent
crimes ... The data show that accused black people represent nearly 27 percent
o f the all violent charges; this, although the latest census figures show that only
8.1 percent o f the population lists their skin colour as black ... The Toronto
police database contains information on 800,000 criminal and other charges that
were laid between 1996 and early 2002 and was obtained under a Freedom of
Information request. It lists skin colour in nearly 95 percent o f violent cases.
The data show that people with white skin, who in the 1996 census says make up
62.7 percent o f the population, were underrepresented - accounting for 52.2
percent o f the violent charges. People classified as having “brown” skin
accounted for 15.9 percent o f the charges, while those in the “other” category
were charged with 5 percent of violent offences. In most cases “brown” is used
to refer to people o f South Asian descent while “other” mainly represents people
o f Chinese and other Far Eastern origin. (October 30th 2002)

5) Singled out. Star analysis of police crime data shows justice is different for
blacks and whites. - March 18th 2003.
Blacks arrested by Toronto police are treated more harshly than whites, a Toronto
Star analysis o f crime data shows. Black people, charged with simple drug
possession, are taken to police stations more often than whites facing the same
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charge. Once at the station, accused blacks are held overnight, for a bail hearing,
at twice the rate o f whites. The Toronto crime data also shows a disproportionate
number o f black motorists are ticketed for violations that only surface following
a traffic stop. This difference, say civil libertarians, community leaders and
criminologists, suggests police use racial profiling in deciding whom to pull over
... The finding provide hard evidence o f what blacks have long suspected - race
matters in Canadian society especially when dealing with police ... But
Toronto’s black community has long worried about being singled out by police
- especially its young black men ... To measure differences in treatment of blacks
and whites, The Star focused on Toronto’s more than 10,000 arrests for simple
drug possession over the six year period. Most people arrested on this charge 63.8 percent - were classified by police as being white. About a quarter - 23.6
percent - were described as black. Remaining skin colour classifications in the
database are “brown” and “other.” In most cases “brown” is used to refer to
people o f South Asian descent while “other” mainly represents people of
Chinese and other Far Eastern origin. Together, these racial categories
accounted for barely 12 percent o f simple drug possession charges, and analysis
showed that “browns” were released in much the same way as whites, while
“others” were treated more like blacks ... And six years o f internal police records
show their decision to has often fallen harder on blacks than on whites ... The Star
analysis o f the police traffic data shows a disproportionate number of blacks
charged compared to whites. (March 18th 2003)

If we recall some o f the tools outlined from CDA, foregrounding is a technique
that can highlight an object, bringing it to the reader’s attention. The articles above
illustrate methods o f foregrounding on two levels. Foregrounding can set the tone of the
entire article through visual aids and can also set the tone o f a single sentence through
topicalization. When analyzing these headlines through topicalization - a form of
foregrounding at the sentence level (Huckin, n.d.) - it is no accident that ‘race’ identifies
the topic or subject o f the sentence and ultimately sets the tone for the entire article. In
this case, skin colour as a signifier o f ‘race’ is presupposed or insinuated to be a natural
factor that is taken-for-granted as connoting cultural difference. These headlines reflect
the tenor of stories that report on abuses of ‘state’ power within a society perceived as
naturally segregated. These abuses of ‘state’ power are reported as the actions carried out
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by individuals within a purportedly racist organization. This method o f foregrounding is
further compounded in the style and size o f font used as a visual aid.
According to Richard Ericson et al. (1987), “visualization - making something
visible to the mind even if it is not visible to the eye - is the essence o f journalism.” (p.4).
Visual aid as a method o f foregrounding can be used in at least two ways. It can be used
implicitly, through the font size and style o f headlines, to capture the reader’s attention. It
can also be used explicitly, through the use o f photographs, charts, diagrams and graphs
to affect a more direct result.
The use of graphs as a visual aid can be found in both the first and fifth articles.
These graphs are tools o f foregrounding used by editorial staffs that help the reader to
visualize the point that The Star is trying to make. In both o f these articles, the graphs
illustrate the disparity between ‘black’ and ‘white’ citizens as they are represented in the
sample of arrest statistics analyzed. These statistics are communicated in a formal
register that is discursively framed under the guise o f objective scientific authority. When
communicated in a formal register, supported by the frame o f a positivistic discourse, the
data collected can be interpreted and qualified as indisputable fact. It can be further
assumed from these graphs that society can be unquestionably categorized in terms of
racial difference as naturally observed phenomena. Complementing the use o f graphs is
the use headlines that attempt to reinforce the assumption that racial difference is absolute
and natural.
Headlines o f the news articles are always placed in a larger bold font to grab the
reader’s attention. This is seen in all five examples o f The S ta r’s coverage on ‘race’ and
crime used above. The large bold fonts o f headlines are usually the first thing that the
reader sees when scanning the newspaper for stories. Indeed, ‘race’ as a natural factor is
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given priority and is taken-for-granted as a natural fact. This grabs the reader’s attention
from the outset by not only appealing visually to their senses, but by appealing to them
textually in the shared meanings o f a normalized discourse about ‘race’. By just reading
the descriptors o f skin colour in the headlines, ‘race’, as a natural way o f designating
group difference is insinuated. Although The Star intentionally grabs the reader’s
attention through headlines that call attention to racist practices, its own racism is masked
through what they choose to omit within the text o f the articles selected.
Omitted from the headlines are the ways in which the TPS contribute to the
racialization o f difference through their practices o f racial profiling. In the process of
omitting these details, The Star further perpetuates the racialization o f difference by
foregrounding categories o f ‘race’ as a natural group distinction. Because of this
omission, all that the reader is called upon to take from the articles are that ‘blacks’ are
victimized by the police because they are naturally different in skin complexion and
culturally different in world view. It is important to recall that this difference is coded in
relation to an ideal concept o f what constitutes sameness. In this case - according to the
ideologies that constitute the ‘mosaic’ metaphor - sameness is equivalent to that which
would embody the notion of an ideal Canadian. This illustrates some o f the more subtle
ways in which racism is perpetuated through myth. As a result, The Star further spreads
this myth by contributing to the same process of racialization that the TPS is accused of
practising. Illustrated by the discourse o f these headlines, The Star subscribes to the same
myth that works to detach the meaning o f ‘race’ from its historical context while masking
the ideologies at work that produce its meaning.
Described at length in earlier chapters of this thesis, ‘race’, as defined through
skin colour, has an historical and ideological context that is masked behind a
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commonsense discourse. This discourse naturalizes power relations through the use of
everyday language. When analyzing the semantics o f the words and phrases used in the
sample o f Toronto Star articles selected, the language used to describe people as ‘blacks’,
‘whites’, ‘brow n’ or ‘other’ illustrates a discourse about ‘race’ coded within our
normalized mythic assumptions about the world we live in. The language of ‘race’ used
in these samples is a part of how the journalistic essence o f visualization (Ericson et al.,
1987) subtly socializes a mass audience to a dominant view on the reality o f racial
difference.
If you recall a central premise to this thesis, ‘race’ as a product o f racism (Darder
& Torres, 2004). The S ta r’s coding o f ‘race’ inverts this premise to read racism as a
product of ‘race’. As a result, ‘race’ as a natural fact is taken-for-granted as knowledge
and appears obvious, to a given society, through their everyday use o f language.
Moreover, The Star insinuates that racism must be dealt with by exposing the practices of
racial profiling that hinder meaningful social relations among the distinct ‘races’ that
exist. As illustrated through samples o f sentences taken from the five aforementioned
articles, The Star uncritically reproduces common racial categories when reporting the
practice of racial profiling by taking-for-granted that such categories are natural. This
occurs through the abundant use of a normalized language about ‘race’.
The language o f ‘race’, used in the Toronto S ta r’s series, illustrates how people
can be read as texts by virtue of their physical features. The body, as a text, is encoded
and decoded through a racialized language. It is interesting to note, however, that when it
is overtly represented, ‘race’ falls into either the category o f ‘black’ or ‘white’. No other
‘races’ exist within these samples, with the exception o f ‘brow n’ or ‘other’ in samples 3
and 5. According to these examples, “brown is used to refer to people o f South Asian
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descent while ‘other’ mainly represents people o f Chinese and other Far Eastern origins”.
The terms ‘brow n’ and ‘other’ do not necessarily represent a ‘race’ as much as they
represent nationality or geographical origin. This is seen where the terms like ‘brown’
and ‘other’ must be qualified or anchored by a secondary definition to clear up any
possibility for confusion. The fact that they are written in quotations connotes
arbitrariness to their label. ‘Black’ and ‘white’ on the other hand are part o f our
commonsense discursive vocabulary. They need not be encased in quotation marks.
Furthermore, secondary definitions o f ‘black’ and ‘white’ are deemed by The Star to be
unnecessary. As a result, ‘black’ and ‘white’ are not defined anywhere in the above
passages nor are they defined anywhere in the entire series.
Notions o f ‘black’ and ‘white’ are signifiers o f social status that bear the weight of
social, historical, and political significance. As cultural descriptors, skin colours are
meshed within a larger framework o f knowledge that constitutes dominant social myths.
These myths carry second-order signification that validate a social relation o f power.
A person is not just ‘black’ in complexion, but bears the burden o f representing a
larger community in everything they do. For example, when The Star refers to a
racialized community, they refer to ‘the black community’ - as though it exists as an
absolute homogeneous whole. Furthermore, when they refer to leaders o f these racialized
communities, they refer to them as ‘black leaders’ - as though there is only one type of
racialized leader to represent one type o f racialized community. On the contrary you do
not see discourses that refer to ‘white’ communities or ‘leaders o f white communities’.
The category o f ‘w hite’ constitutes individuals within a population as opposed to ‘black’
constituting a segregated community within a population. This subtle distinction can lead
to more overt generalizations o f ‘race’ being attributed to crime.
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When coupled with crime, ‘black’ can conjure images o f deviant characters like
Bigger Thomas - Richard W right’s Native Son (Wright, 1998). Such images bear the
weight o f an entire group o f people as programmed deep within the dominant psyche of a
racist society, multicultural or not. In this type o f society, ‘Black’ signifies a type of
person opposite and unequal to one who is ‘white’. Although there are many contested
narratives and meanings behind ‘black’ (Riggs, 1995), through myth, the sign ‘black
man’ is reduced to a homogenized, second-order signifier for the behaviour and
capabilities o f most men who are perceived as ‘black’. This is precisely what Frantz
Fanon (1967) refers to as being trapped in his body. Although The S ta r’s coverage o f the
issues appears to side with the victims o f profiling, nowhere in its coverage is ‘race’
discredited as a natural or causal factor.
By perpetuating the myth that entire populations can be grouped by skin colour as a
signifier o f ‘race’, The Star inadvertently leaves behavioural assumptions linked to ‘race’
open for debate. The easiest way to avoid this debate would have been to address the
notion o f ‘race’ as a social construct that is produced through racism in the process of
racialization. Nowhere in over 100 articles on the issue, is the notion o f ‘race’ or the use
of racial categories critically discussed as a factor o f systemic racism. By not critically
questioning the validity o f racial categorizations as definitive group signifiers, The Star
perpetuates the myth that ‘race’ is a fixed cultural category. As ideologically charged
signifiers, myths about ‘race’ are constructed in and through language. Indeed, there is
nothing fixed or natural about ‘race’ therefore it cannot be considered a cultural, much
less, biological reality

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

139

X.

MOVING BEYOND ‘RACE’

CONCLUSION - Putting to rest the ‘Strange Fruits’ of our Past in the Present
Thus one o f the greatest jokes in the world is the spectacle o f whites busy
escaping blackness and becoming darker everyday, and the blacks striving
towards whiteness, becoming quite dull and grey.
(Ellison, 1947, p. 577)
Despite my findings and the fact that most progressive social scientists refrain
from employing the construct o f ‘race’ as a determinant o f specific social phenomena
(McLaren & Torres, 1999; San Juan Jr., 2002), discussions o f ‘race’ - as a fixed
analytical and descriptive category - continue to dominate popular and media discourses.
Despite the fact that notions o f ‘race’ have no basis in science, The S ta r’s coverage of
Philippe Rushton and racial profiling, abound with rigid conceptions o f ‘race’. Contrary
to this coverage, The S ta r’s reporting on the genetic discoveries that disprove such rigid
classification o f ‘race’ has been scarce. Such rigid characterizations are also prevalent in
the ‘official’ narratives o f Canadian multiculturalism that attempt to define and categorize
citizens into clearly delineable groupings under the rubric o f ‘difference’. This notion of
‘difference’, couched in the broader ‘liberal’ discourse o f tolerance and diversity,
however, continues to reinscribe ‘race’ as a fixed cultural category. Moreover, such
formulations tend to contain the vestiges o f colonialist legacies (Bannerji, 2000).
In short, popular myths about ‘race’, as they have become institutionalized and
canonized in ‘official’ notions of multiculturalism and perpetuated through consciousness
producing industries like the mass media, continue to obscure existing power relations
and power structures (San Juan, Jr., 2002; Meyerson, 2000). This engenders an
environment that implicitly privileges certain communities at the expense o f others
through lived racialized beliefs and practices such as those seen through the policies of
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‘official multiculturalism’ and practices of racial profiling. These beliefs and practices,
however, are premised on a flawed notion o f ‘race’.
As discussed throughout this thesis, ‘race’ is a product o f myth: an ideologicallyloaded, discursive construct, manifest through language and produced in social relations
of power. Seeing that ‘races’ come from racism (Darder & Torres, 2004), the myths that
produce ‘race’ in social relations o f power, constitute a conception o f racism as a way of
life. Indeed, racism as a way o f life implies a process o f socialization that normalizes our
everyday thoughts and actions about fixing differences.
The process o f socialization that institutionalizes categories o f racial difference sometimes referred to as racialization - is seldom analyzed in a critical fashion. Instead,
racism is often talked about as an important social problem experienced through the
isolated actions o f individuals and organizations. When narrowly conceptualized this
way, racisms are often examined through trivial fixations on reified notions o f ‘race’. As
a result, racism as a problematic way o f living has yet to be remedied. This is based on
the homogenization and trivialization of the premise that we construct about it.
Moving forward, if racism is something that we truly want to rid society of; we
need to attune our focus not on ‘race’ but on the processes o f socialization (racialization)
that impel its effects. As a collective society, we need to come together not as divergent
individuals, preserved in a static sea of difference, but as conversation partners
(Benhabib, 2002) united to solve a common crisis. We need to find ways in which to
communicate more effectively towards a counter-socialization that can destroy ‘racisms’
at its root. Although there are currently no standardized formulae for dismantling
‘racisms’, solutions to social problems are dialectical and can only occur through
participatory democratic intervention that recognize the hybridity o f cultural identities.
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This cannot currently be achieved through policies o f ‘official multiculturalism’ nor can it
be achieved through the constant barrage o f media texts that reinforce imagined
differences.
‘Official multiculturalism’, premised on the preservation o f cultural wholes,
presents more harm than good by managing difference as a social problem. As a result,
the fixing o f cultural differences and the reification o f ‘race’ has led some scholars to
revaluate and abandon the concept o f multiculturalism in favour o f polyculturalism.
Instead of ‘tolerating’ or managing fixed racial or cultural differences, polyculturalism
recognizes the plurality and fluidity o f cultures. Cultures in this sense are seen as living,
hybrid entities in the constitution o f identity as a work in progress (Albert & Podur, 2003;
Kelley, 2003). The media, however, continue to portray cultural differences contrary to a
more fluid notion o f culture.
Throughout the selected Toronto Star articles analyzed, ‘race’ has been coded as a
fixed, cultural and biological entity. This is seen through its coverage o f the Philippe
Rushton as well as its expose' on racial profiling as practiced by the police force.
Curiously enough, however, the one subject o f news that was grossly underrepresented
was The Star's scarce coverage o f developments in genetic research that disprove
common notions about ‘race’. It is interesting to note that The S ta r’s coverage on the
genetic evidence occurred between its coverage on Rushton and its coverage on racial
profiling. The fact that The Star continued to report on ‘race’ the same ways after its
publication o f the genome evidence as it had before its publication, is rather telling about
the selective nature o f its institutional memory.
Even years after its original series on ‘Race and Crime’, issues o f racial profiling
have resurfaced. This time reports come from the city o f Kingston Ontario instead of
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Toronto, where the Kinston Police Service has provided their own study that admits to the
practice o f racial profiling. A May 28th 2005 article published in the Toronto Star echoes
the same reporting tactics as seen in its original series on ‘Race and Crime’ that occurred
three years ago. As seen in this most recent article, The Star continues to code ‘race’
uncritically, as a rigid statement of fact. This indicates that little has progress has
occurred in the ways in which we categorize each other. We still continue to live the
myths o f social difference through rigid categories o f ‘race’. As a result, further study
should be dedicated towards theorizing alternative models to the ways in which we live
the myths o f social differences through notions o f ‘race’.
As a collective problem, in which all citizens have a stake, individual solutions are
often inadequate and will not occur overnight. Seeing that this problem requires
collective solutions, which push for a counter-socialization stemming from a critical
consciousness, change will involve a process on the level of evolutionary proportions to
re-naturalize a new world view. As daunting as this task may seem, the battle can only be
won in small victories. These victories are evidenced in the various struggles and
accomplishments for civil rights that have led to models o f critical race theories,
feminism, anti-corporate globalization movements and the like. The struggle towards
social justice, however, did not begin and end with these models and theories. What are
required now, in the changing face o f newer ‘racisms’, are models and theories that can
directly address the constantly evolving issues that the new ‘racism s’ create. Such
models should stress the fact that ‘racisms’ cannot be dismantled through ‘race’ but
should guide policies that addresses the roots o f the problem through close attention to
racialization.
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To invoke the horticultural metaphor once more, ‘races’ are the ‘strange fruits’
that the trees o f racisms produce. Like weeds, these trees continue to grow through
‘biopower’ (Foucault, 2003), choking off the life of other vegetation guided by
acceptance, equality, and justice in the process. One cannot solve this problem by solely
concentrating on plucking the fruit. One must essentially uproot the entire tree. In order
to do so, one must learn to visualize the scope o f the problem at the root and not by the
fruits that the problem produces.
Visualization, structured in the process of socialization through myth, requires a
counter-process o f critical consciousness to affect these desired changes. As a dominant
industry of visualization, the mass media are avenues where a counter-socialization
movement must begin. Unfortunately at present, however, the media still view ‘race’ as
distinguishable, via naturally distinct cultural and bio-genetic traits. The ways in which
they continue to effect a visualization o f this conception, contributes to the production of
our dominant social perception that becomes normalized through myth. The mass media,
therefore, as a site for the production, reproduction, and transformation o f ideologically
loaded myths, harbour our dominant perceptions of ‘race’. This is particularly evident in
The S ta r’s practice o f racial profiling in its reporting o f Philippe Rushton and its coverage
of racial profiling that the Toronto Police Service carries out.
Through The S ta r’s accusations that racial profiling exists, the issues o f racism
become compounded. This occurs primarily because The S ta r’s series on ‘Race and
Crime’ misses the opportunity, in their coverage o f racial profiling, to explore the roots of
racism’s social mechanisms by the ways in which it participates in a dominant discourse
about ‘race’. Although the Toronto Star was in the vanguard in its coverage o f ‘race’ and
crime, in the way that its investigation into racial profiling practiced by TPS exhibited a
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critical step towards exposing the pervasiveness o f systemic racism, it merely scratched
the surface o f social issues deeply rooted in the historical context o f power relations.
Functioning within the dominant myths about the reality o f ‘race’ the Toronto Star
ultimately succeeds in preserving the existing racial categories as commonsense
delineations o f a Canadian multicultural imaginary. These notions o f ‘race’ - cultural and
‘scientific’ - legitimated and institutionalized through ‘official multiculturalism’ in
Canada contribute to a form o f apartheid that is ultimately restrictive to equality and
justice for all citizens within Canada’s borders. This further illustrates the ways in which
vestiges of a colonialist legacy have found a home in the broader ‘liberal’ notion of
tolerable difference.
Inscribed within the rhetoric o f ‘official multiculturalism’ in Canada, the ‘strange
fruit’ o f this legacy survives in the Toronto S ta r’s representation o f ‘race’. Rooted in
racist colonial ideologies, the ‘strange fruit’ o f these representations are manifest in the
myths o f our seemingly fixed and divided existence. As a result, the media have a large
role in determining and reinforcing how groups are distinguished in difference to one
another by the myths that they propagate. By focusing less on the fruit o f ‘race’ and more
on its roots through the process o f racialization, the mass media have an important role to
play in communicating and teaching anti-racist discourses towards social justice.
It is important to note, however, that racisms are not restricted to the overt
phenomena o f individual actions, nor are they restricted to the ‘liberal’ ideologies that
inform a Canadian imaginary. Moving forward, a burgeoning field o f literature is
emerging in assessing the intimate relationships between modem forms o f racism and
contemporary trends towards globalization (Hardt & Negri, 2000; Marable, 2004; San
Juan Jr., 2002). Studying these phenomena on a critical level will present unique and
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original challenges that I believe to have merit in deconstructing barriers in the journey
towards a global social justice. Without tackling racism as a global issue, where everyone
has a stake in its resolution, it becomes all the more difficult to uproot its existence from a
more local Canadian perspective. I find it particularly fitting to end at this juncture with a
quote from the late Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. (Dorrel, 2002)

Injustice anywhere, is a threat to justice everywhere.
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Appendix

Census Highlights

Ontario Ministry of Finance. (2003) Census 2001 Highlights. Retrieved February 15,
2005 from http://www.gov.on.ca/FIN/english/demographics/cenhi6e.htm

Visible Minorities Making Canada Increasingly Diverse
■ Visible minorities are defined as persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are
non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour.
■ Almost 4 million Canadians identified themselves as a visible minority in the
2001 Census, accounting for 13.4% of the total population. This was an increase
from 1996 when the proportion was 11.2% and a major change from 1991 (9.4%)
and 1981 (4.7%).
■ At the provincial level, British Columbia had the highest proportion of visible
minorities, representing 21.6% o f its population, followed by Ontario at 19.1%.
■ People of Chinese origin are Canada’s largest visible minority group, with a
population of more than one million. In 2001, they made up 3.5% of the country’s
population, followed by South Asians (3%) and Blacks (2.2%).
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Ontario Home to 54% of Visible Minorities in Canada

■ There were 2.2 million visible minority individuals in Ontario in 2001, accounting
for 19.1% of the province’s population. They represented 54% of all visible
minorities in Canada.
■ Among visible minority groups, South Asians (554,870) accounted for 26% of
visible minorities, followed by Chinese (481,505) at 22%, and Blacks (411,095) at
19%.
■ In 1991, Blacks were the largest visible minority group (311,000 or 3.1 % of total
population), with Chinese second (290,400 or 2.9%), followed by South Asians
(285,600 or 2.9%).
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2 1 Please note that the webpage referenced in this appendix has been edited to fit the format o f this page,
keeping only the information pertinent to this thesis. For the full webpage, please refer to the website
referenced at the top o f this appendix.
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